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   The intent of this study is to provide evidence regarding the benefits of complying with 
International Accounting Standards (IASs).  Companies expend considerable resources 
on financial reporting.  These resources may or may not be recouped through benefits 
such as lower costs of capital.  Using three proxies for information asymmetry, which has 
been shown to impact a firm’s cost of capital, this study shows that the extent of 
compliance with IAS apparently does not impact these proxies.  The results of this study 
place in question the motives for a firm to incur additional financial reporting costs in an 
attempt to comply with IAS. 
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      Companies spend considerable resources on financial reporting.  These resources may 
or may not be recouped through cost savings (e.g., lower costs of capital).  Using three 
proxies for information asymmetry, a construct which theoretically influences a firm’s 
cost of capital, this study examines the value of providing financial information more 
directly tailored to the needs of capital market participants.  Specifically, this study uses 
firms from France, Sweden, and Switzerland that have moved away from domestic 
financial accounting standards and toward some level of compliance with International 
Accounting Standards (IAS)1.  This sample is examined to ascertain whether the extent of 
compliance with IAS can be associated with reduced information asymmetry, as 
measured by lower bid-ask spreads, lessened dispersion of financial analyst forecasts, and 
lower idiosyncratic (firm-specific) risk. 
      For firms in many countries, the adoption of IAS represents a significant change in 
the orientation of their financial reporting system.  Whereas IAS exemplify standards that 
focus on the decision-making needs of capital market participants—particularly investors 
and creditors—the domestic generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) of the 
companies switching to IAS are often heavily influenced by tax legislation and/or 
                                                 
1 These standards are promulgated by the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB hereafter), 
which was previously known as the International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC).  The 
IASB now refers to its standards as IFRS (International Financial Reporting Standards). 
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governmental macroeconomic policy considerations.  Consequently, the change to IAS 
ordinarily results in financial reports that contain greater transparency relative to 
domestic GAAP reports.  Financial reports prepared under IAS are more suited to the 
needs of capital market participants because these numbers and notes are generated using 
a set of accounting method choices that are more restrictive than are those under domestic 
GAAP (Ashbaugh and Pincus 2001).  Additionally, IASB’s conceptual framework is 
patterned after the written frameworks in Australia, Canada, and the United States—all of 
which refer to investors and creditors (rather than tax authorities or governmental 
agencies) as primary users of financial statements (Cairns, 2001). 
      There are several motives for studying companies domiciled in France, Sweden, and 
Switzerland.  First, many companies from these countries were claiming to have adopted 
IAS by the late 1990s.  On November 1, 1998, the IASC listed 460 total firms as 
complying with IAS and more than 27 percent of the total were French, Swedish, or 
Swiss firms (128 of 460).  Second, capital market information necessary to test the 
proposed hypotheses is more prevalent than it would be from a number of other countries 
where IAS adoption is more recent (e.g., Kuwait, Slovenia, Malta, Croatia).  Finally, the 
move from the domestic GAAP of these three countries to International Accounting 
Standards represents more than just a trivial change in reporting systems.  As a contrast, 
Canadian GAAP and IAS are so closely aligned that capital market effects of companies 
from Canada switching from domestic GAAP to IAS are likely minimal.   
     Financial statements prepared according to IAS are intended to provide transparent, 
comparable information to capital market participants and other external users making a 
variety of economic decisions (IASC 1989). The financial reporting of countries such as 
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France, Sweden, and Switzerland, conversely, has historically either paralleled tax 
accounting and/or has been designed to demonstrate conformance with a national 
economic plan (Gernon and Meek, 2001).  Dumontier and Raffournier (1998) report that, 
for example, Swiss accounting is characterized by “low disclosure requirements, few and 
permissive accounting standards, and a high degree of tolerance for income smoothing” 
(p. 217).  Ashbaugh and Pincus (2001) also provide empirical confirmation that the 
French, Swedish, and Swiss accounting measurement and disclosure requirements differ 
substantially from IAS during the period of this study. 
      Nobes (2000) is among a group of academics who have expressed the urgent need for 
a single global financial reporting mechanism.2  Nobes’s opinion is consistent with the 
view that the reduction of financial reporting diversity will allow investors to more easily 
compare firms.  Gernon and Meek (2001) present not only Nobes’s perspective, but also 
the contradictory view that the results from making business decisions—as reflected in 
financial statements—should not be disassociated with the accounting standards under 
which the original business decisions were made.  Mueller and Walker (1976) illustrate 
this “same context” view by asserting that managers make business decisions with at 
least some understanding as to how these decisions will eventually, based on a particular 
set of accounting principles, be reported in financial statements.  Mueller and Walker 
state, “When business decisions are made under these conditions, they ought to be 
reported only in terms of the same conditions” (p. 70).  
     Because this study’s sample firms are moving away from reporting in the context 
under which business decisions had traditionally been made, the results of this study 
                                                 
2 Jacob Kraayenhof may have first espoused this view in a plenary address to the 1959 AICPA annual 
meeting participants (San Francisco, CA.). 
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address the “comparability” versus “same context” argument summarized above.  This 
study also represents an initial investigation into whether firms that have moved toward 
compliance with what is currently the most popular worldwide financial reporting model 
have in fact obtained quantifiable benefits.  One could argue that if a relationship 
between greater compliance with IAS and lesser information asymmetry cannot be 
obtained for the sample firms in this study, it is unlikely that results would be obtained 
from other parts of the world with similar financial reporting environments.  Conversely, 
it is also possible one could find an even stronger relationship between compliance with 
accounting standards and information asymmetry in other countries where the monitoring 
of public firms is less developed (and thus financial reports play a relatively greater role 




      An inverse relationship between disclosure quality and cost of equity capital is 
provided by both economic theory and anecdotal evidence.  However, empirical work in 
this area suffers from a significant methodological drawback—cost of capital cannot be 
observed directly and information quality is subjectively measured.  Many authors have, 
nonetheless, effectively argued that certain variables represent good proxies for these 
constructs.   Information risk (a.k.a. information asymmetry), as one of the theorized 
components of cost of capital, is also not directly observable.  Although the extent of 
information risk that is associated with any single firm cannot be empirically measured, 
there are at least three useful surrogates that are used as indicators of the magnitude of 
firm-level information asymmetry: (1) the bid-ask spread relating to the trading of a 
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firm’s equity securities, (2) the dispersion in analysts’ forecasts of a firm’s earnings per 
share, and (3) the firm-specific idiosyncratic risk.  These measures are widely recognized 
in the accounting and finance literature as proxies for information asymmetry (e.g., Healy 
and Palepu, 2001; Callahan et al. 1997; Welker, 1995; Amihud and Mendelson, 1986, 
1989; Venkatesh and Chiang, 1986). 
      Though there are many investigations incorporating the use of these three information 
asymmetry proxies, there is little research exploring the implications of moving toward 
compliance with IAS.  Only Leuz (2003), Ashbaugh and Pincus (2001), and Ball et al. 
(2003) have empirically examined the benefits or implications of using IAS.3  However, 
these authors use either a substantially different sample set than is employed in this study 
and/or they apply a different methodology to assess the effects of adopting IAS. 
      There has also been a specific call for research into the benefits of adopting IAS.      
Mr. Gerrit H de Marez Oyens, Secretary General of the World Federation of Stock 
Exchanges (FIBV), encouraged research on this topic in a 1998 speech to the American 
Accounting Association members.4  He challenged academics to “quantify the savings of 
using IAS,” and to “show that IAS benefits investors by lowering costs of capital or 
lowering transaction fee costs.”  Mr. De Marez Oyens mentioned that research results of 
this nature would help remove much of the political haze that surrounds the debate 
regarding the worthiness of IAS as well as convincing firms that the burden of changing 
reporting systems is worthwhile.  Choi and Levich (1991) also suggest that an avenue for 
                                                 
3 Leuz and Verrecchia (2001) examine the benefits of using either IAS or U.S. GAAP versus German 
GAAP.  See Chapter 2 for a discussion of this and other papers referenced in this section. 
4 This speech was given as part of a panel discussion at the American Accounting Association’s 1998 
Annual Meeting in New Orleans, Louisiana. Mr. de Marez Oyens was primarily addressing the 
concerns of the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO)—and specifically the 
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)—regarding the worthiness of IAS. 
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research is investigating whether firms that provide additional accounting information 
actually derive incremental benefits, such as lower costs of capital and/or lower 
transaction costs.  Therefore, the purpose of this paper is to assess whether firms have 
derived benefits by choosing to comply to some extent with IAS.  The “benefits” are 
defined here as reductions in the information asymmetry between firm insiders and 
various capital market participants.  This study will provide evidence that addresses Mr. 
de Marez Oyens’s question regarding possible benefits associated with the use of 
International Accounting Standards. 
      As will be discussed in detail in later sections, measuring compliance with IAS is 
problematic.  Companies have frequently noted in annual reports that they are in full 
compliance with IAS, despite obvious exceptions to IAS guidelines.  The IASB has tried 
to mitigate this possibility by requiring companies to report any material departure from 
IAS and to not report that they are in compliance with IAS unless they in fact do fully 
comply (IAS #1).  However, most of the claimed adoptions noted in this and other studies 
occurred prior to this new IAS requirement becoming effective (for financial statements 
covering a period beginning on or after July 1, 1998), and auditors have not been helpful 
in the quest to discern whether a company is complying fully with IAS both before and 
after the implementation date of IAS #1 (Street and Gray, 2000a). 
      The problems with determining whether there has been an actual adoption of IAS and 
when it has occurred have been significant deterrents in assessing the benefits of IAS 
adoption.  The published literature only provides limited evidence of the quantitative 
benefits of IAS adoption.  There is some research—though the methodology and nature 
of the research question differs substantially from those in this study—contradicting the 
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notion that a firm benefits by adopting IAS.  For instance, Bhattacharya et al. (2003) 
suggest that the increased use of International Accounting Standards has done little to 
impact the quality of earnings as a measure of economic performance.  Specifically, they 




     Alford et al. (1993) suggest that differences in countries’ accounting standards can 
affect the informativeness of financial reporting for capital market participants.  While 
remembering Nobes’s (2000) and others’ pleas for a single global financial reporting 
model, the question as to what single set of accounting standards might best address the 
needs of capital market users remains unanswered.  Several authors have even suggested 
that standard setters compete in an environment where there is an incentive to find 
accounting rules that most directly meet the needs of individuals affected by those rules 
(Dye and Sunder, 2001; Schmidt, 2000).   
     International Accounting Standards have been a popular global accounting standard 
choice for some time.  The IASB website reported in November of 1998 that 831 
companies worldwide were referring to their use of IAS when preparing annual financial 
reports (IASC 1998b).  However, the IASC did not distinguish among the companies that 
only mentioned IAS in their reports, the companies that reported full compliance with 
IAS standards when in fact there are material deviations from IAS, and the companies 
that were actually in full compliance with the latest IAS guidelines. 
                                                 
5 Bhattacharya et al. (2003) use three measures (earnings aggressiveness, loss avoidance behavior, and 
earnings smoothing) to indicate how closely a firm’s earnings mimic its true, but unobservable, 
economic performance.  Earnings opacity, the opposite of earnings transparency, is thus an aggregate 
measure of the degree to which earnings lack informativeness. 
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      Until a short time ago, most academics in the international accounting community 
treated compliance with IAS as essentially a dichotomous variable—meaning that a firm 
in question was either fully complying with IAS or it was using some other GAAP.  
Companies alleging to be in full compliance were taken at face value.  Moreover, it was 
often “Big Five” auditing firms providing credibility to these companies by signing off 
on the usage of IAS in their annual reports.  However, Street, Gray and Bryant (1999), 
Cairns (1999a), and Street and Gray (2000a, 2000b), have all presented examples of 
significant non-compliance among companies purporting to use IAS. 
      The IASC must have recognized that there was a problem with noncompliance as 
early as 1998.  As mentioned previously, revised IAS #1, entitled “Presentation of 
Financial Statements,” became effective in July of 1998 and requires that:  
"An enterprise whose financial statements comply with International 
Accounting Standards should disclose that fact.  Financial statements should not 
be described as complying with International Accounting Standards unless they 
comply with all the requirements of each applicable Standard and each applicable 
Interpretation of the Standing Interpretations Committee” (IASC website). 
 
      However, Street and Gray (2000a) found that at least one firm (Valeo, France) 
mentions the use of IAS, but acknowledges violating IAS #1 because not all IASC 
standards are “applied in their entirety” (Valeo 1999 Annual Report).  In short, it appears 
Valeo is admitting to exceptions to IAS despite IAS #1 specifically requiring that only 
fully complying firms mention their use of IAS.  It is also disturbing that Valeo’s auditor, 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers, does not provide these exceptions in the audit report. 
      Indications that IAS compliance is truly not a dichotomous variable suggest that any 
examination of IAS usage should involve the degree of IAS compliance—possibly over 
several years.  Additionally, the study of the degree of compliance is less ambiguous if it 
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is carried out during a period when the underlying accounting standards are kept 
relatively constant.  With this in mind, this study looks at French, Swedish, and Swiss 
financial statements for the years 1996-1998.  The sample size is considerably larger 
during these years than it would be if an alternative time frame were used (many firms 
did not become IAS “adopters” until the mid-1990s).  Also, the period prior to 1996 was 
one of transition for the IASB and its standards.  In 1993, for instance, 10 revised IASs 
with 1995 implementation dates were issued (IASB website) whereas the 1996-1998 
period saw comparatively few IAS implemented. 
Purpose of the Study 
    
 
      The purpose of this study is to assess the degree to which movement toward an IAS-
compliant financial statement presentation affects three variables that serve as proxies for 
information asymmetry.  The possibility exists that varying the compliance with IAS will 
not be shown to impact all three variables in the hypothesized direction.  For instance, it 
is unclear how accounting policy changes—as the adoption of IAS implies—affect the 
ability of analysts to predict earnings accurately (e.g., Brown, 1983; Elliott and Philbrick, 
1990).  The movement toward fully complying with IAS could actually reduce analysts’ 
abilities to accurately forecast earnings.  If the adoption of IAS restricts the measurement 
choices managers have available to them relative to their previous set of choices (which 
IAS often does), the restricted set might require firms to report a more volatile earnings 
series.  The inability to smooth earnings may result in the analysts having more difficulty 
assessing the future earnings levels, in spite of a collection of financial reports that serves 
to increase the transparency of the firm.  Prior accounting and finance literature also 
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documents a multitude of other causes for change in the three information asymmetry 
proxies that are unrelated to the financial report.  While controlling for as many of these 
alternative sources as the data allows, it is still possible that the hypothesized 
relationships do not exist for this sample of firms.  The implications of various results are 
discussed in the “Significance of the Study” section in the next few pages. 
Evaluating ‘Adoption’ of International Accounting Standards 
 
 
      A number of published papers used a dichotomous assessment of compliance with 
IAS (Ashbaugh and Pincus, 2001; Murphy, 2000; Taylor and Jones, 1999; El-Gazzar, 
Finn and Jacob, 1999; Dumontier and Raffournier, 1998).  Companies were deemed to be 
either fully compliant adopters or non-IAS users.  These papers often employed an event-
study methodology and either claims made in annual reports or an IASB (IASC at the 
time) website list to confirm that a company had in fact adopted IAS.  In short, these 
authors relied on the assertions of biased parties to assess the period during which IAS 
may have first been used.6 
      In one of the early attempts to get at de facto compliance with IAS, Tower et al. 
(1999), using firms from six countries in the Asia-Pacific region, provide evidence as to 
the degree of compliance with IAS.  They find that among a number of variables studied, 
the home country of the reporting company most heavily influences the degree of 
compliance.  These authors also find that other variables such as firm size, leverage, 
profit level, and industry have very little if any explanatory power.  Others who have 
examined IAS compliance include Cairns (1999a, 1999b, 1999c), Street et al. (1999), 
                                                 
6 In fairness, several of these authors mentioned their suspicions regarding the true nature of the IAS 
‘adoptions.’ 
 11
Street and Gray (2000a, 2000b), and Taplin et al. (2002).  A secondary purpose of this 
study is to expand on existing IAS compliance research by focusing on compliance 
exclusively in three countries that historically do not have reputations for catering to the 
needs of capital market providers. 
Objectives of the Study 
 
     Thus, the major objectives of this study are to: 
1) Determine whether companies benefit (by way of reductions in the proxies for 
information asymmetry) by complying to a greater degree with International 
Accounting Standards; and to 
2) Measure the degree of compliance with IAS by companies domiciled in these 
three European countries while also examining the firm characteristics associated 
with greater or lesser compliance. 
Significance of the Study 
     
     
      A benefit of this study is that companies may be able to a priori predict whether they 
could receive financial benefits by complying with IAS.  Finding a statistically reliable 
association between greater IAS compliance and smaller levels in the magnitude of all 
three finance variables would provide convincing evidence concerning these benefits.  Of 
course, finding non-confirmatory or even contradictory results would also suggest that 
complying with more onerous financial reporting standards is a potentially unwise 
endeavor for firms with similar characteristics to those examined in this study. 
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      As mentioned earlier, several authors (e.g., Dye and Sunder, 2001; Schmidt, 2000) 
have suggested that standard-setters compete to have firms adopt their measurement and 
disclosure procedures.  The methodology presented in this paper provides one alternative 
enabling firms to assess whether a particular standard-setting group—whether it be the 
IASB, the FASB, or some other organization—might be providing guidelines that result 
in superior information as viewed by market participants.  It can be argued that the 
legitimacy of financial accounting policies depends on the degree to which those policies 
create information that best meets the needs of users.7  Given this gauge for 
legitimacy/usefulness, one way to assess which accounting rules are best meeting the 
needs of users would seem to be an evaluation of whether the asymmetry between 
company ‘insiders’—who presumably have better information about firm prospects—and 
external users of financial reports is actually minimized or reduced.  Leuz (2003) 
emphasizes this point by noting that the debate on the quality of IAS (most frequently 
compared to U.S. GAAP) has always focused on the standards themselves, rather than on 
the economic effects of applying said standards.  Leuz (2003) and Ball (2001) both argue 
that the focal point of this debate should probably be the market forces and institutional 
factors that help determine what accounting standard choices are made. 
      The methodology described in this study could also be applied as part of a ex-post 
cost/benefit analysis each time firms change their reporting systems.  Given an adequate 
supply of market data, a firm would be able to either confirm or reject the notion that an 
                                                 
7 See Holthausen and Watts (2001) for a discussion on whether value relevance is an appropriate 
foundation in which to address standard-setting questions.  Also see Collins et al. (1997), Land and 
Lang (2002), and Barth et al. (2001) for discussions on the merits of measuring value relevance by 
examining book value-earnings associations. 
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alteration in their financial presentation reduces information asymmetry and thus benefits 
the firm by reducing its costs. 
      Finally, most of what we know about the behavior of bid-ask spreads, analyst forecast 
dispersion, and idiosyncratic risk stems from research on U.S. firms in U.S. markets.  
This study adds to the scant French, Swedish, and Swiss literature regarding how varied 
financial presentation affects these three variables. 





      The phrase ‘IAS adoption’ is used throughout this study to denote that a firm is 
claiming to have some degree of compliance with IAS.  This degree of compliance may 
range anywhere from firms merely claiming IAS compliance (but with evidence that 
there are significant deviations in compliance) to full compliance with IAS. 
Information Asymmetry 
 
      Information asymmetry is a condition whereby managers (insiders) possess greater 
(private) information about the firm and its operations than do those outside the firm 
(e.g., investors, creditors, market makers, analysts).  Because the domestic GAAP 
reporting systems of some countries (e.g., France, Sweden, Switzerland) are not 
historically tailored to capital market participants, the informational divide between 
management and these participants is likely nontrivial.  Information asymmetry is a 
problem for a firm to the extent that it creates perceived “information risk” (Callahan et 
al., 1997; Easley et al., 2002).  Information risk is yet another form of risk for which 
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market participants likely demand compensation8, thus increasing a firm’s cost of capital 
(Easley and O’Hara, 2001).  Accordingly, a reduction in information asymmetry lowers 
information risk, which in turn may lower a firm’s cost of capital.  Information 
asymmetry and associated information risk is, therefore, one component of the overall 
cost of capital. 
Scope and Limitations 
 
Basis for Hypotheses 
 
 
      Much of the literature that is discussed here and in Chapter II is based on studies 
conducted on U.S. firms in U.S. markets (e.g., Botosan, 1997; Duru and Reeb, 2002; 
Healy et al., 1999).  To the degree that the institutional factors differ between the U.S. 
and the sample countries—relative to both companies and capital markets—the 
applicability of this literature is limited.  However, in the event that there is no country-
specific literature to draw upon, hypotheses will be constructed with the results from 
U.S.-based studies serving as guidance. 
When Transparency is Costly 
 
 
      Some companies choosing to adopt IAS—and the increased transparency and capital 
market orientation that accompanies it—may actually be exposing themselves to higher 
costs of capital and negative capital market effects.  This comes about when a company 
                                                 
8 Amihud and Mendelson (1986, 1989), Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1996), and Pastor and Stambaugh 
(2001) all find, using varying proxies for information asymmetry, that there is a positive association 
between information risk and equity returns.  These results are not surprising, given that Klein and 
Bawa (1976) reported that investors must be compensated for bearing the risk of estimating a firm’s 
return distribution parameters, and poor information inhibits the ability to estimate.  
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provides greater transparency, but this transparency simply informs capital market 
participants that their previous assessments of firm risk are understated.  According to 
Leo O’Neill, Standard and Poor’s president and chief ratings officer, IASs support risk-
based pricing by enhancing a company’s financial discipline and improving the 
comparability between companies.  O’Neill states, “risk varies, and the framework and 
tools for the constant evaluation of risk is at the heart of an effective financial market,” 
(as quoted in Accountancy Age, April 1, 1999).  The fact remains, however, that while a 
company may provide greater transparency because it perceives that it is less risky than 
the market assessment, this firm’s greater transparency may cause capital market 
participants to reach the opposite conclusion. 
Self-Selection 
    
   
      Given that the movement toward IAS was not mandated for any of the sample 
companies, this study is essentially about the benefits of voluntary financial reporting, 
Accordingly, it is quite possible that companies adopting IAS (or more fully complying) 
do so as a response to a realized or anticipated (positive) shift in the firm’s operating 
environment.  For instance, if a company’s management recognized that their firm would 
likely outperform relative to whatever benchmark it might be compared to, there would 
exist an incentive to “tell the world” (i.e., become more transparent).  In response to this 
possibility, every attempt is made in this study to control for changes in dependent 
variables caused by something other than greater transparency through compliance with 
IAS.  Though it is not the intention of this study to investigate the motives for moving 
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      This study involves companies from only France, Sweden and Switzerland.  These 
countries were chosen because researchers have shown that the gap between the domestic 
accounting presentations and the IAS presentation is greater for these countries than it is 
for most others.  Also, the market microstructure similarities among these countries 
allows for assuming away certain complicating factors that would otherwise be present 
(e.g., market microstructure differences impacting bid-ask spreads). 
      The end result is that if companies from France, Sweden, and Switzerland cannot be 
shown to derive benefits from greater compliance with IAS, it is unlikely that IAS 
adopters from other countries with similar market environments could make that 
argument.  In that sense, this study represents an initial examination of the benefits of the 
use of IAS.  However, because each and every country represents a unique market 
setting, the ability to generalize any results (or non-results) of this study will be limited to 
companies from France, Sweden, and Switzerland with characteristics similar to the firms 
examined in this study.  Restricting the analysis to a few countries enhances the ability to 
discern the impact of the “country of domicile” on dependent variables, but also limits 




Imperfect Measure of Compliance 
 
 
      Despite attempts made in this study to mitigate the possibility, there remains the 
concern that the IASB has no enforcement mechanism to insure that companies abide by 
its standards and that appearances regarding compliance may be deceiving.  Specifically, 
the nondisclosure of certain items (e.g., geographic segment numbers) could be indicative 
of either noncompliance or lack of applicability (Tower et al., 1999).  While noting that 
firms may intentionally violate IAS and go unpunished, the methodology applied in this 
study—most notably the use of a thorough examination of the annual report and claims 
made by the auditor—alleviates some of this nondisclosure concern.  
Logical and Conceptual Assumptions 
 
 
     There is an obvious danger that the incremental annual report information—
specifically the difference between lesser and greater compliance with IAS—could be 
usurped by other avenues of reporting.  Ashbaugh and Pincus (2001) find a significant 
increase in the number of news reports about non-U.S. firms adopting IAS in the year 
following adoption.  Although the increased frequency with which a firm’s name appears 
in the news does not necessarily indicate that there has been a change in the overall 
disclosure strategy of that firm, it does leave open that possibility.  Healy and Palepu 
(2001) report that the decision to better inform market participants as part of an overall 
disclosure strategy usually results in increases in several avenues of reporting.  Though 
proxies are used to control for non-financial statement information, the results in this 
study must be interpreted with caution because some of any reduction in information 
asymmetry could be the result of uncontrolled sources.  The scope of this study also 
 18
precludes an analysis of any non-financial statement information and its impact on 
information asymmetry (e.g., a comparison of IAS presentation versus other means of 
conveying financial information).   
Outline of Work 
 
 
      The remainder of the study is organized into the following sections: Chapter II 
reviews the literature and discusses the dependent and independent variables used in this 
study.  Chapter III reports the hypotheses and details the methodology used to test the 
hypotheses.  Chapter IV reports the results and their implications.  Chapter V summarizes 
the findings and discusses the limitations and conclusions of the study.  Finally, 



































     The literature pertinent to this study is arranged into five areas, one for each of the 
four primary variables of interest, followed by a discussion of the interaction among the 
three proxies for information asymmetry.  Specifically, this chapter reviews prior 
literature devoted to: 1) companies’ compliance with International Accounting Standards 
(IAS) and the motivation to do so, 2) the bid-ask spread, 3) analyst forecast dispersion, 4) 
idiosyncratic risk, and 5) interaction among or common effects upon the latter three 
constructs. 
Compliance with IAS and the Motivation to Comply 
 
 
     The sample firms in this study have signaled a desire to provide greater information to 
financial statement users by either moving from domestic GAAP to IAS or simply by 
using IAS from the inception of the firm.  Grossman (1981), Milgrom (1981), and 
Verrecchia (1983) provide early discussions of possible motives behind providing greater 
public information.  There are also some more recent discussions of how the 
dissemination of information impacts a firm’s cost of capital and/or information 
asymmetry (e.g., Leuz, 2003; Easley et al., 2002; Easley and O’Hara, 2001; Heflin et al., 
2001; Bailey et al., 2000; Leuz and Verrecchia, 2001; Botosan, 1997; and Lang and 
Lundholm, 1996).  The consensus among these authors is that information asymmetries 
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are costly to firms and that increasing the quantity and quality of financial information 
reduces these asymmetries.  For instance, Leuz (2003) not only summarizes the literature 
detailing why information asymmetry is costly to firms, but he also argues that the 
proxies for information asymmetry should reflect the level and the precision of financial 
disclosure.  Leuz finds that for firms forced to choose between the use of IAS or U.S. 
GAAP (specifically, firms trading in Germany’s “New Market”), the bid-ask spreads and 
analyst forecast dispersion do not statistically differ between the two groups.  Leuz states 
that the results suggest IAS are of relatively similar quality to U.S. GAAP, thus lending 
credibility to the pervasive assertion within this study and elsewhere that a financial 
presentation in conformity with IAS is of high quality and informative to financial 
statement users. 
     Botosan (1997) provides what may be the best known empirical assessment dealing 
with the quantifiable benefits of greater disclosure.  She uses a version of the residual 
income model to implicitly measure a firm’s cost of equity capital and finds that those 
firms—particularly the smaller firms—with higher-quality disclosures benefit from 
relatively lower costs of capital.9  Like many of the investigations involving the benefits 
of increased disclosure quality, Botosan’s study employs only U.S. listed firms.  
Sengupta (1998) and Botosan and Plumlee (2002) also provide evidence that greater 
levels of disclosure are associated with lower costs of capital for U.S. firms.  Finally, 
                                                 
9 The residual income model depends, in part, on long-range forecasts of earnings and book value when 
using the model to empirically derive a firm’s cost of capital.  Because the availability and reliability 
of long-range forecasts for non-U.S. firms are sporadic and questionable, respectively, it makes the 
use of this particular model to measure cost of capital in this study somewhat suspect. 
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Francis et al. (2003) is one international study that documents a lower cost of capital for 
firms having higher average levels of accounting disclosure.10 
     The studies involving IAS usage or compliance as means of providing greater 
information are in short supply.  When IAS compliance is addressed in prior literature, it 
is occasionally the primary variable of interest, and it is sometimes just part of a broader 
research question.  Regardless of the role played by IAS compliance in these studies, it is 
has been evaluated both as a dichotomous variable (full compliance with IAS or not) and 
as a continuous variable (extent of compliance is assessed).  The discussion below 
describes: 1) the literature pertaining to IASC’s standards and the firms that adopt them, 
particularly as it relates to the countries in this study; 2) the literature using a 
dichotomous measure to evaluate compliance with IAS; 3) the first indications of 
noncompliance; 4) how researchers have dealt with measuring compliance given the 
findings of noncompliance; and 5) the limitations of using IAS compliance as a variable 
in an empirical study of this nature. 
The IASC and IAS Adopters 
 
     A large number of IAS adopters (per the IASC’s website, 1999) are from Europe, but 
Canada and the Middle East are also well represented.  Cairns (1999a) reports that the 
accounting requirements in continental Europe have historically been perceived as being 
different from and more flexible than IASs.  However, he also notes that it has often been 
possible for continental European and Nordic companies to choose options within their 
                                                 
10 Francis et al. (2003) use the Easton (2004) approach to estimate a firm’s cost of capital.  However, this 
method also depends on long-horizon analysts’ forecasts, which have been shown to possess 
extremely questionable accuracy (e.g., Brown et al., 1987a, 1987b; O’Brien and Bhushan, 1990; 
Brown, 1993; Capstaff et al., 2001; Duru and Reeb, 2002).  Francis et al. (2003) also use the Rajan 
and Zingales (1998) metric to assess a firm’s dependence on external financing.  Specifically, this 
metric is (capital expenditures minus cash flow from operations/capital expenditures). 
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domestic accounting standards and IAS such that the firm complies with both domestic 
GAAP and IASs.  Cairns states that the French and Nordic companies have been 
practicing this approach for “many years” (p. 8) and that Swiss companies have been 
doing so since the late 1980s.  The reduction in the flexibility (due in part to the IASC’s 
Comparability/Improvements project11) once available with IAS has served to make this 
“dual compliance” more difficult to achieve.  At the same time, the national standard 
setting bodies in France, Sweden and Switzerland (among others) are making it easier to 
comply with both sets of standards by increasing the conformance of their national 
accounting requirements with IASs (Cairns, 1999a).  Cairns also points out that some 
companies, particularly Swedish firms, have dropped their reference to the use of IAS 
after their countries joined the European Union (EU).  Since EU member stock exchanges 
allowed the use of domestic GAAP financial statements to gain access, some of the 
motivation for claiming to comply with IAS no longer existed.12 
     During the period of study, all three exchanges involved in this study (Paris, 
Stockholm, and Zurich) allow the use of IAS for listing purposes.  Firms traded in Paris 
that are domiciled elsewhere in the European Union may instead use their national 
accounting standards.  Stockholm-listed firms may use either IAS or Swedish GAAP (per 
the Annual Accounts Act of 1995).  For Zurich-listed firms, compliance with IAS 
inherently means that these firms have met the Swiss Foundation for Accounting and 
Reporting standards (ARR/FER), which are required of all listed companies (IASC 
                                                 
11 In hopes of gaining IOSCO’s endorsement, the IASC revised ten IASs so that they allow for fewer 
choices.  The project began in 1987 and was completed in 1993 (with the revised IASs effective for 
1995 financial statements). 
12 Note that as of January 14, 2003, the European Union is requiring all firms listed on a regulated market 
to prepare their consolidated financial statements in accordance with International Accounting 
Standards, beginning with their fiscal 2005 statements. Comparative IAS information is required for 
the fiscal 2004 reports prepared under standards other than IAS (Regulation No 1606/2002 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council). 
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website, “IAS around the World”).  As Ashbaugh and Pincus (2001) illustrate, the 
national accounting standards of these three countries tend to be less restrictive and less 
suitable for capital market participants (e.g., financial analysts) than IAS. 
IAS Compliance as Dichotomous Measure 
 
     The use of “IAS compliance” as a variable in studies has evolved considerably in the 
last four or five years.  Until recently, researchers assumed that a firm’s attestations 
regarding its use of IAS in the financial statements were sufficient to presume that the 
firm was fully complying with IASC standards.  Hence, the assessment of IAS 
compliance in these earlier studies became a dichotomous measure (i.e., IAS adopter 
versus non-adopter).  Some of these authors warn of the tenuous nature of the firms’ 
“degrees” of compliance, while others do not.  These examinations often apply an event-
study methodology to assess the effects of, or reasons for, initially adopting IAS. 
     Several authors use the dichotomous measure to assess IAS compliance/usage (e.g., 
Murphy, 2000; Taylor and Jones, 1999; El-Gazzar et al., 1999; Dumontier and 
Raffournier, 1998; and Ashbaugh and Pincus, 2001).  Dumontier and Raffournier (1998), 
for instance, find that among Swiss companies certain firm characteristics make it more 
likely that the firm is reporting under IAS.  The authors find that, among other things, 
firm size increases the likelihood that a Swiss company is using IAS.  The authors place a 
Swiss firm in the “IAS group” if it has declared that its financial statements conform to 
IAS.  Those companies referring to IAS, yet admitting that there are exceptions to the 
IAS disclosure requirements, are classified as being in the IAS group.  Dumontier and 
Raffournier justify the placement of these non-conforming firms into the IAS group by 
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stating that, “[these] companies which referred to IAS but with some disclosure 
exceptions were nevertheless classified in the IAS group because it was apparent that 
most Swiss firms which declare compliance with IAS do not, in fact, satisfy the entire set 
of disclosure requirements of the IASC” (p. 227).   
     Ashbaugh and Pincus (2001) also assess IAS compliance with a dichotomous 
measure.  Using non-U.S. firms that “adopted” IAS during the 1990-93 period, Ashbaugh 
and Pincus investigate the impact of countries’ accounting measurement and disclosure 
standards (relative to IAS) on the ability of analysts to accurately forecast earnings, 
including whether the adoption of IAS improves this ability.  The authors posit that the 
analyst’s task is easier if a country’s accounting standards are more like IAS or if a firm 
adopts IAS.  Ashbaugh and Pincus compare domestic measurement and disclosure 
practices to IAS using a self-constructed index that numerically depicts the differences 
between thirteen countries’ domestic GAAPs and IAS.  The authors determine that the 
French, Swedish, and Swiss domestic requirements differ substantially from IAS.13 
     Ashbaugh and Pincus (2001) ultimately conclude that the adoption of IAS improves 
the analyst’s ability to forecast earnings, as it secures a reduction in the absolute value of 
analysts’ earnings forecast errors.  However, the evaluation of the IAS adoption “event” 
in Ashbaugh and Pincus (2001) is based simply on lists of adopters obtained from the 
IASC’s website in 1993.  Although the authors examine many of their sample firms’ 
annual reports to confirm the year of adoption, the research cited in the following section 
                                                 
13 Ashbaugh and Pincus (2001) report that only Finland and Norway have a greater degree of dissimilarity 
with IAS than do France, Sweden, and Switzerland.  They also report that Swiss firms, due to the 
unrestrictive nature of Swiss GAAP, are able to apply IAS without violating Swiss GAAP.  The 
authors also note that French firms are allowed to present domestic GAAP parent-only financial 
statements, and Swedish firms typically use footnote reconciliations to comply with IAS measurement 
requirements. 
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demonstrates that neither the IASC list nor companies’ annual report claims should be 
used as confirmation of firms’ compliance with IAS.  
Indications of Noncompliance 
 
     Street and Gray (2000a, b), Street and Bryant (2000), Tower et al. (1999), Street et al. 
(1999), and Cairns (1999a) provide the initial examples of significant non-compliance 
among companies purporting to use IAS.  Street et al. (1999) look specifically at 
compliance with the ten IASs issued as part of the IASC’s Comparability Project.  The 
authors inspect the 1996 annual reports of 49 large companies that claim to comply (or 
admit only limited exceptions) with IAS in their accounting policy notes.  They find that 
noncompliance is particularly common when the sample companies present: 1) 
extraordinary items;  2) the revaluation of property, plant, and equipment; 3) pension 
disclosures; 4) the valuation of inventories; 5) the restatement of foreign entities for 
companies operating in hyperinflationary economies; and, 6) the amortization (or lack 
thereof) of goodwill.   Street et al.’s evaluation of compliance improves upon simply 
using a company’s claims.  Street et al. use a survey instrument that was based on the text 
in the ten revised IASs.  This instrument allows the researchers to compare the required 
IAS measurement and disclosure practices to those used by the sample firms.14   
     Street and Bryant (2000) show that companies claiming to observe IAS that are U.S. 
listed or have filings in the U.S. comply with IASC-required disclosures to a greater 
degree than those companies without U.S. listings or filings.  These authors’ results are 
                                                 
14 Noncompliance with accounting standards is apparently not limited to IAS noncompliance.  Bradshaw 
and Miller (2002) provide recent documentation of non-U.S. firms’ compliance with U.S. GAAP.  
Using Worldscope’s coding of a firm’s accounting method choices, they find significant 
noncompliance with U.S. GAAP prescriptions. 
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based on an examination of the 1998 reports of 82 companies referring to their use of IAS 
in the accounting policy notes.  Street and Bryant note that their findings are consistent 
with prior research indicating that listing status and the overall level of disclosure (or at 
least the disclosure requirements) are correlated (e.g., Dumontier and Raffournier, 1998; 
Adhikari and Tondkar, 1992; Saudagaran and Biddle, 1992; Cooke, 1989a).15 
     Street and Gray (2000b) expand the sample of companies used in Street and Bryant 
(2000).  Street and Gray use the financial statements of 279 companies appearing on the 
1999 IASC list of “Companies Referring to their Use of IAS” and find that there is 
significant noncompliance with IAS requirements.  Street and Gray find that, among 
other things, compliance tends to be greatest for companies domiciled in China and to be 
most problematic for companies domiciled in France. 
     The indications of significant noncompliance have troubled Cairns (1999a) in 
particular.  He has suggested regulatory authorities should take disciplinary action against 
those audit firms that ignore obvious noncompliance with IAS—and especially when 
these firms issue an unqualified opinion or reference IAS in a misleading manner.  He 
also asks the IASB to reconsider its policy of requiring no mention of IAS unless in 
conjunction with full compliance.  Cairns indicates that it would be better to know that a 
company has complied with, for instance, all IAS but one or two, rather than to not know 






                                                 
15 Street and Bryant (2000) also point out that Cerf (1961) and Buzby (1975) found the association between 
listing status and extent of disclosure to be insignificant. 
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Measuring the Degree of Compliance with IAS 
 
     It may have been some of these early findings of noncompliance that motivated 
researchers to move away from assuming compliance when a firm simply stated that its 
financial statements were in conformance with IAS (i.e., the dichotomous approach).   
Within the last few years, researchers have begun incorporating more sophisticated 
methods for measuring the degree of IAS compliance.  
     In several articles (e.g., Cairns, 1999d), Cairns refers to three general categories of 
companies’ financial statement presentations that claim compliance with IAS even 
though they do not fully comply.  First, there are those companies that disclose 
compliance with IAS but with certain specified exceptions in the accounting policy 
statement.16  The second category also encompasses companies who claim to comply 
with exceptions, but the exceptions are disclosed somewhere deep within the notes to the 
financial statements rather than in the accounting policy statement.  The third category is 
the most worrisome to Cairns and others relying on financial statements purportedly 
compiled under IAS requirements.  It includes companies that claim compliance with 
IAS without exceptions, but where even a cursory examination of the financial statements 
reveals substantive non-compliance issues.   
     Cairns (1999a)17 offers evidence that many companies were using what he deems 
“IAS Lite” (i.e., less that full compliance), and he provides a more detailed measurement 
scale for assessing the degree of compliance with IAS.  Cairns places firms mentioning 
IAS in their 1998 financial statements into eleven categories: 
                                                 
16 Cairns (1999d) specifically mentions four companies that are part of the sample population in this study: 
Renault, Valeo, Lafarge, and Oerlikon-Buehrle. 
17 As past Secretary-General of the IASC, David Cairns provides a unique and well-informed perspective 
on companies’ compliance with IAS.  
 28
 1) Full IAS compliance 
 2) Full IAS compliance with exceptions specified in the accounting policies  
 3) Full IAS compliance with exceptions specified in the notes to the financial 
  statements but outside the accounting policies 
 4) Full IAS compliance claimed but material omissions or exceptions evident  
  from the financial statements 
 5) Accounting policies comply with IASs or are based on IASs or IAS principles 
 6) Accounting policies comply with IASs or are based on IASs or the principles in 
  IASs but with specified exceptions from full compliance 
 7) IASs used only when there are no equivalent domestic standards 
 8) IASs used only for selected items or when permitted by domestic requirements 
 9) Reconciliation from domestic GAAP to IASs 
 10) Summary IAS financial statements (restatement of domestic financial  
  statements 
 11) Unquantified description of differences from IAS treatments  
  (Cairns 1999a, p. 10).  
Cairns finds that there is significant noncompliance among his sample firms.  He 
categorizes 71 of the 125 sample companies in something other than category #1 (full 
compliance).  Cairns also documents a number of the ways in which firms do not comply 
with the current IAS requirements (p.203): 
1) the non-disclosure of cost of goods sold and other income statement expenses; 
2) the inclusion of extraordinary items in the income statement which do not 
meet the criteria to be included as such; 
3) the amortization of goodwill as a reduction of gross profit, rather than as an 
expense to determine gross profit; 
4) the amortization of goodwill over more than 20 years; 
5) writing off goodwill directly to equity (disallowed for post-1994 goodwill); 
6) the inclusion or deduction of too many items from cash and cash equivalents 
on the Statement of Cash Flows (e.g., including equity investments and 
deducting bank loans); 
7) the use of LIFO for inventories in one location, while a different cost-flow 
method is used for apparently similar inventories in another location; 
8) the omission of required disclosures for segments, particularly the segment 
result (profit or loss); 
9) the use of very broad industry and geographic segment delineations. 
 
As previously indicated, Cairns also finds that some auditors are either claiming the 
company to be in compliance with IAS when there are obvious deviations from full 
compliance, or the auditors avoid expressing an opinion on the compliance with IAS even 
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when IAS usage (often with exceptions noted) is mentioned within the financial 
statements.   
     Tower et al. (1999) endeavor to provide an even more precise measure of IAS 
compliance by examining it as a continuous variable.  The authors use firms from six 
countries in the Asia-Pacific region to offer evidence on the degree of compliance with 
IAS, as measured by a percentage of compliance.  Tower et al. code each of 512 
“compliance points” within a total of twenty-six IASs (applicable to 1997 fiscal year-
ends) according to the following options:  
1) No compliance with the relevant IAS issue; 
2) Compliance with the relevant IAS issue; 
3) Compliance with IAS benchmark on a particular issue; 
4) Compliance with IAS allowable alternative on a particular issue; 
5) Compliance with both the IAS benchmark and allowable alternative; 
6) Compliance not disclosed and not readily discernable; and 
7) Non-applicable issue. 
 
The authors report two problems with this type of coding.  First, a number of items are 
clearly not applicable to some reporting firms (e.g., IAS 11 on Construction Contracts), 
and 2) there is considerable non-disclosure with regard to many of the IAS rules.  Tower 
et al. address the latter concern by measuring IAS compliance in two ways: 1) with non-
disclosure indicating “non-applicability” of that particular accounting issue and 2) with 
non-disclosure indicating “non-compliance” with IAS guidelines.  The authors find that 
there is a considerable disparity between the results from each of the two measures of 
IAS compliance.18 
     Tower et al. (1999) also examine the determinants of IAS compliance by regressing 
the level of compliance on a number of firm characteristics.  They find that among the 
                                                 
18 Tower et al. report that the mean compliance for the first measure of IAS compliance (assumed non-
applicability) was 90.68 percent, whereas the mean compliance for the second measure of IAS 
compliance (assumed non-compliance) was much lower at 42.2 percent. 
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variables studied, the home country of the reporting company is the characteristic that 
most heavily influences the degree of compliance.  Tower et al. also discover that a 
troubling amount of non-compliance exists if non-disclosure of an item is in effect 
assumed to be non-compliance.  Given that this lack of disclosure could be indicative of 
either non-compliance or the non-applicability of that particular standard, an assessment 
of this type can be extremely subjective (e.g., deciding whether a firm with primarily 
local operations has provided sufficient geographic segment results). 
Audit Report as Confirmation or Dissent  
 
 
     A financial statement user’s expectation regarding the extent of compliance with IAS 
is likely affected by the nature of the audit opinion provided.  The assertions made by the 
company in the financial statements can essentially be further confirmed or somewhat 
disavowed by its auditor in the audit report.  Cairns (1999a) discusses the extent to which 
auditors have provided confirmation of firms’ use of IAS.  He formulates seven 
approaches that an auditor may use to express their opinion as to the firm’s degree of 
compliance with IAS (p. 188): 
 1) True and fair view in accordance with IASs 
 2) True and fair view and comply with IASs 
 3) True and fair view – no accounting framework 
 4) Presented fairly in accordance with IASs 
 5) Presented fairly and comply with IASs 
 6) Presented fairly – no accounting framework 
 7) Comply with IASs – no reference to true and fair view or presented fairly 
  (Cairns 1999a, p. 188).  
 
Cairns considers the firm’s contentions about IAS usage as an issue that is separate from 
the auditor’s opinion.  In other words, he does not integrate the assessment of the firm’s 
IAS compliance with the auditor’s contentions.  However, in an empirical assessment of 
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the effects of IAS compliance, it would seem logical to take the auditor’s statement into 
consideration as playing either a confirmatory or a contradictory role. Consequently, this 
study will analyze not just a firm’s presentation, but also its auditor’s statements in order 
to assess the relative effects of compliance.  The review of the extent to which the auditor 
corroborates the statements made by the firm is somewhat different from Cairn’s 
categories above, yet is inspired by Cairn’s approach. 
     In summary, the prominent deficiency with most of the previous literature involving 
IAS compliance is that researchers deal with IAS compliance as if it were a dichotomous 
variable.  The conclusions reached in these studies are placed in doubt given the evidence 
on noncompliance in Cairns (1999a), Tower et al. (1999), Street and Bryant (2000), and 
others.  While these subsequent authors expose the degree of noncompliance, and even 
provide various means to assess degrees of compliance, they do not attempt to provide an 
in-depth assessment of the economic impact of either complying or not complying with 
IAS. 
Limitations of IAS Compliance as Measure of Information Quality 
 
 
     The use of the annual report as a measure of the quality of a firm’s information 
environment ignores the fact that there are other sources of information, particularly to 
financial analysts (e.g., conference calls, face-to-face meetings).  The degree to which 
these other sources of information provide incremental information, or at least are not 
correlated with IAS compliance and the information it produces, may result in faulty 
inferences.  The effects of adopting (and abiding by) a new set of accounting standards 
will continue to be difficult to measure if variables used to proxy for improvements in an 
information environment are also affected by things other than the annual report—and 
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those other effects cannot be “quarantined” from the annual report effect.  In short, 
attributing reductions in the information asymmetry proxies used in this study (detailed 
below) to higher levels of IAS compliance may be unfounded if the reductions occurred 
due to information obtained through other sources.19  To address this possibility, some 
U.S. studies have used AIMR (Association for Investment Management Research) 
rankings as a proxy for a firm’s overall disclosure quality (e.g., Welker, 1995).  However, 
the rankings are based on only U.S. firms and similar current assessments of firms’ 
disclosure quality are not readily available for large numbers of firms in non-U.S. 
markets.  Thus, alternate measures will be used in this study to control for the amount of 
information a firm provides via sources other than the annual report. 
     Finally, the instruments used to address IAS compliance in Street et al. (1999), Tower 
et al. (1999), Taplin et al. (2002), and the one detailed in Chapter III of this study at least 
partially ignore what may be valuable evidence for users as they assess the credibility of 
firms’ financial presentations.  A number of authors contend that the degree of 
enforcement of accounting standards may be as important as the standards themselves 
(e.g., Hope, 2003; O’Brien, 1998; and Sunder, 1997).  The instrument used in this study 
and some of the authors previously mentioned, however, do provide some anecdotal 
evidence on accounting enforcement.20  For instance, the lack of enforcement is apparent 
when a sample firm’s auditor opines that the firm complies fully with IAS, yet the firm’s 
financial statements indicate that deviations from full compliance are present. 
                                                 
19 Alternatively, if these other sources are “assigned” to firms randomly and are independent of IAS 
compliance, controlling for the influence of these sources is not necessary. 
20 Again, Cairns (1999a) addresses compliance and enforcement (with respect to auditor issues, primarily), 
but does so primarily as separate topics. 
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Information Asymmetry and Its Proxies21 
 
     Information asymmetry, as it is used in the context of this study, is a condition 
whereby managers (insiders) possess greater information about the firm and its 
operations than do those external to the firm (e.g., investors, market makers, analysts).  
Because the domestic GAAP reporting systems of some countries are not tailored to 
capital market participants, information asymmetry between management and these 
participants may be at relatively higher levels in those countries.  Information asymmetry 
is a problem for a firm to the extent that it creates perceived “information risk” (Callahan 
et al. 1997).  Information risk is a form of risk for which market participants may demand 
compensation, thus increasing a firm’s cost of capital.  Accordingly, a reduction in 
information asymmetry lowers information risk, which in turn may lower a firm’s cost of 
capital. 
     Verrecchia (2001) addresses the rewards inherent in an examination involving 
information asymmetry when he states: 
“But another potential research activity that I hope will result from this 
document is empirical work that forges a link between disclosure and its 
economic consequences.  While I am interested in all such links, let me 
suggest again that the one with the greatest potential may be the link between 
disclosure and information asymmetry reduction” (p. 174).   
 
Verrecchia also expresses an awareness of the difficulty of this type of research, noting, 
“…for all my enthusiasm for the information asymmetry component of the 
cost of capital as a starting point for a comprehensive theory, I acknowledge 
the difficulty of ferreting it out in real market settings” (p. 174). 
 
Hau (2001) reiterates similar sentiments, pointing out that 
 
                                                 
21 Except where noted, the studies reviewed in Chapter II deal with U.S. firms.  The implications and 
limitations of using literature developed primarily in the U.S. capital market domain is discussed in a 
later section. 
 34
“Information and its assumed asymmetric distribution has become an 
important aspect of financial market theory.  Yet even though information 
heterogeneity of agents is now a common assumption in microstructure 
models, direct evidence for the scope of such asymmetry is hard to provide” 
(p. 1959). 
 
     Although information asymmetry is not directly observable, there are at least three 
useful surrogates that may be used as indicators of the magnitude of firm-level 
information asymmetry: (1) the bid-ask spread relating to the trading of a firm’s 
securities, (2) the dispersion in analysts’ forecasts of a firm’s earnings per share, and (3) 
firm-specific idiosyncratic risk.   
     Much of the discussion of information asymmetry and its proxies is found in the 
finance literature.  Often, there is a distinction made in this literature between “insiders” 
and “informed traders.”  Insiders are normally defined as corporate officers with 
fiduciary responsibilities to shareholders, whereas informed traders are those hoping to 
profit from information not held by the “uninformed traders” (Madhavan, 2000).  Again, 
for the purposes of this study, information asymmetry is presumed to exist between 
informed and uniformed capital market participants (also know as “liquidity” or “noise” 
traders in a market).  Theoretically, this asymmetry should be reduced when quality 
information is available to a broader base of investors, thus reducing the population of 
uninformed traders. 
     Clarke and Shastri (2001) suggest that the proxies for information asymmetry fall into 
four broad categories: 1) measures based on analysts’ forecasts, 2) investment 
opportunity set measures, 3) stock return measures, and 4) market microstructure 
measures.  This study uses a measure from three of these four categories.  The bid-ask 
spread, analyst forecast dispersion, and idiosyncratic risk represent all but the investment 
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opportunity set category.  The following pages describe these three proxies and illustrate 
how they are being used in both the accounting and finance literature.   
The Bid-ask Spread 
 
 
     The bid-ask spread is set by the dealer(s) in a firm’s stock and is a cost of transacting 
in the market.  The dealer (i.e., specialist or market maker) provides liquidity to the 
market by standing ready to buy at the “bid” price and standing ready to sell at the “ask” 
price (Demsetz 1968).  The bid price is below the current market price for the stock 
whereas the ask price, which includes a “premium for immediate selling” (Callahan et al. 
1997, p. 51), is above the current market price.  Therefore, the bid-ask spread 
compensates the dealer for his or her willingness to act as the provider of liquidity and as 
a securities “clearinghouse”. 
     Though the entire spread has been used as a proxy for divergence of opinion (e.g., 
Leuz, 2003; Garfinkel, 2003), a number of researchers (e.g., Amihud and Mendelson 
1980; Copeland and Galai 1983; Glosten and Harris 1988; Krinsky and Lee 1996) 
propose that the quoted bid-ask spread can be decomposed into three cost components.  
The basis for this decomposition is the theoretical notion that a dealer faces (1) order 
processing costs, (2) inventory holding costs, and (3) adverse selection costs.  The order 
processing component is a fee charged by market makers for standing ready to match buy 
and sell orders (Demsetz, 1968 and Tinic, 1972).  The market maker’s remuneration for 
performing the paperwork necessary to consummate the transaction is also included in 
this component.  The inventory holding component (modeled in Stoll, 1978 and Ho and 
Stoll, 1981) compensates market makers for holding less than fully diversified portfolios.  
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As suppliers of immediacy, market makers are frequently obligated to hold an inventory 
of shares.  The price risk and the opportunity cost of the funds dedicated to the inventory 
give rise to this holding cost (Venkatesh and Chiang 1986).  Finally, the adverse selection 
component is a dealer’s compensation for taking on the risk of dealing with traders who 
may possess superior information.  Copeland and Galai (1983) and Glosten and Milgrom 
(1985) show that the greater the risk of trading with a party who holds private knowledge 
about the firm, the wider the spread should be.  
     The adverse selection component of the bid-ask spread reflects the degree of 
“information asymmetry risk” (Callahan et al. 1997, p. 50) as perceived by the dealer.  
The risk is that the dealer will be locked into carrying excess inventories (at rapidly 
declining prices) in the event that there are many successive buy transactions, or that the 
dealers will face a shortage when they are asked to rapidly sell as prices rise.  In 
summary, one facet of the bid-ask spread seems to represent an unambiguous proxy for 
information asymmetry and, holding everything else constant, a higher degree of 
information asymmetry leads to a larger total bid-ask spread.   
The Bid-Ask Spread and Market Microstructure 
 
     Before discussing the bid-ask spread further, it may be useful to describe the 
characteristics of the markets and the varying effects differing microstructures may have 
on the spread.22   On quote-driven markets, investors trade based on dealers’ posted 
prices to either buy (bid) or sell (ask) a stock and offers to buy or sell from other 
investors.  Examples of quote-driven systems include the NASDAQ and London’s 
SEAQ.  Thus, in quote-driven markets the dealers often provide the liquidity when the 
                                                 
22 For a comprehensive review of the literature on stock market microstructure, see Biais et al. (2002). 
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quantity of bids or asks from investors is insufficient to meet demand (Handa et al., 
1998).23  Conversely, within order-driven markets traders use quotes in the (typically 
electronic) order book as investors themselves provide liquidity to the market.  Examples 
of the order-driven environment include all the markets used in this study (i.e., Paris 
Bourse’s CAC system, Stockholm’s Automated Exchange (SAX), and Switzerland’s 
SWX market).  In reality, most exchanges are not pure forms of either the quote-driven or 
order-driven models, but hybrids involving varying degrees of dealer participation and 
electronic trading (Leuz, 2003; Gajewski and Gresse, 2003; Chung et al., 1999).24   
     While execution costs and the components of trading costs have been researched 
extensively, the bulk of this research has been done in the context of a specialist or dealer 
market (quote-driven) rather than in an automated (order-driven) electronic limit order 
book.25  However, Brockman and Chung (1999a) and Handa et al. (1998) point out that 
the bid-ask spread in the order-driven environment is similar to the quote-driven market 
spread in that both represent the expected compensation for the costs of supplying 
immediate liquidity.  Brockman and Chung (1999a) note that the effective bid-ask spread 
in an order-driven market is the difference between the price of the lowest sell (offer) 
limit order and the price of the highest buy (bid) limit order.26  Handa et al. (1998) echo 
                                                 
23 O’Hara (1995) and Madhavan (2000), among others, also provide excellent summaries of varying 
microstructure designs and trading mechanisms, along with how these market characteristics affect 
the formation of price. 
24 Chung et al. (1999) report that specialists participated in 20 percent of the trades on the NYSE per the 
NYSE’s 1992 Fact Book.  The NYSE verifies that the percentage of specialist participation rose to 
29.7% in 2002 [NYSE Fact Book, 2002]. 
25 A “limit order” is a request to either buy or sell with the condition that a price ceiling (for a bid to buy) or 
a price floor (for an ask to sell) is specified. The request to trade is not executed if the price is above 
ceiling or below floor. 
26 There are several metrics used in the literature to evaluate the magnitude of the bid-ask spread, including 
quoted, effective, and percentage spreads.  The quoted spread is the raw difference between the bid 
and ask prices.  The effective spread, typically used when there is concern about trades being executed 
within the spread, is two times the difference between the execution price and the most recent 
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Brockman and Chung’s sentiments and note that the bid-ask spread is a “natural 
property” (p. 48) of an order-driven market, a property that persists even in the presence 
of a large number of limit order traders.  Handa et al. further justify the study of the bid-
ask spread in an order-driven market by using 1995 Paris Bourse data to show that as the 
authors’ proxy for divergence of opinion among limit order traders becomes greater, the 
market’s bid-ask spread becomes wider.   
     It is clear that the extent to which markets differ, specifically with regard to the 
transparency of the trading process, will help determine the levels of the bid-ask spreads.  
In fact, some authors have argued that the trading process can itself provide information 
to market participants.  O’Hara (1995) states that, “the information available in the 
trading process can affect the strategies of market participants” (p. 252).  However, there 
seems to be some disagreement as to the direction of this effect when dealing with 
electronic (quote-driven) markets.  For instance, Pagano and Röell’s (1996) model 
illustrates that greater transparency within the trading mechanism will lower the costs of 
uninformed traders.  McInish et al. (1998) empirically confirm the Pagano and Röell 
analytics by showing that a change requiring market makers on the quote-driven 
NASDAQ to display investors’ limit orders reduces the spread.  However, Madhavan 
(1996) argues that an increased transparency regarding order flow should lead to larger 
bid-ask spreads as the dealer’s ability to share risk with outside investors is reduced.   
     Heidle and Huang (2002) also explore whether structural differences between markets 
explain differences in the degree that informed traders are exposed, thus allowing for 
differential bid-ask spreads.  Heidle and Huang find that informed traders are more 
                                                                                                                                                 
midpoint of the bid and ask prices. The percentage or relative spread is either the quoted or effective 
spread divided by the midpoint of the bid and ask prices (Chung et al., 2003). 
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difficult to distinguish in a competing dealer market, suggesting that one would expect to 
find relatively larger adverse selection components of the spread on the NASDAQ.27  
Along these lines, Van Ness et al. (2002) and Affleck-Graves et al. (1994) discover 
important differences in the individual components of the bid-ask spread when 
comparing NYSE and NASDAQ firms.  Wang (1999) also finds that electronic traders 
face a larger adverse selection component, but a smaller order processing component of 
the spread than the floor traders.28  Wang concludes that the floor traders (in an open 
outcry system) are better able to identify adverse selection risks than are the electronic 
screen traders. 
     In summary, the literature on market microstructure indicates that the structural 
differences in the two basic microstructure types do not necessarily preclude generalizing 
some of the bid-ask spread conclusions from the quote-driven environment to that of an 
order-driven market, though it also does not assure analogous results.  Other market 
characteristics such as the trading process may also affect how prices are formed, thus 
impacting how the bid-ask spread is created and the levels it subsequently takes.  The 
basic premise behind this literature as it pertains to this study is that there is a need to 
control for any differences in microstructures or trading processes among the French, 
Swedish, and Swiss market.  The characteristics of these three exchanges and related 
country-specific literature are discussed further in Appendix 1.   
 
 
                                                 
27 These authors use the Easley et al. (1996) model to assess the probability of informed trade. 
28 Wang uses the Sydney Futures Exchange in his examination.  This market uses an open outcry auction 
for daytime trading and then switches to a screen-based automated order execution system for 
overnight trading. 
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Questions Regarding Decomposition and Trading Volume as a Control 
 
 
     Some researchers have questioned the validity of various models to decompose the 
bid-ask spread.  Neal and Wheatley (1998) use the Glosten and Harris (1988) and the 
George et al. (1991) decomposition models to show that estimates of the adverse 
selection component of the bid-ask spread were large and significant even for U.S. 
closed-end funds29.  Neal and Wheatley argue that the unique transparency associated 
with closed-end funds (which use weekly mark-to-market accounting) should cause little 
concern regarding the fund’s current liquidation value, an otherwise very important 
potential source of information asymmetry (Glosten and Milgrom, 1985).  Hanousek and 
Podpiera (2000) use a variation of the Huang and Stoll (1997) decomposition model and 
also find somewhat anomalous results when estimating the adverse selection component 
of the spread.  They discover that even in an emerging market, the adverse selection 
component may make up a relatively small portion (14% in this case) of the total bid-ask 
spread.  These authors use data from the Czech Republic, a market known to be 
historically fraught with insider trading (an attribute arising form the lack of proper 
regulation and enforcement, according to Hanousek and Podpiera).  The authors suggest 
their results indicate that the relative importance of the adverse selection component may 
be low across markets.   
     Hanousek and Podpiera (2000) also point out that the approach to decompose the 
spread advocated by Roll (1984), Stoll (1989), and George et al. (1991), among others, 
assumes market efficiency.  This assumption allows for the only source of serial 
covariance between prices and quotes to be the bid-ask spread “friction” and the factors 
                                                 
29 A closed-end fund is a publicly traded investment company.  Shares from these funds traded on both the 
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and the American Stock Exchange (AMEX). 
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associated with it (e.g., adverse selection).  The authors state that the assumption of 
market efficiency may not be appropriate for even the developed markets. 
     Neal and Wheatley (1998) note that point estimates of the adverse selection 
component of the spread span an uncomfortably broad range, from 6% in Jones and 
Lipson (1995) to 84% in Jegadeesh and Subrahmanyam (1993).  Other authors who 
estimate the adverse selection component include: Venkatesh and Chiang (1986), George 
et al. (1991), Foster and Viswanathan (1991), Lee et al. (1993), Jennings (1994), Alford 
and Jones (1998), Madhavan et al. (1997), and Van Ness et al. (2001).  Van Ness et al. 
(2001) use five different models30 of adverse selection and compare the results gleaned 
from these models to other proxies for asymmetric information (e.g., analyst forecast 
error and dispersion, trading volume, percentage of stock held by insiders, market-to-
book, etc.).  The authors find the adverse selection component of the bid-ask spread, 
though correlated with various measures of volatility, to be unrelated to the measures of 
asymmetric information.  Van Ness et al. conclude that the adverse selection component 
might be picking up some other trading cost in addition to asymmetric information, and 
that the decomposition models may not be providing any benefits beyond simply using 
the entire spread.  The Van Ness et al. results supplement the Neal and Wheatley (1998) 
findings in that both studies use well-recognized decomposition models to derive adverse 
selection components, which were then shown to be unrelated to other accepted measures 
of information asymmetry. 
     The interest in a stock, particularly with regard to the trading activity in that stock, 
may also affect bid-ask spread levels.  Easley et al. (1996) speculate that frequency of 
                                                 
30 Van Ness et al. (2001) provide a valuable summary of the five commonly used models to decompose the 
spread. 
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trade may be highly correlated with the spread.  Their results show that infrequently-
traded stocks on the London Stock Exchange had an 11.8 percent bid-ask spread, whereas 
the spread averaged only 1 percent for the most actively traded stocks.  Easley et al. 
attribute their results to the fact that the probability of trading with an informed trader is 
lower for high volume stocks than it is for medium- or low-volume stocks.  Given the 
number of times trading volume or “liquidity” are mentioned in the bid-ask spread 
literature, and the findings of several authors (e.g., Easley et al., 1996; Brockman and 
Chung, 1999b), it is apparent that there are strong ties between bid-ask spreads and the 
liquidity of a firm’s stock.   
     The literature described above brings into question the appropriateness of 
decomposing the bid-ask spread.  In fact, Leuz (2003) argues that the structural features 
of an electronic exchange mitigate any limitation of not using the decomposed spread, 
creating a scenario in which the entire quoted spread represents both the effective spread 
faced by market participants and a good proxy for information asymmetry.  The literature 
also illustrates the importance of controlling for trading activity when examining the bid-
ask spread.  Consequently, this study uses trading volume as a control in models 
investigating the relationship between the percentage spread and compliance with IAS.  
The percentage bid-ask spread metric is based on the quoted spread and is used in lieu of 
decomposing the quoted spread. 
Limitations of Using Bid-Ask Spread 
 
 
     Although the adverse selection component of the bid-ask spread certainly appears to 
be less than a perfect proxy for information asymmetry, it is more commonly used in the 
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literature than is the entire quoted spread.  However, the dataset used in this study 
consists of price data consisting of daily closing prices and limited market depth (daily) 
information.  Consequently, estimation of the information asymmetry component using 
one of these decomposition models is impractical and the analysis is limited to the effects 
on quoted spread (using the percentage spread metric).  Since Stoll (1989) and others 
suggest that the bid-ask spread is composed of three components, using the overall spread 
increases the danger of both Type I (incorrectly rejecting the null hypothesis) and Type II 
error (incorrectly failing to reject the null).  Changes in the overall spread, though Leuz 
(2003) sees this risk as being low, may occur because of changes in the order processing 
or inventory holding components, even though these changes may be attributed to 
changes in a firm’s information environment (Type I error).  A lack of change in the 
spread could also be observed even when the information asymmetry component is 
shifting (Type II error).  This could arise if changes in one or both of the other two 
components served to offset the changes in the information asymmetry component.  
Regardless, the assessment of changes in bid-ask spreads is built upon the premise that 
the inventory holding and order processing components are held constant (if not low), or 
that any reduction in the total spread is at least correlated with, if not directly attributable 
to, reduction in the information asymmetry component.  
     Though finer data are almost always preferred, the use of intraday data in this case 
seems unwarranted in view of the doubts expressed in the literature above and due to the 
fact that the measure of the primary independent variable (IAS compliance) is an annual 
assessment.  The best case scenario would obviously be one in which intraday or even 
daily measures of the information asymmetry component were aggregated into an annual 
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measure and then compared to results from using the entire spread.  Again, however, data 
availability limits the analysis to the total quoted spread. 
Analyst Forecast Accuracy and Dispersion 
 
 
     Research involving properties of analysts’ earnings forecasts (i.e., studies dealing 
primarily with accuracy, dispersion, or bias) is extensive.  After a brief description of the 
financial analyst’s task, the following sections discuss this research, specifically as it 
relates to forecast dispersion and its use as a proxy for information asymmetry.  The 
various ways to measure forecast dispersion and the multitude of factors that have been 
shown to affect dispersion are then reviewed.  The discussion involving analyst forecast 
dispersion concludes with the limitations of using this proxy. 
The Analyst’s Task 
 
 
     Financial analysts are among the primary users of financial accounting information, 
and researchers have been investigating the nature of this association for many years 
(Schipper, 1991).  The typical analyst’s forecast report includes buy or sell 
recommendations, a description of a firm’s position with respect to its competitors, and a 
discussion of the prospects the firm’s industry as a whole (Bhushan, 1989b).  Though 
secondary to the task of writing these reports, analysts often provide short-term earnings 
forecasts and long-term growth forecasts.  Analysts also perform investigative tasks to 
improve their ability to forecast earnings per share, with the ultimate goal of making 
better stock recommendations.  In addition to gathering information from other analysts, 
they study market research, trade press, and various statistics that convey information 
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about the firm and its industry, including an analysis of the firm’s financial statements.  
As part of the overall investigation, analysts may also interview customers, suppliers, and 
company management (Schipper, 1991).  Other researchers have also established that the 
annual report is a crucial part of analysts’ information set both in the U.S. and abroad 
(e.g., Vergoossen, 1993; Epstein and Palepu, 1999). 
     Blackwell and Dubins (1962) were the first to demonstrate that opinions tend to 
converge as the amount of information about an uncertainty increases.  The logic behind 
the use of dispersion of analysts’ forecasts to proxy for the quality of a firm’s information 
environments follows from the Blackwell and Dubins findings.   If a firm generates 
financial information of high quality, it will enable an analyst to more accurately predict 
earnings, thus reaching conclusions similar to that of his or her colleagues.  Conversely, 
firms providing information that is vague or of insufficient quantity create varied 
interpretations of that information, causing high dispersion among analysts’ forecasts of 
earnings (Ciccone, 2001).   
Dispersion and/or Accuracy as a Proxy for Market Uncertainty 
 
 
     Investors’ differing beliefs about a firm’s future earnings and stock returns are 
unobservable.  Thus, the dispersion of analysts’ forecasts of earnings per share is 
commonly used in accounting and finance literature as a surrogate for these differing 
beliefs and/or market uncertainty (e.g., Comiskey et al., 1987; Ziebart, 1990; Ajinkya et 
al., 1991; Morse et al., 1991; Stickel, 1989; Lobo, 1992; Imhoff and Lobo, 1992; Atiase 
and Bamber, 1994; Barron and Stuerke, 1998; and Krishnaswami and Subramaniam, 
1999).   
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     La Porta (1996), Barry and Brown (1985), and Ajinkya and Gift (1985), among others, 
advise that the divergence of analysts’ opinions is indeed an appropriate surrogate for 
earnings uncertainty.  Brown et al. (1987b), Brown and Rozeff (1978), and Fried and 
Givoly (1982) are among those who have empirically confirmed that analysts’ forecasts 
are better surrogates of investors’ expectations than either naïve or mechanical models.  
Brown et al. (1987b) suggest their results “demonstrate the preeminence of security 
analysts’ forecasts as the best single proxy for market earnings expectations” (p. 65).  
Daley et al. (1988) and Ajinkya and Gift (1985) also find that earnings forecasts are 
effective indicators of the market’s uncertainty with respect to future earnings 
announcements.  Daley et al. (1988) document a positive association between the 
variance in analysts’ forecasts and (1) the magnitude of the forecast error, and (2) the 
average variance of the return to maturity as implied by the prices of options maturing 
after earnings announcement dates.  Ajinkya and Gift use a similar methodology to 
indicate that implied standard deviation in returns reflects contemporaneous dispersion in 
analysts’ forecasts—beyond information that can be gleaned from an historical time 
series of returns.31   In a summary of the earnings expectation research, Williams (1995) 
confirms that analysts’ forecasts better approximate actual earnings and are more closely 
associated with security price movements than statistical models of future earnings. 
     Several authors (i.e., Litzenberger and Rao, 1972; Bowen, 1981; and Givoly and 
Lakonishok, 1984) go so far as to suggest that analysts’ forecast dispersion could be 
defined as an ex ante surrogate for the overall firm risk.  Givoly and Lakonishok mention 
that, unlike beta or other risk surrogates estimated from past time-series, the advantage of 
                                                 
31 Ajinkya and Gift (1985) use the Black-Scholes option pricing model and simultaneous levels of option 
and stock prices to derive the implied standard deviation in returns. 
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analysts’ forecast dispersion is that it is an ex ante, rather than an ex post measure of risk.  
Athanassakos and Kalimipalli (2003) empirically confirm the notion that the dispersion 
of analysts’ forecasts is an ex ante risk measure in at least one setting.  These authors find 
that a sample of U.S. firms from 1981-1996 exhibits a strong positive correlation between 
forecast dispersion and future price volatility.  Several other empirical studies find that 
there is also a relationship between the dispersion of analysts’ forecasts and alternative 
proxies for firm risk.  Givoly and Lakonishok (1983) observe that dispersion is related to 
systematic risk (beta), total risk (standard deviation of returns), and earnings growth 
variability.  In earlier studies, Malkiel (1982) and Malkiel and Cragg (1980) find that the 
dispersion of forecasts appears to be more highly correlated with expected return than 
even with the CAPM beta, and Malkiel concludes that the best single risk proxy is not 
beta, but the dispersion of analysts’ forecasts.  Malkiel and Cragg likewise stress that 
dispersion measures could be construed not only as indicators of systematic risk, but also 
as indicators of overall firm risk. 
     Increases or decreases in the dispersion of analysts’ forecasts over time are 
inconsequential unless a linkage between divergence in expectations and increased costs 
for the firm can be established.  Handa and Linn (1993), Coles et al. (1995), Cho and 
Harter (1995), and L’Her and Suret (1996) conclude that the estimation risk associated 
with divergence in agents’ expectations must, in fact, be compensated.  These results are 
in line with the previously discussed studies in which heterogeneity of expectations is 
expressly viewed as an ex ante risk measure (e.g., Cragg and Malkiel, 1982; Barry and 
Brown, 1985; and Varian, 1989) or as a measure of incomplete information (Merton, 
1987).  Thus, a large degree of unpredictability of earnings arguably carries with it the 
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perception that there is a greater level of risk.  If one accepts the notion that greater risk 
requires higher returns (i.e., assuming a prevalence of risk-averse investors), then firms 
whose earnings and prices are less predictable over time incur a demand for higher 
returns, and ceteris paribus, these firms are subject to a higher cost of capital. 
     Additional empirical evidence shows that analyst forecast dispersion may indeed have 
some very useful informational characteristics.  Dische (2002) is among an increasing 
number of researchers who find that the dispersion in consensus forecasts may be 
incrementally informative for the prediction of future stock returns.  Dische shows that 
for German stocks in the 1987-2000 period, a portfolio consisting of low forecast 
dispersion stocks outperforms a portfolio consisting of high dispersion stocks.  
Specifically, he discovers that an investment strategy applied to the low dispersion stocks 
outperforms the low dispersion stocks by an incredible 95 basis points per month.32  
Dische thus lends credibility to the assertion (made by Givoly and Lakonishok [1984], 
among others) that forecast dispersion can in fact be seen as an ex ante measure of firm 
risk, at least for the German market.  Evidence suggests the Dische results may also 
extend to U.S. markets.  Ang and Ciccone (2001) sort portfolios on the degree of forecast 
dispersion, Fama and MacBeth (1973) perform cross-sectional regressions, and Fama and 
French (1993) use factor models to each show that U.S. firms with lower forecast 
dispersion or error enjoy greater stock returns.   
     Though less popular than the use of forecast dispersion, a related metric, forecast error 
(often measured as the absolute value of the difference between the forecasted and the 
                                                 
32 Dische’s (2002) primary motive was actually to investigate whether a portfolio involving going long 
(purchasing) in stocks with upward analysts’ revisions would outperform a portfolio involving going 
short (selling) in stocks with downward analysts’ revisions.  He then applies this same strategy to both 
high dispersion and low dispersion groupings.   
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actual earnings deflated by stock price33), is often utilized as an indicator of investor or 
market uncertainty regarding firm performance.  Elton et al. (1984), Christie (1987), and 
Atiase and Bamber (1994) are among those suggesting that analyst forecast error does 
provide, in addition to forecast dispersion, a useful proxy for information asymmetry.  
There are many studies that consider the determinants of analysts’ forecast accuracy (e.g., 
Brown et al., 1987b; Kross et al., 1990; Lang and Lundholm, 1996; Wiedman, 1996; 
Clement, 1999).  Although past empirical studies generally find analysts to be 
systematically optimistic in their earnings forecasts (e.g., O’Brien, 1988; Abarbanell, 
1991), some recent research has documented the presences of pessimistic analyst 




     Researchers have measured analysts’ forecast dispersion in several ways.  Within the 
accounting literature, the most commonly used dispersion metrics are: (1) variance of the 
forecasts (e.g., Morse et al., 1991; Daley et al., 1988); (2) standard deviation (SD) of the 
forecasts (e.g., Lang and Lundholm, 1996); and the most common one, (3) the coefficient 
of variation (CV), which is the standard deviation divided by a mean (or median) EPS 
forecast for a specific time period (e.g., Ajinkya et al., 1991; Comiskey et al., 1987; 
Elliott and Philbrick, 1990; Ziebart, 1990; Imhoff and Lobo, 1992; Healy et al., 1996; 
Das and Saudagaran, 1998). 
     Buchenroth and Jennings (1987) found that their results were sensitive to the 
specification of the dispersion measure (SD vs. CV) and the deflator (mean vs. median 
EPS forecast).  Because any standard deviation measure is sensitive to the size of the 
                                                 
33 See, for example, Duru and Reeb (2002). 
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underlying population, the strategy in this study is to use the coefficient of variation (with 
median as the deflator, while use of the mean serves as a sensitivity test) as the measure 
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Smaller values for the coefficient of variation are indicative of higher levels of agreement 
among analysts regarding future earnings.  Individual (monthly) measures using the 
formula above will be taken for periods following each of three actual earnings 
announcements from fiscal years 1996-1998. 
     Lobo (1992) uses a minimum of five forecasters to form the dispersion measure at any 
one point in time.  However, the number of analysts following some of the sample firms 
tends to be lower than the typical U.S. firm, so the minimum forecasters in this study will 
be set at three.   The analysis will be repeated using a minimum requirement of five 
forecasters to determine the sensitivity of the results.  Also, the time frame from which 
forecasts are taken is an important consideration.  For instance, Capstaff et al. (2001) use 
a forecast horizon that goes from 20 months before fiscal year-end to 3 months after 
fiscal year-end as part of a classic event study.  The post-fiscal year-end period allows the 
authors to pick up the lag in European firm’s announcements of the actual EPS numbers.  
However, the fundamental hypothesis in this study is that analysts are able to be more 
precise with their forecasts due to better quality financial information.  For instance, the 
analysts would be using the 1996 fiscal year report to assist in forming their estimates for 
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fiscal 1997.   Thus, the last consensus forecast prior to the actual earnings announcement 
and one six months prior will both be paired with the prior year’s financial information 
(i.e., IAS compliance) in the analysis.   
Determinants of Forecast Accuracy and/or Dispersion 
 
 
     Though contrary to the seemingly more rational notion that greater information will 
decrease analysts’ forecast dispersion, Lang and Lundholm (1996) and Eng and Teo 
(2000) do offer a circumstance in which information actually increases the dispersion of 
analysts’ forecasts.  In this situation, the forecasters are each using unique models to 
derive their forecasts, and the introduction of greater information causes each of the 
estimates from these various models to increasingly diverge.  Given this case holds at 
least occasionally, one could also envision a scenario in which analysts’ forecast 
dispersion increases while the consensus (mean) forecast becomes more accurate.  
Research into whether an improved information set assists analysts with their forecast 
task has produced mixed results, though the consensus is that dispersion normally 
decreases with improved information.  Lang and Lundholm (1996) find that the quality of 
annual report disclosure among U.S. firms (based on a component of the overall AIMR 
rankings) is negatively related to forecast dispersion, but not significantly related to 
forecast accuracy.  Adrem (1999) studies Swedish firms and also finds a significant 
inverse relationship between a more active, informative disclosure strategy and analysts’ 
forecast dispersion.  Adrem discovers a statistically insignificant association between 
disclosure and forecast accuracy for the same Swedish firms.  Conversely, both Basu et 
al. (1998) and Chang et al. (2000) use country-level disclosure levels to illustrate that 
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these there is a positive relationship between forecast accuracy and these disclosure 
levels.34  However, Chang et al. fail to find a significant association between disclosure 
and forecast dispersion.   
     While examining the impact of IAS adoption on analysts’ forecast accuracy, 
Ashbaugh and Pincus (2001) discover that there is a significant increase in the number of 
news reports about non-U.S. firms in the year following IAS adoption.  Consequently, 
these authors control for changes in the number of news reports, market capitalization, 
and analyst following in their assessment.  Ashbaugh and Pincus ultimately find that the 
adoption of IAS results in a statistically significant reduction in analysts’ forecast errors.  
As mentioned earlier, they also discover that analysts’ forecast accuracy is adversely 
affected by the extent of the difference between a country’s domestic accounting 
standards and IAS.   
     Hope (2003) provides one of the rare cross-country examinations of the characteristics 
of financial analysts’ forecasts, and possibly the only research to date empirically 
addressing the effects of accounting standards enforcement.  He uses the following proxy 
variables to assess the degree of enforcement of accounting standards: country-level audit 
spending, insider trading laws, judicial efficiency, legal tradition, shareholder protection, 
auditor type (firm-level), and stock exchange listings (firm-level).35  Hope examines the 
degree to which analyst forecast accuracy is dependent upon both the amount of firms’ 
financial accounting disclosure and the degree of enforcement of accounting regulations.  
                                                 
34 Basu et al. (1998) examine forecast accuracy using a sample of seven countries, including France and 
Switzerland.  Chang et al. (2000) use a sample of 37 countries and a well-known disclosure measure 
(Center for International Financial Analysis and Research [CIFAR] country averages from 1990) to 
proxy for annual report disclosure levels.  Hope (2003) notes that the limitation of using country-level 
disclosure scores is that the within-country variation can be as significant as the between-country 
differences. 
35 See Hope (2003) for a detailed description of each of these variables. 
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Hope finds that both firm-level disclosures and strong enforcement of accounting 
standards are positively related to forecast accuracy.  He also finds that the firm-level 
disclosures have a greater effect on analyst forecast accuracy when the number of 
analysts following is relatively low.36    
     Both Capstaff et al. (2001) and Higgins (1998) use country-level disclosure rankings 
developed by Saudagaran and Biddle (1992)37 to examine the relationship between 
country-level disclosure and analyst forecast accuracy.  The Capstaff et al. results 
indicate that the mean country-level accuracy matches up with the disclosure ranking of 
the five European countries in their study for which a Saudagaran and Biddle disclosure 
index is provided (six European countries in the Capstaff et al. study were not ranked by 
Saudagaran and Biddle).  Capstaff et al. also find the forecasts with the strongest 
optimistic bias are from the analysts of Swiss firms, and that the overall accuracy of 
forecasts deteriorates significantly as the forecast horizon lengthens.  Higgins (1998) also 
assesses the ability of financial analysts to accurately forecast the earnings of firms from 
seven countries (United States, Japan, and five European companies—including France 
and Switzerland) and finds a positive relationship between a countries’ level of disclosure 
and the accuracy of the forecasts. 
     Forecast horizon, and specifically, the proximity of the forecast to the actual earnings 
announcement apparently also plays an important role in determining the accuracy and/or 
dispersion of analysts’ forecasts.  A number of authors document that the nearer a 
                                                 
36 Hope (2003) does not address the rationale for firms’ levels of disclosure, nor is it the intention of this 
study to do so.  For extensive reviews of the literature on empirical findings related to financial 
disclosure in the global arena, see Saudagaran and Meek (1997) and Marston and Shrives (1996). 
37 Saudagaran and Biddle (1992) surveyed 142 participants of the international security listing process (e.g., 
investment bankers, stock exchange officials, public accountants, etc.) and asked these individuals to 
rank countries based on both voluntary and mandated disclosures.  Among the seven countries 
involved in the survey, France ranked 4th and Switzerland ranked 7th.  
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forecast is to the earnings announcement date, the more accurate the forecast becomes 
(e.g., Brown, 1991, Das and Saudagaran, 1998; Capstaff et al., 2001; Richardson et al., 
2001).  Richardson et al. (2001), for instance, find that analysts make optimistic forecasts 
at the beginning of each year and then ‘walk down’ their estimates to a level that the firm 
can meet (or exceed) by the end of the year.  Regardless whether early forecasts are either 
optimistic or pessimistic, the increased accuracy as the earnings announcement 
approaches would seem to be an intuitive consequence since the analyst would 
undoubtedly have better information about a firm’s earnings prospects as the 
announcement draws near.   
     As noted earlier, Capstaff et al. (2001) also indicate that the forecast horizon is 
important in generating more accurate forecasts.  These authors find that for eleven 
European countries, short horizon forecasts (four months or less from announcement) 
explained more than 50 percent of the variation in actual earnings per share.  Forecasts 
that are made twelve months from the announcement, conversely, explained only three 
percent of the variation in actual earnings.  A number of other authors using U.S. data 
(e.g., Brown et al., 1987a, 1987b; O’Brien and Bhushan, 1990; Brown, 1993; Duru and 
Reeb, 2002) concur with Capstaff et al. and find that longer forecast horizons are 
associated with less forecast accuracy (and likely greater dispersion).      
     The extent of earnings management may also impact the financial analyst’s ability to 
forecast earnings, particularly in multinational settings.  Leuz et al. (2003) find that 
among 31 countries, Switzerland ranks seventh in the degree to which earnings are 
managed, while France and Sweden rank among countries seeing relatively less earnings 
management (ranking 21st and 25th, respectively).  Leuz et al. also conclude that reported 
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earnings in the U.S. are managed relatively less than earnings from other countries.  
Brown and Higgins (2002) note that earnings surprises (difference between actual and 
forecasted earnings) can be managed to be more upbeat by either providing financial 
analysts downward guidance (a less optimistic message) or by managing reported 
earnings upward.  With this notion in mind, Brown and Higgins (2001) also assess the 
management of earnings, but by examining the earnings surprises in thirteen countries.38  
Brown and Higgins find relatively low earnings management in France, Sweden, and 
Switzerland, particularly when compared with U.S. earnings surprises, contradicting the 
Leuz et al. (2003) findings.  They also discover that the management of earnings 
surprises has increased over time globally, whereas Bhattacharya et al. (2003), Fulkerson 
et al. (2002), and Land and Lang (2002) find that the global management of reported 
earnings has decreased over time. 
     In summary, researchers have shown that for a variety of settings a large number of 
factors impact analyst forecast dispersion and/or accuracy.  These factors include: the 
properties of earnings, the extent of earnings management, the level of enforcement of 
accounting standards, the number of analysts following a firm, and the forecast horizon.  
The extent to which these factors are controlled for in this study will be limited only by 
the availability of data on those factors.  Whether the findings on analyst forecast 
dispersion discussed above, including those regarding confounding factors, are also 
common in non-U.S. markets is also an empirical question that is largely unanswered.  
Finally, if the results associating lesser forecast dispersion with higher stock returns 
and/or lower earnings variability can be relied upon, then one could assume that any 
                                                 
38 Brown and Higgins (2002) and Matsumoto (2002) also examine earnings management, but by looking at 
the difference between the consensus analyst forecast of earnings and the expected forecast of 
earnings based on prior changes in earnings. 
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factor serving to reduce forecast dispersion would naturally be viewed in a very positive 
light. 
Limitations of the Use of Analysts’ Forecasts 
 
 
     Various researchers note that there are some limitations of using financial analysts’ 
forecasts as proxies for investors’ expectations and information asymmetry (e.g., 
Schipper, 1991; Imhoff and Lobo, 1992; Abarbanell et al., 1995; Barron, 1995; Williams, 
1995; Barron et al., 1997; and Bamber et al., 1997).  For example, Abarbanell et al. 
(1995) explain that analysts’ forecasts are imperfect measures for at least three reasons: 
(1) analysts depend on common sources of information that are not likely available to the 
individual investor; (2) individuals use analysts’ forecasts to form expectations, but these 
expectations are also a function of the relative importance of other sources of private 
information; and, (3) empirical models using expectations (e.g., valuation models) are 
generally formulated using expected prices rather than expected earnings.  Because 
analysts’ forecast dispersion does not capture all of the elements inherent in investors’ 
expectations, measurement error may be elevated.   
     Schipper (1991) and Givoly and Lakonishok (1984) also mention that the analyst’s 
overall decision process incorporates a loss function that is unlikely to mimic the loss 
function of an individual investor.  The analyst’s loss function affects the way he or she 
views the task of estimating earnings in a way that may differ from how an individual 
investor would view the same task.  Schipper states that the nature of the analyst’s loss 
function may not be captured by the typical measures used for evaluating earnings 
forecasts. 
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     The ability of analysts to assess earnings levels is also unlikely to be based on the 
annual report alone.  In fact, Frankel and Lee (1998) and Dechow et al. (1999) use 
analysts’ forecasts as proxies for all non-accounting information that the analyst may 
have at their disposal.  Beaver (2002) also lists some possible nonfinancial measures that 
may impact the properties (i.e., accuracy and dispersion) of analysts’ forecasts (e.g., 
market share, population within licensed areas, penetration ratios, etc.).  As was 
discussed earlier, this study essentially assumes that the annual report is either the 
analyst’s sole source of information about the firm or the other sources have random and 
independent effects on the dependent variables.  If both these assumptions are untrue, it 
leaves open the possibility that any observed changes in forecast dispersion (or any of the 
other variables at least partially dependent upon the quality of information) occurred as a 
result of changes in omitted variable (i.e., other information sources). 
     Also, failure to reject null hypotheses may result if there is insufficient variation 
across firms in any of the dependent variables.  For instance, Ajinkya et al. (1991) find 
there is little intertemporal variation (i.e., there are elevated levels of autocorrelation) in 
their measure of forecast dispersion.  Additionally, there may be insufficient variability in 
other variables within this study (i.e., bid-ask spreads across firms), as documented by 
Callahan et al. (1997), who find that more than 75% of all trades on the New York Stock 
Exchange (NYSE) occur at 1/8 or 1/4 spreads. 
     Financial analysts’ forecast dispersion does likely measure the disagreement among 
individual market participants with error.  However, many researchers have also endorsed 
the use of (or used) financial analysts’ forecasts as proxies for unobservable investor 
beliefs.  Also, research has also shown that forecast dispersion itself may have 
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informational qualities (e.g., predictor of uncharacteristically high returns), justifying its 





     Amihud and Mendelson (1989) and Goyal and Santa-Clara (2003) are among those 
who suggest “idiosyncratic risk” may be used as a measure of information asymmetry.39  
Roll and Ross (1984) posit that the actual return on any asset (i.e., stock, bond, or 
portfolio) may be separated into three components: (1) the expected return on the asset; 
(2) the asset’s sensitivity to a change in a systematic factor, given by the actual return on 
the systematic factor; and (3) the return on the unsystematic (idiosyncratic or firm-
specific) factors.  Thus, idiosyncratic risk is the likelihood of a price change in a security 
resulting from circumstances that are unique to that particular firm, as opposed to those 
circumstances that affect the overall market (i.e., systematic risk).  Benston and 
Hagerman (1974), Richards (1999), and Xu and Malkiel (2003) are among those who 
estimate idiosyncratic (unsystematic) risk using the market model.  This model is the 
applied form of the CAPM, which can be expressed as: 



















                                                 
39 This form of risk is also referred to in the literature as unsystematic risk, residual risk, asset-specific risk, 
and firm-specific risk. 
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  Consequently, the return for firm i at time period t is given by: 
titmiiti rr ,,, εβα ++=         Equation 2 
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The assumption inherent in the market model (which is based on CAPM expected return 
theory) is that the rate of return on the market portfolio (rm,t) captures the effect of all 
variables that impact the return on the entire population of assets.  The disturbance term 
(εi,t) is presumed to capture variables that only (“idiosyncratically”) affect the returns for 
asset (or firm) i.  Benston and Hagerman (1974) find that for a sample of over-the-
counter (U.S.) stocks, their estimates of idiosyncratic risk are associated with one of the 
other proxies used in this study, bid-ask spreads.  Baer (1993) uses a somewhat more 
sophisticated model of systematic risk than the Sharpe (1964), Linter (1965), Black 
(1972) version above—one incorporating five macroeconomic factors—and finds “very 
little difference” (p. 48) between clusters based on this model and clusters based on the 
market model.   
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Modeling Expected Returns 
 
   
     Much of Richards’s (1999) paper is a discussion of alternative ways to measure a 
firm’s return, hence its idiosyncratic risk.  In one approach, he reports that the asset-
specific (idiosyncratic) component of an asset’s return could be calculated by subtracting 
the equally-weighted average return using all the assets in a specific class (e.g., a certain 
industry within a particular country) from the asset’s return.  The equation for this 
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Limitations of Using Idiosyncratic Risk 
 
 
     The primary deficiency in using idiosyncratic risk as a proxy for information 
asymmetry is that this firm-specific risk is derived from a subjective asset pricing model, 
regardless of which model is used to obtain the proxy.  Thus, the measures of levels of 
and changes in idiosyncratic risk and are only as robust as the pricing model used to 
obtain them.  There is significant disagreement in the finance community regarding the 
appropriate pricing model to use in modeling expected (U.S.) stock returns (see Fama and 
French [1993], Chan and Lakonishok [1993], Kothari et al. [1995], and Daniel and 
Titman [1997] for discussions), much less in the more diverse global arena (see Koedijk 
et al., 2002, for a summary).  The theoretical and empirical support for the use of 
idiosyncratic risk as a proxy for information asymmetry is also not as prevalent as it is for 
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the other two proxies used in this study.  Despite having relatively less support than the 
bid-ask spread and analyst forecast dispersion, it is likely that idiosyncratic risk would be 
the consensus choice as the third proxy for information asymmetry. 
Proxy Interaction and Potentially Confounding or Omitted Variables 
 
 
     The characteristics of the proxies for information asymmetry make it likely that there 
is some interaction among these proxies, due in part to the bid-ask spread, forecast 
dispersion, and idiosyncratic risk having some common explanatory variables.  For 
instance, Chung et al. (1995) document a positive relationship between the number of 
analysts following a firm and bid-ask spreads.  Chung et al. posit that analysts are 
attracted to firms with higher levels of information asymmetry due to the increasing value 
of private information about those firms.  The authors thus suggest that market makers 
may assess the degree of information asymmetry associated with a stock by observing 
how many analysts are following that stock, and then setting the level of the bid-ask 
spread accordingly.  The authors also list a number of other factors that may affect either 
the spread or the number of analysts following a firm. These factors and the literature 
supporting their inclusion in Chung et al.’s model include: price volatility affecting bid-
ask spreads [(Tinic and West, 1972), (Benston and Hagerman, 1974), (Stoll, 1978), 
(Copeland and Galai, 1983), and (McInish and Wood, 1992)]; price volatility affecting 
financial analyst following [(Bhushan, 1989a, b), Moyer et al., 1989)]; trading volume 
affecting the spread (McInish and Wood, 1992), firm size affecting the spread (Chung et 
al., 1995); and firm size affecting analyst following [(Bhushan, 1989a, b), (Moyer et al., 
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1989), and (Brennan and Hughes, 1991)].  Attempts will be made in this study to control 
for each of the variables shown to affect the information asymmetry proxies. 
     Affleck-Graves et al. (2002) find that NASDAQ firms with less predictable earnings 
(based on relatively less analyst forecast accuracy and relatively greater dispersion), have 
total bid-ask spreads that are higher than firms with more predicable earnings.  These 
results suggest there is incentive on the part of firms to manage their earnings, while 
providing further evidence of an empirical relationship between the proxies for 
information asymmetry.  In a related study, Ciccone (2001) theorizes that the ability of 
the analyst to accurately forecast earnings numbers may be correlated with the riskiness 
of the firm.  Specifically, analysts’ predictions of more risky firms may be less accurate 
and more widely dispersed because those firms have more volatile earnings (e.g., 
Capstaff et al., 2001), and not due to greater levels of information asymmetry.  More 
volatility in earnings may also, as Van Ness et al. (2001) find, be correlated with the 
adverse selection component of bid-ask spreads.  Taken together, the Affleck-Graves et 
al. (2002), the Ciccone (2001), and the Van Ness et al. (2001) results seem to indicate 
that one should expect some relationship between forecast dispersion and the bid-ask 
spread that is possibly unconnected to information asymmetry changes—if earnings 
volatility is indeed a driver of each.   
     Firm size, a variable used as a proxy for a multitude of characteristics within the 
accounting and finance literature, may also impact the hypothesized relationships in this 
study.  For example, Atiase (1986) argues that large firms are less likely to see high 
degrees of information asymmetry due in part to an increased analyst following.  
However, as Dunn and Nathan (2000) and Duru and Reeb (2002), among others, 
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illustrate, there tend to be a greater number of analysts following large firms than small 
firms.  Based on the results and arguments in Chung et al., (1995), Atiase (1986), Dunn 
and Nathan (2000), and Duru and Reeb (2002), the overall conclusion would be that large 
firms attract analysts, causing market makers to generate a larger bid-ask spread.  But 
intuitively, one would expect large firms to be associated with relatively lower levels of 
information asymmetry, and several authors have found firm size and the extent of 
disclosure in annual reports to be positively related (e.g., Buzby, 1975; Cooke, 1989a; 
Meek et al., 1995; Raffournier, 1995; Wallace and Naser, 1995; Ashbaugh, 2001). 
     Some of the “interaction” described may not in reality be interaction, but simply two 
or more variables that are held up as proxies for the same construct measuring what they 
are purported to measure (e.g., Ciccone, 2001).  If, for instance, the levels of forecast 
dispersion and idiosyncratic risk are appropriate measures of information asymmetry, one 
would expect an event that genuinely reduces information asymmetry to affect both 
measures.   
      This section has provided evidence that these proxies for information asymmetry may 
be affected by factors above and beyond changes in the informedness of capital market 
participants.  The discussion also illustrates that isolating and measuring the nature of the 
relationships involving these variables has been and will continue to be considerably 
more problematic than the typical cause-effect relationship.  This difficulty arises due to 
the extent and complexity of interactions between the proxies for information asymmetry 
and external factors, and among the proxies themselves (e.g., a market maker observes 
high dispersion in analysts’ forecasts, assumes that it is an indication of greater degrees 
of information asymmetry, and thus increases the bid-ask spread).   
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Summary of the Information Asymmetry Proxy Literature 
 
     The bid-ask spread and analysts’ forecast dispersion have strong support as proxies for 
the unobservable beliefs of capital market participants.  However, several authors 
question the appropriateness of various bid-ask spread decomposition models given 
anomalous results, and even these results are primarily gleaned from quote-driven trading 
structures, rather than the order-driven markets used in this study.  Analysts’ forecast 
dispersion too comes with some measurement difficulties, particularly with regard to the 
massive number of potentially confounding variables that have been shown to impact the 
extent of dispersion.   
     Whereas the bid-ask spread and analysts’ forecast dispersion have widespread 
endorsement as proxies for information asymmetry, idiosyncratic risk has somewhat less 
support.  This may be due to the fact that idiosyncratic risk is derived from expected 
return models which have varied levels of support.  Again, however, the selection of 
proxies in the current study is based upon the prevalence of these proxies in the prior 
accounting and finance literature in which information asymmetry is explored.  Each of 
these three proxies is uniquely problematic.  Nonetheless, there appears to be no better 
way to assess whether a firm has reduced the information asymmetry between its own 
managers and those external to the firm—and hence reduced its cost of capital—than the 
collective use of these proxies. 
Contribution of this Study 
 
 
     It is difficult to identify and quantify any firm benefits when the decision is made to 
change a firm’s financial reporting system.  Although firms presumably conduct lengthy 
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analyses regarding any proposed change to their current reporting system, primarily 
anecdotal evidence indicates it is also likely that present and future costs are much easier 
to catalogue and predict than are the future benefits.  There are few examples of empirical 
work that attempt to quantify benefits of firm disclosure in the U.S. or elsewhere.  The 
number of non-U.S. studies examining changes in information asymmetry is scarce, and 
this researcher finds no study that addresses potential changes in information asymmetry 
using the multitude of proxies found in this study.  Due to the number of factors that have 
been shown to affect the information asymmetry proxies, it is doubtful that the results of 
this study will provide unassailable evidence regarding the benefits of complying with 
International Accounting Standards.  However, it will provide a valuable foundation from 
which other studies of the benefits of financial presentation, including those dealing with 
the adoption of and/or compliance with a set of accounting standards, can be carried out.  
The fact that a company may be able to a priori predict whether it may receive 
quantifiable financial benefits by moving toward compliance with IAS is a worthy 
objective of this study.  Finding a statistically reliable association between IAS 
adoption/compliance and reductions in the magnitude of all three finance variables would 
provide evidence of the benefits companies could receive from moving toward full IAS 
compliance. 
     The three proxies for information asymmetry detailed above are well received in the 
accounting and finance literature.  Likewise, they bring triangulation to the research 
question posed here, since they are derived from three relatively independent sources that 
are all external to the firm.  Financial analysts produce earnings forecasts, market makers 
(or limit order traders) establish bid-ask spreads, and the collective behavior of the 
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market as a whole determines idiosyncratic risk.  Therefore, consistency among the three 
proxies brings an added level of robustness to any result.  A lack of consistency among 
the results would obviously provide less assurance that greater compliance with IAS 
generates greater benefits—at least in terms of how the benefits have been 
operationalized in this study.  A positive byproduct of this study is that it will also 
provide some insight into how the levels of these theoretically supported measures for 
information asymmetry relate to one another in the French, Swedish, and Swiss markets.  
Regardless of the geographic setting, no previous study has combined what are the three 
most popular proxies for information asymmetry into one analysis.   







































     The fundamental question addressed in this study is whether firms from France, 
Sweden, and Switzerland derive information asymmetry benefits from relatively greater 
compliance with International Accounting Standards.  The benefits are operationalized as 
lower levels of three proxies for information asymmetry: the bid-ask spread, analyst 
forecast dispersion, and idiosyncratic (or firm-specific) risk.  To determine whether 
relatively higher levels of compliance are associated with relatively lower levels of the 
information asymmetry proxies, multiple regression in the form of ordinary least squares 
analysis (OLS) is used.  One of the three information asymmetry proxies will serve as the 
dependent variable in each of three fundamental regression models.  The principal 
independent variable in all of these models is the extent of firm-level IAS compliance.   
     Additional independent variables are used to control for firm-related characteristics 
that the literature shows may affect information asymmetry proxies.  Independent 
variables are also added to assess country or interactive (with IAS compliance) effects on 
the dependent variables.  Finally, correlation analyses will be performed to evaluate 
univariate relationships, in part to consider the degree to which the collinearity of 
independent variables is a problem in the regressions. 
     The following sections in Chapter III describe: 1) the time period for the study and the 
selection of the sample firms, 2) the measurement of IAS compliance and how the audit 
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opinion impacts perceptions of compliance, 3) the measurement of bid-ask spreads, 4) the 
measurement of forecast dispersion, 5) the measurement of idiosyncratic risk, 6) the 
justification for and measurement of selected control variables, and 7) a discussion of the 
primary and secondary hypotheses along with the models used to test them. 
 
Time-Period and Sample Selection 
 
 
     The three-year period from 1996 to 1998 is used to evaluate the effect of IAS 
compliance on the information asymmetry proxies.  1996 is chosen as a start date in part 
because the IASC’s Comparability/Improvements Project was ending. One of the 
objectives of the Comparability Project was to reduce the number of allowed alternatives 
under IAS.  Since fewer accounting choices were now available, it is likely easier to 
distinguish between the use of IAS and domestic GAAP, hence the extent of IAS 
compliance.  The 1996-1998 period also partially coincides with two well-known 
compliance studies discussed earlier (Street et al. [1999], who analyze 1996 fiscal period 
reports and Cairns [1999a], who reviews fiscal 1998 reports).   
     At November 1998, the IASC’s webpage listed 128 firms from France, Sweden, and 
Switzerland using IAS.  Nineteen of these firms are omitted from the study because the 
firm was either not publicly listed, it substantially changed structure via merger or 
acquisition, or it was an affiliated firm or subsidiary of another sample firm.  Fifteen 
firms are omitted because they did not have at least two English annual reports available 
during the three fiscal years 1996-1998.  Ten of the firms are removed because there were 
no claims in either the accounting policy statement or the audit report that IAS was being 
used.  Two firms are omitted because of claims that U.S. GAAP was being used in 
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conjunction with IAS.  Finally, nine firms are added when evidence of their IAS 
compliance claims became apparent through a variety of other sources (e.g., Global 
Vantage, Auer [1998], Dumontier and Raffournier [1998]).  The resulting sample consists 
of 91 firms and 247 firm-year observations of IAS compliance.  However, due to missing 
observations in the dependent variable data, there are considerably fewer than 247 
observations in each of the analyses comparing compliance to the bid-ask spread, analyst 
forecast dispersion, and idiosyncratic risk.  The final sample also includes both financial 
firms and firms with fiscal year-ends other than December 31.  Ten companies in the 
sample have a fiscal year-end that does not match the calendar year and six are financial 
firms. 
128 French, Swedish, Swiss firms listed on IASC website 
(19)  Non-listed, structure change, affiliated firms 
(15) Firms without at least two years of English annual reports  
(10) Firms not claiming compliance in either audit report or policy statement 
 (2) Firms using U.S. GAAP in addition to IAS 
   9 IAS “Claimants” not listed on IASC website 
       =    91 Study firms scored for IAS compliance 
       x  2.72 Average number of reports per firm 
       =   247 Total annual reports evaluated for IAS compliance 
 
Nearly all of the firms’ annual reports are downloaded from the Primark/Thomson 
website.  Primark/Thomson provides online access to images of reports from firms 
worldwide.  A few reports missing from the Primark/Thomson database are downloaded 
from sample firms’ websites. 
Compliance with International Accounting Standards 
 
 
        The instrument appearing in Appendix 2 is used to assess the extent of a firm’s 
compliance with IAS.  It is in part the result of information from Cairns (1999a), Tower 
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et al. (1999), and others (e.g., Ashbaugh and Pincus, 1998; Street and Gray, 2000a) who 
have analyzed firms’ compliance with International Accounting Standards.  Cairns’s 
categorical assessment and Tower et al.’s 512-point evaluation are likely the two most 
comprehensive instruments that have been used to assess IAS compliance.  However, 
applying either of these “instruments” is problematic.  As noted previously, Cairns 
(1999a) places firms into eleven categories: 
 1) Full IAS compliance 
 2) Full IAS compliance with exceptions specified in the accounting policies  
 3) Full IAS compliance with exceptions specified in the notes to the financial 
  statements but outside the accounting policies 
 4) Full IAS compliance claimed but material omissions or exceptions evident  
  from the financial statements 
 5) Accounting policies comply with IASs or are based on IASs or IAS principles 
 6) Accounting policies comply with IASs or are based on IASs or the principles in 
  IASs but with specified exceptions from full compliance 
 7) IASs used only when there are no equivalent domestic standards 
 8) IASs used only for selected items or when permitted by domestic requirements 
 9) Reconciliation from domestic GAAP to IASs 
 10) Summary IAS financial statements (restatement of domestic financial  
  statements 
 11) Unquantified description of differences from IAS treatments  
  (Cairns 1999a, p. 10).  
 
There are several difficulties with Cairns’s approach for an empirical analysis.  First, the 
guidelines for placing a firm into a particular category seem less precise and more 
subjective than what is normally required for rigorous empirical analysis.  Cairns is not 
abundantly clear about what evidence is needed to place a firm into a specific category 
and he admits that some firms are very close to being reclassified into another category, 
hinting that the categorization may require considerable judgment.  Second, the 
categories are not rank-ordered from most compliant to least compliant and Cairns does 
not always provide an indication as to what categorical placement is preferred over 
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another.  Even if a researcher could use these categories to form a reliable rank-ordering, 
the coefficients on the resulting class variables would be less meaningful than they would 
be if the classes had more clearly defined ordinal properties.        
     An instrument similar to the one in Tower et al. (1999) appears to be preferable to 
Cairns’s in that it measures compliance with more precision.  These authors use seven 
“levels” of compliance within each of 512 specific IAS requirements.  The placement of 
a firm into one of these seven categories is less subjective than the Cairns (1999a) 
approach, but analyzing 512 items is a time-consuming process.  These authors find that 
over 60 percent of the data points addressed in their instrument are scored as “not 
disclosed”, suggesting that their instrument may actually be too detailed.  The authors 
find it difficult to ascertain whether a firm does not provide a required disclosures due to 
noncompliance or because the requirement is not applicable to that firm (e.g., no 
discontinued operations presented because the firm did not have operations meeting the 
criteria).  The Tower et al. instrument is primarily a structured search for IAS-required 
disclosures, whereas the Cairns (1999a) manuscript deals more with the misclassification 
of events or the misrepresentation of some aspect of performance.   
     The instrument in Appendix 2 removes some of the subjectivity found in Cairns’s 
(1999a) method and it can be applied more efficiently than the Tower et al. (1999) 
instrument.  The 46 questions were developed by considering all the prior research on 
IAS compliance.  This research, including Cairns (1999a), Tower et al. (1999), Ashbaugh 
and Pincus (1998), and Street and Gray (2000a), helped to identify not just contentious 
issues, but also those IAS requirements that were most often ignored by firms.  The 
choice of the questions is also based on using those contentious issues that can be 
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evaluated with the most objectivity.  Finally, industry-specific standards and/or 
guidelines that apply to only a small subset of firms, such as IAS #11 (Construction), IAS 
#15 (Changing Prices), IAS #20 (Government Grants), IAS #26 (Accounting and 
Reporting by Retirement Benefit Plans), IAS #29 (Hyperinflationary Economies), IAS 
#30 (Banks & Financial Institution disclosures), etc., are omitted from the analysis.   
     The instrument in Appendix 2 is applied to a total of 247 annual reports (from 91 
firms).  A score of ‘3’ is given to a firm on each of 46 questions if it is in full compliance 
with IAS.  A score of ‘2’ is given when it is not readily apparent that a firm is complying 
or the firm does not make it entirely clear that the question/standard does not apply to it.  
A score of ‘1’ is given when the firm is obviously not complying with a particular 
standard.   
     All of the questions found in the instrument pertain to IAS requirements during the 
period of study except for questions #42 and #43.  These questions deal with the 
requirement to present basic and fully diluted earnings per share, including the weighted 
average shares outstanding used in the calculation.  Since this requirement (IAS #33) is 
effective only for fiscal periods beginning on or after January 1, 1998, the denominator 
representing the total possible compliance score is greater (by six “points”) for those 
firms’ reports that cover a period starting after IAS #33 becomes effective. 
     Some of the evaluations are subjective.  For instance, the requirement to present 
minority interest is unimportant if the firm fully owns all of its subsidiaries (or it uses the 
rarely applied pooling of interest approach).  However, if the presentation does not make 
it clear that there is 100% ownership, the failure to provide minority interest figures 
results in a ‘2’, or possibly even a ‘3’ if there are indications elsewhere of interests 
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representing between 50% and 100% ownership of a firm (thus creating minority 
interest).  As another example, question #41 addresses whether a firm presents financial 
asset and liability information so that the amount, timing, and likelihood of future cash 
flows can be assessed.  This question has several layers of subjectivity.  First, does the 
firm have enough financial assets and liabilities to cause concern about the ability or 
inability of these assets and liabilities to create or use cash?  Second, if the firm does have 
a material amount of these assets or liabilities, is the disclosure adequate?  Essentially, if 
there are any questions as to the adequacy of disclosure, the firm receives a ‘2’ on this 
issue—or any other issue of this type.   
     The question that possibly requires the most judgment is question #19, “Does the 
entity adequately break down its operations into segments necessary to evaluate do 
product line and geographic analysis?”  This scoring is based on comparing the segment 
disclosure to other parts of the annual report.  For instance, if a firm describes various 
geographic locations in which it is operating or it has managers whose titles suggest their 
responsibilities cover a particular region or product line, then the expectation is that 
segment results are presented the same way.  If discussion in the annual report suggests 
there are at least four or five geographic areas and/or four or five distinct product lines, 
but the firm only provides results on two areas or product lines, then the firm receives a 
score of at most a ‘2’ on that particular question. 
     Questions #23 and #24 relate to the classification and presentation of leases.  If a firm 
states that it has no leased assets, then it receives a score of ‘3’.  If it is unclear whether 
the firm had leased assets (e.g., there is no statement to the effect that it does not have 
leased assets, or there are suggestions elsewhere in the annual report that there are lease 
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obligations), failure to provide the information required in questions #23 and #24 results 
in a score of ‘1’.   Several questions are at least in part conditional on the “answer” to the 
previous question (e.g., #36 is dependent on #35), but principally the questions address 
unique issues and are independent of answers to other questions. 
     Some judgment is also involved when evaluating the “spirit” of the IAS requirements.  
For instance, the requirements to expense R&D and to capitalize some development costs 
imply that the amounts expensed are distinguishable from other operating expenses.  If a 
firm proclaims that it is expensing R&D, but the amount is “hidden” within depreciation, 
salaries, etc., the result is a score of ‘2’.   
     The IASC does not intend to have all required items within the “audited” section of 
the financial statements.  For instance, the “discussion of the segments requirement” 
(Questions #20 and #21) would be met by very few firms if it is required to be within the 
“audited” pages.  However, the focus of the compliance questions is on the “audited 
pages” of a firm’s financial report.  Though it is sometimes unclear where these audited 
pages start and stop, the IASC specifically excludes management’s discussion of specific 
operations from its definition of “financial statements” (IASC 1997).  Hence, an 
adjustment is made to a firm’s compliance score if certain presentations are made only in 
the management discussion area of the report.  Specifically, if one of the required 
quantitative segment disclosures (questions #15, #16, #17) is provided outside the context 
of the audited pages of the annual report, a .5 penalty is assessed on that particular item 
after a determination of the adequacy of the disclosure is made.  The exception to this 
scoring is the requirement to describe the geographic and product line segments 
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(questions #20 and #21).  There is no penalty assessed if this discussion is presented 
outside the audited pages.   
     The compliance scores are also completed with respect to the materiality of specific 
amounts.  If it is unclear as to which compliance category an item should be placed, the 
materiality of that item relative to amounts within the same statement is taken into 
consideration.  For instance, if goodwill amortization is presented as a percentage of total 
operating expenses in the notes (rather than the face of the income statement), but it 
represents, say, only .2% of the total expenses, the firm is deemed to be in full 
compliance with the requirement to amortize goodwill (question #11). 
     Two percentage compliance scores are calculated.  One score equally weights each of 
the 46 questions in Appendix 2.  The second compliance score weights each question 
based on its perceived importance to a financial statement user.  Two accounting 
academics well-versed in financial statement analysis and one finance academic who is 
also a practicing financial analyst were asked to categorize the questions as A) most 
important, B) moderately important, or C) least important from the perspective of a 
financial statement user attempting to assess firm value.  The consensus weighting is 
reflected in Appendix 2 by denoting the “most important” questions with an ‘A’, 
moderately important questions with a ‘B’, and least important questions with a ‘C’.  The 
weights were applied by multiplying the ‘A’ category question scores by 2, the ‘B’ scores 
by 1.5, and the ‘C’ scores by 1.0.  For both the raw and weighted measures, the sum of 
the individual question scores is divided by the total possible score to achieve a 
percentage compliance score.  Because there is virtually no difference between the 
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eventual unweighted and the weighted percentage compliance scores (Pearson correlation 
= .9928), the weighted scores are used in analyses discussed in Chapter IV. 
 
Audit Opinion as Moderating Effect 
 
 
     The type of audit opinion provided can impact a user’s confidence in a set of financial 
statements.  Users who see an audit report as contradicting management claims likely 
view the financial statements in an entirely different light—likely with less credibility—
than they would if management and auditor assertions are in agreement.  In the context of 
this study, an audit firm may attest to a client’s compliance with IAS or it may indicate 
something quite different.  These auditor assertions serve to either corroborate or refute 
what management has declared within the accounting policy section of the annual report.   
     As a result, the scoring approach described in Appendix 3 is used to classify auditors’ 
opinions as either 1) confirming management’s contention that the firm is complying 
with IAS, or 2) non-confirming.40  The first category of firms is those in which both the 
accounting policy statement and the audit report confirm IAS compliance (referring to 
Appendix 3, a score of ‘1’ or ‘3’ in both the accounting policy and audit report 
evaluations) with no exceptions noted (a score of ‘A’ in assessment B2).  The second 
category of firms includes all those not satisfying the criteria for the first category.  There 
are no instances among the sample firms of an auditor asserting IAS compliance without 
management making similar claims. 
     A “dummy” variable is created in which the firms in the first group (referred to as 
“auditor-confirmation” firms) are assigned a value of ‘1’ and all other firms are assigned 
                                                 
40 The scoring mechanism shown in Appendix 3 is part of a larger instrument used to assess the type of 
audit opinion in the sample firms’ annual reports.  This instrument is based on the approach Cairns 
(1999a) uses to classify his sample firms’ auditor attestations. 
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a value of ‘0’.  The resulting dichotomous variable is used to test whether the auditor’s 
confirmation (or lack thereof) of IAS use has any impact on the relationship between IAS 
compliance and each of the dependent variables.  The audit compliance variable appears 
in the statistical models as a variable providing an effect separate from IAS compliance 
(an “intercept shifter”), but it is also examined as if it interacts (a “slope shifter”) with 
IAS compliance to affect the dependent variables.  Finally, a comparison of the extent of 
compliance between “auditor-confirming” firms and all others is performed to see if the 




Measuring Bid-Ask Spread 
 
 
     There are several metrics used in the literature to evaluate the magnitude of the bid-
ask spread, including quoted, effective, percentage (or relative) spreads, normalized (or 
standardized) spreads, and logarithmic transformations of one or more of these.  The 
quoted spread is commonly defined as the raw difference between the bid and ask prices.  
The effective spread is two times the difference between the execution price and the most 
recent midpoint of the bid and ask prices. The percentage or relative spread is either the 
quoted or effective spread divided by the midpoint of the bid and ask prices (see Chung et 
al., 2003 for more detail).  However, the definitions provided by Chung et al. do not seem 
to be universal.  Affleck-Graves et al. (2000) mention five methods that have been used 
in the literature: 1) spread (raw spread), 2) percentage spread (spread divided by price), 
the natural logarithms of 3) spread and 4) percentage spread, and 5) the change in spread 
(first differences).  These authors argue that since little is known about the distributional 
 78
properties of various spread metrics, it is difficult to assess the size (probability of Type I 
error) and power (probability of rejection) of any statistical tests employing these metrics.  
Affleck-Graves et al. then use the distributional properties of various spread metrics to 
provide support for standardizing the raw spread, and to show that logarithmic 
transformations appear to be unnecessary. 
     As Chung et al. (2003) and Affleck-Graves et al. (2000) illustrate, there seems to be 
some inconsistency in the literature regarding the number and form of bid-ask spread 
metrics.  Since Affleck-Graves et al. find that standardizing the raw spread is important 
and logarithmic transformations are not necessarily useful, the percentage spread (raw 
spread divided by the midpoint of the bid and ask quotes) is used in this study as a proxy 
for information asymmetry.  Specifically, the calculation is: 
Percentage Spread   =    (Ask – Bid) 
                                         (Ask + Bid)/2 
 
The bid and ask quotes for French and Swiss firm are provided by Datastream, while the 
Stockholm Exchange (OM Stockholmsbörsen) is the source for the Swedish bid and ask 
quotes.41  The closing-day bid and ask quotes for all the sample firms are used to form 
daily percentage spread measures.  A monthly mean percentage spread is then calculated 
using the daily measures.  The months corresponding to the fiscal period covered by a 
firm’s annual report are then aggregated (and divided by the relevant number of months) 
to form an average percentage spread over a 12-month period.  This average “annual” 
percentage spread becomes the measure of the first proxy for information asymmetry in 
the regression analysis detailed later in this chapter. 
                                                 
41 www.stockholmsborsen.se provides historical daily opening prices, closing prices, and closing bid and 
ask quotes for all listed firms. 
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Analyst Forecast Dispersion and Accuracy 
 
Measuring the Dispersion of Analysts’ Forecasts 
 
 
     Thomson’s I/B/E/S (Institutional Brokers Estimate System) provides financial 
analysts’ forecasts.  The International Summary/History tapes provide consensus 
forecasts and summary statistics on forecasts of non-U.S. firms’ earnings per share on a 
continuing operations basis (having eliminated the effects of discontinued operations, 
extraordinary items, and other non-recurring or unusual events).  The International 
Details tapes provide information on the individual analysts and their forecasts of the 
same group of firms.  Consistent with Brown and Higgins (2002), the standard deviation 
of the aggregate forecasts in the month before the actual earnings announcement is 
extracted from the Summary/History tapes.  This metric is then deflated by both the mean 
and median forecast from that same month to form two sets of alternative coefficient of 
variation (CV, hereafter) measures for dispersion.  Both the mean and median forecasts 
are used as deflators because these two numbers are quite different (indicating skewness 
in the forecasts) across many of the consensus estimates. 
     Hope (2003) defines forecast dispersion as the standard deviation of analysts’ 
forecasts scaled by stock price.  Duru and Reeb (2002) and Lang and Lundholm (1996) 
are among others who have measured forecast dispersion as the standard deviation of 
analysts’ earnings forecasts, deflated by the stock price at the forecast date.  However, 
standard deviation is sensitive to the size of the forecasted earnings and a measure of 
dispersion scaled by price is sensitive to stock price levels.  The use of standard deviation 
scaled by either the mean or median forecast is also commonly used in the literature (e.g., 
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Ajinkya et al., 1991; Comiskey et al., 1987; Elliott and Philbrick, 1990; Ziebart, 1990; 
Imhoff and Lobo, 1992; Healy et al., 1996; Das and Saudagaran, 1998).  Consequently, it 
seems the use of CV (and the mean or median forecast) is the most appropriate measure 
of dispersion, thus information asymmetry, in this context. 
     A number of authors find that forecast accuracy improves as the actual earnings 
announcement draws near (e.g., Brown, 1991, Das and Saudagaran, 1998; Capstaff et al., 
2001; Richardson et al., 2001).  Since forecast accuracy and forecast dispersion are 
presumably related, a second measure of dispersion is taken by using the forecasts six 
months prior to the actual earnings announcement.  The standard deviation of this second 
set of forecasts is again used to form two more CV measures.  For reasons discussed in 
Chapter IV, this second measure of dispersion is used for the primary testing, with the 
previously discussed measure serving as a sensitivity analysis.  Finally, the I/B/E/S 
Summary/History tapes also provide the number of analysts supplying forecasts for that 
particular fiscal time period (a year, in this case), which then becomes the measure used 
for the number of analysts following a particular firm.    
     In summary, the following information is collected from the I/B/E/S Summary tapes: 
1) the last consensus estimate of earnings prior to the actual earnings announcement 
2) a consensus estimate of earnings six months prior to the earnings announcement 
3) the mean and median for each of the consensus estimates above 
4) the standard deviation for each of the consensus estimates above 
5) the number of forecasts making up each of the consensus estimates above 
 
The standard deviation from each of the first two consensus numbers are then deflated by 
the mean and median estimates to form the four CV measures.  These CV measures are 
used to then gauge the dispersion of analysts’ forecasts for each firm.  Higher (lower) 
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levels of the CV indicate lower (higher) levels of agreement among analysts regarding a 





     The idiosyncratic risk associated with a particular stock is unobservable.  Since it is 
estimated relative to the systematic returns of a stock, idiosyncratic risk is also model 
dependent.  Idiosyncratic risk is defined in this study as the firm-specific variation in 
price (or returns) unexplained by the co-variation with a broad market benchmark.  Thus, 
idiosyncratic risk is the magnitude of a price change in a security resulting from 
circumstances that are unique to that particular firm, as opposed to circumstances that 
affect the overall market.   
 
Measuring Idiosyncratic Risk 
 
     This study uses the market model to disaggregate a firm’s returns into that portion that 
is the result of covariation with some market return benchmark and that portion that is the 
result of “idiosyncratic” variables having a unique effect on that specific firm.  There are 
alternative pricing models available (e.g., Fama and French [1993] and their use of book-
to-market as an additional “risk” factor), but given the controversy in the finance 
literature, the most straightforward pricing model is used.  Also, some of the factors 
included in the alternative pricing models serve as control variables in this study (e.g., 
country, firm size).  Thus, the Sharpe/Linter/Black market model provides that the 
relationship between the rate of return on a security (ri,t) and the market (rm,t) may be 
expressed as:  
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ri,t = αi + βirm,t + εi,t     Equation 4   
 
where  r,t  =  (Pi,t + Di,t)/Pi,t-1 
  rm,t =  Mt/Mt-1 
  αi   = E(ri,t) - βi E(rm,t)     (the normal unsystematic return for stock i)  
βi    = cov(ri,t, rm,t)/σ2(rm,t)  (the systematic risk of stock i) 
  εi,t  = a disturbance (random error) term that is assumed to be serially  
      independent and contemporaneously independent of rm,t 
and  Pi,t  = price of ith asset at time t 
  Di,t  = dividend paid on the ith asset during period t 
 Pi,t-1 = price of ith asset at t-1 adjusted for capital changes during t 
Mt = a general market index or portfolio at time t 
 
Datastream provides daily closing prices and cash dividends for most sample firms.  The 
daily returns for firm i are calculated by comparing the current day’s closing price to the 
previous day’s closing price.  A number of firms in these three markets experience 
sporadic trading, occasionally resulting in an unchanging stock price over a number of 
days.  The resulting effect is that beta takes on unreasonably low levels when firms have 
more than a few periods of unchanging prices.  Thus, each firm’s return is calculated by 
going back to the last day in which there is a price different from the current price, 
essentially assuming that there is no trading activity during the interim.  Hence, the 
general form to calculate returns below is applied only when a price change is detected: 
(Current Price + Dividend – Previous Price)  = Return for a specific number of days 
                        Previous Price 
 
The resulting return is then “annualized” by multiplying it by 365/t, where t is the 
number of days since the previous (different) price. The same series of calculations are 
performed on observations of a daily market index obtained from Reuters.  These are 
commonly known benchmarks for the three countries in this study (CAC40 for France, 
the SAX all share index for Sweden, and the SMI index for Switzerland).  The result is 
 83
that there is a vector of annualized firm returns and a vector of annualized index (or 
market) returns. 
     After the vector of firm returns is contemporaneously matched to a vector of index 
returns appropriate for that particular firm, the market model regression is performed on 
the individual observations over the period(s) of time corresponding to the firm’s fiscal 
period(s).  As in Richards (1999) the idiosyncratic risk for each firm in a specific period 
is then equivalent to the mean squared error (MSE): 
MSEit = knSSEit −/  
 
where  SSEit = sum of the squared errors from regressing firm i  returns on the index  
  returns during period t  
 n      = the number of observations   
 k      = degrees of freedom (2 in each case here)  
 
     To determine the sensitivity of the results to the market indices used, the same process 
above is also performed using an alternative index.  The Datastream International Total 
Market Index represents a value-weighted portfolio of all the stocks from a particular 
country found on the Datastream database.  However, since only monthly observations 
are available for this index, the “matching” process requires that the daily observations of 
prices between the monthly index observations are ignored.  The annualization of the 
firm’s returns and the market returns is accomplished in the same manner as was 
previously described.   
     This method to calculate idiosyncratic risk has two distinct advantages over the use of 
other models: 1) it requires less data, and 2) it does not constrain a firm to a pre-estimated 
CAPM beta, which a number of researchers suggest is time-varying across firms (e.g., 
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Fabozzi and Francis, 1978; Harvey, 1989; Bos and Newbold, 1984, Ferson and 




     This study controls for structural and trading process differences in these three 
markets by using a country dummy variable.  The base regression is for Switzerland, with 
an individual dummy variable added for both France and Sweden.  The coefficients on 
the country dummy variables indicate the effects of regressing French and Swedish firm 
on a particular dependent variable, relative to the effects of Swiss firms.43 
     There are a number of other variables that can potentially impact the behavior of the 
dependent variables.  To summarize the relevant findings (or suggested relationships) on 
these other variables and the author(s) of some of the pertinent studies: 
- firms with greater trading volume tend to have lower bid-ask spreads (McInish 
and Wood, 1992; Easley et al., 1996; Brockman and Chung, 1999b) 
 
- small firms tend to have greater adverse selection problems, thus greater bid-ask 
spreads (Chung et al., 1989; Daley et al., 1995) 
 
- firms with greater analyst following are associated with higher bid-ask spreads 
(Chung et al., 1995) 
 
- firms with greater trading volume tend to have less disperse forecasts (Comiskey 
et al., 1987; Ajinkya et al., 1991) 
 
- a large analyst following is associated with improved forecast accuracy, hence 
dispersion (Lys and Soo, 1995, Botosan, 1997; Hope, 2003) 
 
- greater earnings volatility is associated with greater forecast dispersion (Duru and 
Reeb, 2002). 
                                                 
42 A cursory glance at two alternative beta specifications for the sample firms (one from Global Vantage 
and one from I/B/E/S) suggests that beta is anything but constant.  The methodology used in this 
study to derive idiosyncratic risk does, however, assume that beta is constant over the study period. 




Efforts are made to examine and control for the potential effects of these variables.  A 
number of previous authors, in fact, have used analyst following to proxy or control for 
the amount of information available on a firm (Dowen, 1989; Bhardwaj and Brooks, 
1992; Lim, 2001; Leuz, 2003), while several others (e.g., Chung et al., 1995; Chang et 
al., 2000; Frost et al., 2002) suggest that the number of analysts following a firm 
represents an appropriate proxy for the extent of private information acquisition and 
communication.  Leuz (2003) also argues that since financial disclosure alternatives other 
than the financial report are associated with firm size, using firm size as a control variable 
should mitigate concerns that the financial report is usurped by other sources of 
information.  Consequently, this study controls for the level of non-financial report 
disclosures, and particularly the firm’s communications with financial analysts, by 
including both firm size and the number of analysts following a firm as control variables. 
     There may also be some interaction among the independent variables.  Though no 
formal hypotheses are provided regarding these relationships, the following ideas will be 
evaluated: 
- that a greater number of financial analysts will tend to follow companies with 
greater trading volume (Lys and Soo, 1995) 
 
- that larger firms are associated with greater analyst following (Bhushan, 1989a,b; 
Moyer et al., 1989; Dunn and Nathan, 2000; Duru and Reeb, 2002) 
 
- that firm size and the extent of disclosure (i.e., IAS compliance) are positively 
related (Meek et al., 1995; Raffournier, 1995; Wallace and Naser, 1995; 
Ashbaugh, 2001) 









Each of the three models takes the following general form: 
 
(Y)it = αi + β1(X1)it + β2(X2)it + β3(X3)it + β4(X4)it + β5(X5)it + β6(X6)it + β7(X7)it +  
 β8(X8)it +  β9(X1*X2)it + εit 
 
where the dependent variable (Y) takes the following forms: 
 
(Y1) BIDASKit  =   the annualized average daily quoted spreads (difference between the 
bid and ask prices divided by the midpoint of the bid and ask) for 
firm i at time period t 
(Y2) DISPit   = the coefficient of variation (standard deviation deflated by the median 
forecast) of the analysts’ EPS forecasts six months prior to the 
earnings announcement for firm i at time period t 
(Y3A) IDIO-Dit = the annualized average monthly idiosyncratic risk for firm i at time 
period t based on daily observations of price and Reuters market 
indices 
(Y3B) IDIO-Mit = the annualized average monthly idiosyncratic risk for firm i at time 
period t based on monthly observations of price and Datastream total 
market country index 
 
and where the independent variables (X1-X8) take the following forms: 
 
(X1) IASit        = the weighted percentage IAS compliance score for firm i during 
each of three (maximum) fiscal report periods t 
(X2) AUDITi      = dummy variable representing the auditor’s IAS compliance 
confirmation (‘1’ if present, ‘0’ otherwise) for firm i and period t 
(X3) FRANCEi   = dummy variable (‘1’ if firm domiciled in France, ‘0’ otherwise) for 
firm i 
(X4) SWEDENi    = dummy variable (‘1’ if firm domiciled in Sweden, ‘0’ otherwise) 
for firm i 
(X5) SIZECAPit    = market capitalization based on the number of common shares 
outstanding multiplied by the closing price for firm i and period t  
(X6) ANALYSTit = number of analysts for firm i and period t 
(X7) VOLUMEit   = average monthly trading volume in number of common shares for 
firm i during year t 
(X8) EPSVARit     = the absolute value of the percentage change in earnings per share 
(from the previous year’s earnings) for firm i and period t 
(X9) INTERAit = the interaction between IAS compliance and the auditor’s IAS 
compliance 
 
     An alternative measure of firm size is also provided.  Though market capitalization 
(SIZECAP above) is commonly used as the primary indicator of firm size, some of the 
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sample firms have relatively few employees, yet maintain significant market 
capitalizations.  By using a firm’s number of employees (SIZEEMP in the analyses) as an 
alternative (in sensitivity analyses) to market capitalization, it provides insight into 
whether the findings in the prior literature on firm size extend to this sample—and if they 
do, whether they are sensitive to how firm size is specified.  The market capitalization 
figures are from Global Vantage and are based on the fiscal year-end closing prices 
multiplied by the common shares outstanding.  The number of employees is also 
provided by Global Vantage.  This figure represents the number of full-time and part-
time employees at the parent and all consolidated subsidiaries.  If a specific firm is not 
covered on the I/B/E/S tapes during this study’s time period, this firm is assumed to have 
an analyst following of zero (five firms).   
     Duru and Reeb (2002) measure earnings volatility as the standard deviation of return 
on assets over the previous five-year period.  However, this measure is sensitive to asset 
size and the metric for earnings volatility should reflect the degree to which the 
forecasting task becomes more or less difficult.  Since it is actually earnings per share 
that the analysts are attempting to forecast, and this study is interested in the dispersion of 
those forecasts, earnings variability in this study is defined as the annual percentage 
change in earnings (from the prior year).   
     Though Global Vantage provides the bulk of the market capitalization and employee 
number figures, it does not have full coverage of the sample firms  Where figures are 
missing in Global Vantage, the firm’s annual report is used to calculate market 
capitalization and, when available, the number of employees.  Because all of the control 
variables except for analyst following can take on extremely large values, and because 
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these large values can distort results from regression analysis, natural logarithms are used 
in lieu of the raw numbers for these variables (i.e., SIZECAP, SIZEEMP, VOLUME, 
EPSVAR). 
     Descriptive statistics on each one of the dependent and independent variables are 
provided.  Pearson correlation coefficients are also presented in Chapter IV.  These 
coefficients provide evidence on the presence of multicollinearity in the models and also 
offer insight into some of the relationships among the independent variables discussed in 
prior literature, but primarily in the U.S. context.  The Pearson correlation coefficient (r) 
takes the following form. 









 Equation 5 
where x and y are the sample means respective averages.  The Spearman rank 
correlation coefficient (Rho) is the equivalent of the Pearson correlation coefficient, but is 
based on a comparison of the ranking of variables, rather than their means.  The 
Spearman comparison is appropriate when the variables are not distributed normally, 
there are several outliers greatly impacting the Pearson coefficient, or the relationship 
between the two variables is actually non-linear.  The Spearman Rho is used to 





     The multivariate model above are used to test each of the hypothesis below.  The 
coefficient of primary interest in each of these examinations is β1, the coefficient on the 
IAS compliance independent variable.  Because the expectation is that greater IAS 
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compliance reduces information asymmetry, relatively higher (lower) levels of IAS 
compliance are expected to be associated with relatively lower (higher) levels of each of 
the three information asymmetry proxies.  Hence, the primary hypothesis (in the null 
form) for each of the three full models is: 
 H0:  The IAS compliance variable (IAS) coefficient > 0. 
        versus the alternative: 
 HA:  The IAS compliance variable (IAS) coefficient < 0 
 
The alternative is couched as a one-tail test, since the expectation is that greater (lesser) 
IAS compliance results in lesser (greater) levels for each of the information asymmetry 
proxies.  There are also likely to be differential effects on the proxies due to the impact of 
the control variables. Because of the uncertainty associated with the behavior of these 
variables within this sample of firms and the fact that they are in fact control variables, no 
particular hypotheses are provided.  However, the impact of country and the other control 
variables (firm size, analyst following, trading volume, and earnings variability) on the 
dependent variables are examined in Chapter IV. 
 























    This chapter provides the descriptive statistics on firm characteristics and correlation 
statistics on the independent variables.  The results of the formal test of hypotheses 
follow these statistics. 
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations among Independent Variables 
 
     Table I below shows descriptive statistics on firm characteristics.  The primary 
variable of interest, IAS compliance, ranges from 70.25% to 95.31% compliance.  The 
firms from Switzerland have the highest average percentage IAS compliance score 
(85.3%), while the firms from Sweden have the lowest (75.8%) average.  Although these 
91 sample firms each claim compliance with IAS, only 48 (52.7%) of them have auditor 
confirmation of compliance.  Characteristics such as market capitalization, number of 
employees, trading volume, and earning per share variability span a wide range of values.  
The effects of these variables’ extreme observations are mitigated by using the natural 
logarithms of the raw data. 
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     Given the number of relatively small firms in the sample, it is not surprising that ten 
firms are not followed by at least three analysts.  These ten firms represent missing 
observations with respect to the forecast dispersion dependent variable.  However, five of 
these ten firms have either one or two analysts providing I/B/E/S estimates, and so are 
assigned a value of either ‘1’ or ‘2’ for the analyst following (ANALYST) control 
variable in the regressions for bid-ask spreads and idiosyncratic risk.  The five firms not 
listed on I/B/E/S are assumed to have a ‘0’ analyst following for these same regressions. 
     Table II below shows that there are a number of independent variables that are highly 
correlated. Using .5 correlation as a subjective benchmark, and while realizing that even 
some less significant correlations can cause collinearity problems, these pairs of variables 
Table I – Descriptive Statistics on Firm Characteristics 















of firms 91 89 87 81 89 85
Mean 83.47% $5,276,020 17,380 15.2381 3,225,464 130.70%
Median 84.31% $811,490 6,940 15 380,795 38.57%
Max. 95.31% $111,303,750 225,810 41 46,116,336 3039.39%
Min. 70.25% $15,770 35 3 88 0.17%
Std. Dev. 6.69% $17,105,241 32,681 7.89 7,606,056 296.24%







by Country  
 91 Firms  France - 18 France -  80.6  
 48 Confirmations Sweden - 9 Sweden - 75.8  
 43 Non-Confirmations Switzerland - 64 Switzer. - 85.3  
       
Number of firms is the count of firms having values for that variable for all reporting periods. 
Number of employees is the full-time and part-time employees at the parent and subsidiaries. 
Market Capitalization (in 000s of $U.S.) is the year-end closing price times common shares outstanding. 
The number of analysts is based on per-firm averages during the study period. 
Trading Volume is the raw number of shares traded on an average monthly basis during a year. 
EPS Volatility is measured as the percent change in EPS from the previous year. 
Auditor Confirmation is the number of firms for which an auditor verifies the use of IAS in the audit report. 
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appearing in the same model may create imprecise coefficient estimates in any ordinary 
least square (OLS) regressions44: 
 SIZECAP and VOLUME  (r = .66517) 
SIZECAP and ANALYST (r = .66447) 
 SIZEEMP and ANALYST (r = .63951) 
 SIZEEMP and VOLUME  (r = .56678) 
 
     Table II below also provides some insight into the firm characteristics that are 
associated with higher or lower levels of IAS compliance.  Consistent with Tower et al. 
(1999), the country designations provide ex ante indications regarding a firm’s IAS 
compliance.  However, the best indicator of the extent of IAS compliance appears to be 
the auditor’s confirmation of its use.  The Pearson Correlation matrix also indicates that, 
like Tower et al., firm size (whether measured as market capitalization or number of 
employees) has only a modest positive association with IAS compliance. Another 
variable that has a relatively strong correlation with both measures of firm size, analyst 
following, has a slightly stronger association with the extent of IAS compliance than do 
the size measures.  Trading volume and earnings per share variability seem to be 
unrelated with IAS compliance.  In summary, it appears that among the group of 
independent variables in this study, country and the auditor’s confirmation45 are the best 
indicators of the extent of a firm’s IAS compliance. 
     Table II also offers some evidence regarding relationships found in previous studies, 
primarily in the context of U.S. listed firms.  The Pearson correlation measures indicate 
that the larger firms are associated with a greater number of analysts (e.g., Bhushan, 
                                                 
44 In the presence of multicollinearity, OLS is still BLUE (best linear unbiased estimator) and all the 
beneficial properties of OLS (e.g., unbiased, consistent, efficient) remain.  The effect of 
multicollinearity that causes the most concern is the loss of precision in parameter estimates. 
45 The average IAS compliance score for those firms with auditors confirming IAS use is 85.93%, whereas 
the average IAS compliance score for the “non-confirming” group is 79.97%. 
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1989a,b; Moyer et al., 1989; Dunn and Nathan, 2000; Duru and Reeb, 2002), whether 
firm size is based on market capitalization (r = .66447) or number of employees (r = 
.63951).  The correlation between number of analysts and trading volume (r = .43299) 
suggests a positive association between analyst following and the number of common 
shares traded (Lys and Soo, 1995).  Meek et al. (1995), Raffournier, (1995), Wallace and 
Naser, (1995), and Ashbaugh (2001) are among those previously documenting a 
relationship between firm size and the extent of firm disclosure. There is less support in 
this study for a relationship between firm size and the extent of disclosure (as measured 
by IAS compliance).  The correlations, though indicative of a positive relationship, are 
relatively low between IAS compliance and size as market capitalization (r = .15483) and 
size as number of employees (r = .10767).   
     Ordinary least squares is run on each of the three dependent variable models.  Because 
White’s (1980) test indicates the presence of heteroscedastic errors in the regressions for 
the bid-ask spread and forecast dispersion, White’s covariance matrix is used in a GMM 


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































In Table II, IAS is the weighted percentage IAS compliance score during each of three 
(maximum) fiscal report periods. AUDIT is a binary variable representing the auditor’s IAS 
compliance confirmation (‘1’ if present). FRANCE is a binary variable (‘1’ if firm domiciled in 
France). SWEDEN is a binary variable (‘1’ if firm domiciled in Sweden). SIZECAP is the natural 
log of a firm’s market capitalization (closing market price times number of common shares 
outstanding).  SIZEEMP is the natural log of the number of full-time and part-time firm 
employees. ANALYST is the number of analysts providing estimates during a particular time 
period. VOLUME is the natural log of the average monthly trading volume (in common shares) 
over a 12-month period. EPSVAR is the natural log of the absolute value of the percentage 
change in earnings per share when comparing the current and most recent annual earnings per 




   The null hypothesis, as stated in Chapter III, is: 
 HO:  The IAS compliance variable (IAS) coefficient > 0 
        versus the alternative: 
 HA:  The IAS compliance variable (IAS) coefficient < 0 
  
    Hypothesis test results are discussed in the three sections below. 
IAS Compliance and Bid-Ask Spreads 
 
 
     Based on the literature discussed in earlier chapters, the following model is estimated 
to determine the relationship between IAS compliance and bid-ask spread: 
(BIDASK)it = αi + β1(IAS)it + β2(AUDIT)it + β3(FRANCE)it + β4(SWEDEN)it + 
  β5(SIZECAP)it + β6(ANALYST)it + β7(VOLUME)it + β8(EPSVAR)it + 
  β9(INTERA)it + εit 
  where: 
 
  (Y1) BIDASKit   =  the annualized average daily quoted spreads (difference between  the bid 
 and ask prices divided by the midpoint of the bid and ask) for firm i at 
 time period t 
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  (X1) IASit        = the weighted percentage IAS compliance score for firm i during each of 
three (maximum) fiscal report periods t, t+1, t+246 
  (X2) AUDITi      = dummy variable representing the auditor’s IAS compliance confirmation 
(‘1’ if present, ‘0’ otherwise) for firm i 
  (X3) FRANCEi   = dummy variable (‘1’ if firm domiciled in France, ‘0’ otherwise) for firm i 
  (X4) SWEDENi    = dummy variable (‘1’ if firm domiciled in Sweden, ‘0’ otherwise) for  
  firm i 
  (X5) SIZECAPit    = market capitalization based on the number of common shares 
outstanding multiplied by the closing price for firm i and period t  
  (X6) ANALYSTit = number of analysts for firm i and period t 
  (X7) VOLUMEit  = average monthly trading volume in number of common shares for 
firm i during year t 
  (X8) EPSVARit    = the absolute value of the percentage change in earnings per share 
(from the previous year’s earnings) for firm i and period t 
  (X9) INTERAit = the interaction between IAS compliance and the auditor’s IAS 
compliance 
 
     Table III shows that the model explains almost 40 percent of the variation in the bid-
ask spreads (adjusted R2 = 0.3969).  IAS compliance does not appear to affect bid-ask 
spread.  Thus, the null hypothesis is not rejected.  The AUDIT term and the interaction 
between IAS and AUDIT (INTERA) are also insignificant.  The highly significant (p < 
.01)47 VOLUME coefficient confirms the theoretical premise that firms with higher 
trading volume are apt to see lower spreads.  EPSVAR is positive and marginally 
significant (p < .10), indicating that greater variability in a firm’s earnings creates 
relatively larger bid-ask spreads.  All remaining control variables (FRANCE, SWEDEN, 
SIZECAP, ANALYST), appear to have little or no impact on the bid-ask spread for this 
sample of firms.  Finally, a test of all the coefficients on the independent variables allows 
us to reject the null that these coefficients are zero (Wald statistic = 355.16, p < .0001). 
     In sensitivity tests (not reported) using three alternative bid-ask model specifications 
(i.e., IAS compliance without audit conformation or interaction, AUDIT confirmation 
                                                 
46 Since a comparison of the unweighted and weighted versions of the compliance instrument indicates 
there is virtually no difference in the resulting firm compliance scores, only the weighted percentage 
compliance scores are used in the analyses. 
47 Throughout the model evaluation and hypothesis testing phase, the critical levels of significance are 
assumed to be p < .01 (highly significant), p < .05 (significant), and p < .10 (marginally significant). 
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without IAS or interaction, and interaction without IAS or AUDIT, plus all other control 
variables), the conclusions regarding the impact of trading volume and earnings 
variability remain unchanged.  The auditor confirmation is significantly negative in the 
AUDIT-only model and INTERA is marginally significant (negative) in the INTERA-
only model.  These latter results provide some mild evidence that auditor confirmation of 
IAS use reduces a firm’s bid-ask spread.  When number of employees (SIZEEMP) 
replaces market capitalization as the measure for size in the main model and the three 
alternative models described above, the results (not reported) remain virtually unchanged 
(auditor confirmation becomes marginally significant in the AUDIT-only model). 
 
GMM Parameter Estimates 
Parameter Estimate 
Approx 
Std Err t Value 
Approx 
Pr > |t| 
intercept -0.0035 0.02780 -0.13 0.8991 
(X1) IAS  0.0531 0.03950  1.34 0.1804 
(X2) AUDIT -0.0050 0.03200 -0.16 0.8749 
(X3) FRANCE -0.0012 0.00264 -0.46 0.6434 
(X4) SWEDEN  0.0046 0.00352  1.31 0.1924 
(X5) SIZECAP -0.0010 0.00162 -0.60 0.5506 
(X6) ANALYST  0.0001 0.00035  0.31 0.7543 
(X7) VOLUME -0.0038 0.00099 -3.92 0.0001 
(X8) EPSVAR  0.0013 0.00072  1.75 0.0827 
(X1*X2)INTERA -0.0050 0.03920 -0.13 0.8981 
 
 
Table III - IAS Compliance on BIDASK 
GMM Summary of (White Corrected) Residual Errors 
Equation DF Model 
DF 





BIDASK 10 180 0.0358 0.000199 0.0141 355.16 0.3969 
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     IAS is the weighted percentage IAS compliance score during each of three (maximum) fiscal 
report periods. AUDIT is a binary variable representing the auditor’s IAS compliance 
confirmation (‘1’ if present). FRANCE is a binary variable (‘1’ if firm domiciled in France). 
SWEDEN is a binary variable (‘1’ if firm domiciled in Sweden). SIZECAP is the natural log of a 
firm’s market capitalization (closing market price times number of common shares outstanding).  
ANALYST is the number of analysts providing estimates during a particular time period. 
VOLUME is the natural log of the average monthly trading volume (in common shares) over a 
12-month period. EPSVAR is the natural log of the absolute value of the percentage change in 
earnings per share when comparing the current and most recent annual earnings per share. 
INTERA is the interaction term resulting from the multiplication of IAS and AUDIT. 
 
IAS Compliance and Analyst Forecast Dispersion 
 
     Based on the prior literature, the following model is estimated to determine the 
relationship between IAS compliance and forecast dispersion: 
(DISP)it = αi + β1(IAS)it + β2(AUDIT)it + β3(FRANCE)it + β4(SWEDEN)it +  
  β5(SIZECAP)it + β6(ANALYST)it + β7(VOLUME)it + β8(EPSVAR)it + 
  β9(INTERA)it + εit 
  where: 
 
  (Y2) DISPit    = the coefficient of variation (standard deviation deflated by the median  
 forecast) of the analysts’ EPS forecasts six months prior48 to the earnings 
 announcement for firm i at time period t.  The raw dispersion measures 
 are winzorized by constraining the CV number to a maximum of 1.0.  
 Less than one percent of the raw CV numbers are affected by the 
 constraint.49 
  (X1) IASit         = the weighted percentage IAS compliance score for firm i during each of 
 three (maximum) fiscal report periods t 
  (X2) AUDITi      = dummy variable representing the auditor’s IAS compliance confirmation 
(‘1’ if present, ‘0’ otherwise) for firm i 
                                                 
48 When forecasting the earnings of the current year, it is likely that the analysts are depending on the 
previous year’s annual report to a much greater extent approximately six months after it becomes 
public than they are approximately twelve months after it is published.  This is due not only to the 
previous year’s report becoming less timely, but also because alternative information sources are 
likely to be more readily available as earnings for the current year are about to be announced. 
Consequently, the dispersion metric (CV) formed on consensus forecasts from six months prior to the 
earnings announcement (rather than the most current set of forecasts) is used in the analysis.  The 
eventual results do not materially differ when CV is based on the current consensus, nor when it is 
deflated by the mean forecast (rather than the median).  
49 When using the IB/E/S Summary History tapes to form the dispersion metric, there is the possibility that 
stale forecasts or errors are part of the consensus measures. The individual forecasts that make up the 
6-month prior forecasts relating to the 1998 fiscal period were examined to degree to which stale 
forecasts were affecting resulting standard deviation numbers.  Very few forecasts were more than six 
months old, and they did not materially impact that firms related standard deviation calculation 
(hence, the CV calculation).  
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  (X3) FRANCEi   = dummy variable (‘1’ if firm domiciled in France, ‘0’ otherwise) for firm i 
  (X4) SWEDENi    = dummy variable (‘1’ if firm domiciled in Sweden, ‘0’ otherwise) for  
  firm i 
  (X5) SIZECAPit    = market capitalization based on the number of common shares 
outstanding multiplied by the closing price for firm i and period t  
  (X6) ANALYSTit = number of analysts for firm i and period t 
  (X7) VOLUMEit   = average monthly trading volume in number of common shares for 
firm i during year t 
  (X8) EPSVARit     = the absolute value of the percentage change in earnings per share 
(from the previous year’s earnings) for firm i and period t 
  (X9) INTERAit = the interaction between IAS compliance and the auditor’s IAS 
compliance 
 
     The results in Table IV indicate that the independent variables only explain about 
seventeen percent (adjusted R2 = 0.1730) of the variation in forecast dispersion, and that 
IAS is not statistically significant in explaining the variation in forecast dispersion. Thus, 
the null hypothesis is not rejected.  Among control variables, large firms (for SIZECAP, 
p < .01), firms with lesser trading volume (p < .01), and firms with relatively less 
earnings variability (p < .05) seem to generate significantly less forecast dispersion.  
Also, the FRANCE variable is positive and marginally significant (p < .10), indicating 
that the French firms may see more dispersion in analyst forecasts than the Swiss firms 
(represented by the intercept term).  There is little indication that the auditor’s 
confirmation of IAS compliance, its interaction with IAS compliance, or the number of 
analysts following a firm has an impact on the dispersion of analysts’ forecasts.   
     The alternative (not reported) model specifications detailed earlier (i.e., IAS-only, 
AUDIT-only, and INTERA-only, each with all the other control variables present) result 
in the same basic conclusions regarding all variables except for the two country variables.  
FRANCE remains positive and becomes more significant (p < .05) in the IAS-only 
model, while SWEDEN becomes negative and marginally significant (p < .10) in the 
AUDIT-only and INTERA-only models.  When number of employees is used as the 
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measure of firm size (results not reported), it is significant in both the main forecast 
dispersion model and each of the three alternative models.  Also, trading volume is no 
longer significant when size is specified as number of firm employees. The coefficients 
for IAS, AUDIT, SWEDEN, ANALYST, and INTERA are insignificant at conventional 
levels.  Results also do not materially differ when forecast dispersion (per the coefficient 
of variation) is deflated by the mean rather than the median forecast.50  Finally, a test of 
the coefficients on the independent variables in the dispersion model above allows us to 
reject the null that these coefficients are equal to zero (Wald statistic = 225.6, p < .0001). 
Table IV - IAS Compliance on Forecast Dispersion 
GMM Summary of (White Corrected) Residual Errors 





DISP 10 183 7.9927 0.0437 0.2090 225.6 0.1730 
 
GMM Parameter Estimates 
Parameter Estimate 
Approx  
Std Err t Value 
Approx 
Pr > |t| 
intercept  0.1173 0.3606  0.33 0.7453 
(X1) IAS  0.2161 0.3992  0.54 0.5890 
(X2) AUDIT -0.1753 0.4030 -0.44 0.6640 
(X3) FRANCE  0.0974 0.0557  1.75 0.0822 
(X4) SWEDEN -0.0692 0.0671 -1.03 0.3036 
(X5) SIZECAP -0.0669 0.0206 -3.24 0.0014 
(X6) ANALYST  0.0054 0.0035  1.54 0.1249 
(X7) VOLUME  0.0271 0.0104  2.61 0.0097 
(X8) EPSVAR  0.0355 0.0158  2.25 0.0258 
(X1*X2)INTERA  0.1456 0.4777  0.30 0.7609 
     IAS is the weighted percentage IAS compliance score during each of three (maximum) fiscal 
report periods. AUDIT is a binary variable representing the auditor’s IAS compliance 
                                                 
50 Another sensitivity test limiting the sample of dispersion (CV) observations to those firms with a 
minimum of five forecasts produced similar results to the basic dispersion model here (based on a 
minimum of three forecasts), with the FRANCE variable becoming slightly more significant (p < .05). 
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confirmation (‘1’ if present). FRANCE is a binary variable (‘1’ if firm domiciled in France). 
SWEDEN is a binary variable (‘1’ if firm domiciled in Sweden). SIZECAP is the natural log of a 
firm’s market capitalization (closing market price times number of common shares outstanding).  
ANALYST is the number of analysts providing estimates during a particular time period. 
VOLUME is the natural log of the average monthly trading volume (in common shares) over a 
12-month period. EPSVAR is the natural log of the absolute value of the percentage change in 
earnings per share when comparing the current and most recent annual earnings per share. 
INTERA is the interaction term resulting from the multiplication of IAS and AUDIT. 
 
     A variation (not reported) of the full dispersion model above is also run with a 
redefined dependent variable.  Instead of using the consensus forecasts from six months 
prior to the earnings announcement, the consensus forecasts from the month prior to the 
earnings announcement is used.  The coefficient of variation (standard deviation deflated 
by the median forecast) is again used to measure the extent of dispersion.  The adjusted 
R2 of this model is lower (0.108) than the original specification of forecast dispersion, but 
the coefficients on size (market capitalization), trading volume, and earnings variability 
are still statistically significant (p < .05) with the same signs.  The coefficient on 
SWEDEN is marginally significant (p < .10) and negative, while the coefficient on 
FRANCE is insignificant at traditional rejection levels.  All other coefficients remain 
insignificant in explaining the variation in analyst forecast dispersion under the revised 
specification.51   
IAS Compliance and Idiosyncratic Risk 
 
 
     Two specifications of idiosyncratic risk are used in this study, one based on daily 
returns and the other based on monthly returns.  A number of the firms in the study are 
                                                 
51 Pearson correlation coefficients between 1) the dispersion values based on the last consensus and 2) the 
dispersion values from the consensus from six-months prior are very low (.0011), thus illustrating the 
importance of taking time horizon into consideration when using financial analyst forecasts in a study 
of this nature.  The CV measures also indicate that, contrary to past results in primarily U.S. literature 
(e.g., Brown, 1991; Das and Saudagaran, 1998; Capstaff et al., 2001; Richardson, 2001), the 
dispersion measure is actually less disperse when the forecasts from six months prior to the earnings 
announcement are used. 
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lightly traded, which potentially creates noise in the daily returns measures of 
idiosyncratic risk.  Thus, an alternative specification of idiosyncratic risk using monthly 
returns is also provided.  The first model specification is based on error terms from 
regressing the individual firms’ returns on the daily country Reuters indices (IDIO-D).  
The model used to test the association between IAS compliance and idiosyncratic risk 
using the first (daily) specification is: 
(IDIO-D)it = αi + β1(IAS)it + β2(AUDIT)it + β3(FRANCE)it + β4(SWEDEN)it + 
 β5(SIZECAP)it + β6(ANALYST)it + β7(VOLUME)it + β8(EPSVAR)it + 
 β9(INTERA)it + εit 
where: 
 
  (Y3) IDIO-Dit   = the annualized average monthly idiosyncratic risk for firm i at time 
 period t based on daily observations of price and Reuters market  indices 
  (X1) IASit        = the weighted percentage IAS compliance score for firm i during each of 
three (maximum) fiscal report periods t 
  (X2) AUDITi      = dummy variable representing the auditor’s IAS compliance confirmation 
(‘1’ if present, ‘0’ otherwise) for firm i 
  (X3) FRANCEi   = dummy variable (‘1’ if firm domiciled in France, ‘0’ otherwise) for firm i 
  (X4) SWEDENi    = dummy variable (‘1’ if firm domiciled in Sweden, ‘0’ otherwise) for  
  firm i 
  (X5) SIZECAPit    = market capitalization based on the number of common shares 
outstanding multiplied by the closing price for firm i and period t  
  (X6) ANALYSTit = number of analysts for firm i and period t 
  (X7) VOLUMEit   = average monthly trading volume in number of common shares for 
firm i during year t 
  (X8) EPSVARit     = the absolute value of the percentage change in earnings per share 
(from the previous year’s earnings) for firm i and period t 
  (X9) INTERAit = the interaction between IAS compliance and the auditor’s IAS 
compliance 
 
     Table V shows that the IAS compliance coefficient is again not statistically 
significant.  Therefore, the null hypothesis is not rejected.  However, both the AUDIT 
and INTERA terms are significant in this model, albeit with opposite effects.  The 
coefficient on FRANCE is highly significant and positive.  For this specification of 
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idiosyncratic risk, the French firms appear to have greater idiosyncratic risk than the 
Swiss firms, while the Swedish firms do not statistically differ from the Swiss firms.  
Firm size (SIZECAP, p < .05) and analyst following (ANALYST, p < .10) both seem to 
affect the level of firms’ idiosyncratic risk, with larger firms and firms followed by a 
greater number of analysts being associated with lower levels of idiosyncratic risk.  
Finally, a test of all the coefficients on the independent variables in the IDIO-D model 
above allows us to reject the null that these coefficients are equal to zero (Wald statistic = 
1792.7, p < .0001). 
            The alternative (not reported) model specifications (i.e., IAS-only, AUDIT-only, 
and INTERA-only, each with all the other control variables present) result in the same 
conclusions regarding the effects of FRANCE and firm size (SIZECAP).  However, the 
auditor confirmation (AUDIT) and interaction (INTERA) cease to be significant in any of 
the alternative models.  When number of employees is used as the measure of firm size 
(not reported), it is insignificant in both the main forecast dispersion model and each of 
the three alternative models.  The revised measure of firm size is insignificant, yet analyst 
following (ANALYST) becomes highly significant (and negative) and earnings 
variability (EPSVAR) becomes marginally (positive) significant.  The coefficients for 
IAS and INTERA are insignificant in all the alternative models with size based on 
number of employees, and are only marginally significant (p < .10) in the full model with 
the same size specification.   
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OLS Parameter Estimates 
Parameter Estimate 
Approx  
Std Err t Value 
Approx 
Pr > |t| 
intercept  10.08592 3.3247  3.03 0.0027 
(X1) IAS -2.3700 3.8258 -0.62 0.5363 
(X2) AUDIT -10.4187 4.7247 -2.21 0.0285 
(X3) FRANCE   1.6824 0.5406  3.11 0.0021 
(X4) SWEDEN   0.0203 0.7724  0.03 0.9791 
(X5) SIZECAP  -0.3057 0.1445 -2.12 0.0356 
(X6) ANALYST  -0.0490 0.0266 -1.84 0.0669 
(X7) VOLUME   0.0068 0.0831  0.08 0.9345 
(X8) EPSVAR   0.0890 0.1061  0.84 0.4024 
(X1*X2)INTERA 12.1925 5.5285  2.21 0.0285 
     IAS is the weighted percentage IAS compliance score during each of three (maximum) fiscal 
report periods. AUDIT is a binary variable representing the auditor’s IAS compliance 
confirmation (‘1’ if present). FRANCE is a binary variable (‘1’ if firm domiciled in France). 
SWEDEN is a binary variable (‘1’ if firm domiciled in Sweden). SIZECAP is the natural log of a 
firm’s market capitalization (closing market price times number of common shares outstanding).  
ANALYST is the number of analysts providing estimates during a particular time period. 
VOLUME is the natural log of the average monthly trading volume (in common shares) over a 
12-month period. EPSVAR is the natural log of the absolute value of the percentage change in 
earnings per share when comparing the current and most recent annual earnings per share. 
INTERA is the interaction term resulting from the multiplication of IAS and AUDIT. 
 
     The second measure of idiosyncratic risk is based on monthly Datastream indices 
(IDIO-M) regressed on individual firm’s monthly returns: 
(IDIO-M)it = αi + β1(IAS)it + β2(AUDIT)it + β3(FRANCE)it + β4(SWEDEN)it + 
 β5(SIZECAP)it + β6(ANALYST)it + β7(VOLUME)it + β8(EPSVAR)it + 
 β9(INTERA)it + εit 
where: 
 
Table V - IAS Compliance on Idiosyncratic Risk (Daily) 
OLS Summary of Residual Errors 
Equation DF Model 
DF 





IDIO-D 10 208 995.3 4.7851 2.1875 1792.7 0.1251 
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  (Y3) IDIO-Mit   = the annualized average monthly idiosyncratic risk for firm i at time 
 period t based on montly observations of price and Datastream market 
 indices 
  (X1) IASit        = the weighted percentage IAS compliance score for firm i during each of 
three (maximum) fiscal report periods t 
  (X2) AUDITi      = dummy variable representing the auditor’s IAS compliance confirmation 
(‘1’ if present, ‘0’ otherwise) for firm i 
  (X3) FRANCEi   = dummy variable (‘1’ if firm domiciled in France, ‘0’ otherwise) for firm i 
  (X4) SWEDENi    = dummy variable (‘1’ if firm domiciled in Sweden, ‘0’ otherwise) for  
  firm i 
  (X5) SIZECAPit    = market capitalization based on the number of common shares 
outstanding multiplied by the closing price for firm i and period t  
  (X6) ANALYSTit = number of analysts for firm i and period t 
  (X7) VOLUMEit   = average monthly trading volume in number of common shares for 
firm i during year t 
  (X8) EPSVARit     = the absolute value of the percentage change in earnings per share 
(from the previous year’s earnings) for firm i and period t 
  (X9) INTERAit = the interaction between IAS compliance and the auditor’s IAS 
compliance 
 
     The results in Table VI below have little in common with the model based on the 
previous specification of idiosyncratic risk.  The AUDIT and INTERA terms are no 
longer even marginally significant and neither of the country variables remain significant 
(while FRANCE is highly significant in the previous specification). Trading volume 
becomes marginally significant (and positive), whereas analyst following loses the 
marginal significance it has under the daily specification of idiosyncratic risk.  A test of 
all the coefficients on the independent variables in the IDIO-M model above allows us to 
reject the null that these coefficients are equal to zero (Wald statistic = 1792.7, p < 
.0001). When size is alternatively characterized as number of employees, the results (not 
reported) are very consistent with those from the other (daily) specification of 
idiosyncratic risk.  Analyst following (ANALYST, p < .05) and earnings variability 
(EPSVAR, p < .05) continue to have significant negative and positively effects, 
respectively, on idiosyncratic risk.  However, audit confirmation (AUDIT) and the 
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IAS*AUDIT interaction are no longer even marginally significant for this specification 
of size. 
Table VI - Compliance on Idiosyncratic Risk (Monthly) 
OLS Summary of Residual Errors 
Equation DF Model 
DF  





IDIO-M 10 208 42.840 0.2060 0.4538 1052.2 0.0407 
 
OLS Parameter Estimates 
Parameter Estimate 
Approx  
Std Err t Value 
Approx 
Pr > |t| 
intercept  0.7409 0.6898  1.07 0.2840 
(X1) IAS  0.6319 0.7937   0.80 0.4268 
(X2) AUDIT -0.1801 0.9802 -0.18 0.8544 
(X3) FRANCE  0.0528 0.1122  0.47 0.6380 
(X4) SWEDEN -0.1413 0.1602 -0.88 0.3788 
(X5) SIZECAP -0.0689 0.0300 -2.30 0.0226 
(X6) ANALYST -0.0021 0.0055 -0.38 0.7047 
(X7) VOLUME  0.0294 0.0172  1.71 0.0894 
(X8) EPSVAR  0.0271 0.0220  1.23 0.2199 
(X1*X2)INTERA  0.0774 1.1470  0.07 0.9463 
     IAS is the weighted percentage IAS compliance score during each of three (maximum) fiscal 
report periods. AUDIT is a binary variable representing the auditor’s IAS compliance 
confirmation (‘1’ if present). FRANCE is a binary variable (‘1’ if firm domiciled in France). 
SWEDEN is a binary variable (‘1’ if firm domiciled in Sweden). SIZECAP is the natural log of a 
firm’s market capitalization (closing market price times number of common shares outstanding).  
ANALYST is the number of analysts providing estimates during a particular time period. 
VOLUME is the natural log of the average monthly trading volume (in common shares) over a 
12-month period. EPSVAR is the natural log of the absolute value of the percentage change in 
earnings per share when comparing the current and most recent annual earnings per share. 







Summary of Results 
 
  The primary variable of interest, IAS compliance, does not appear to have a material 
impact on the three proxies for information asymmetry in this study.52  It is statistically 
insignificant at all conventional levels of rejection in the four basic models and in each 
one of the alternatively specified models.  Stated otherwise, this study is unable to 
document that IAS compliance benefits firms in the form of reduced information 
asymmetry. 
     It is somewhat surprising that the capital market participants apparently do not pay 
more attention to the level of compliance with IAS and the presumed improvement in 
firm transparency.  However, the mild evidence that the auditor’s confirmation—and 
possibly the interaction between the auditor’s confirmation and IAS compliance—
explains some of the variation in the bid-ask spread and daily idiosyncratic risk models 
suggests that the accountant and/or accounting information play some role in determining 
the level of these proxies. There does appear to be at least one variable unrelated to 
country that explains much of the variation in each of the proxies for information 
asymmetry.  Based on the results from the full models and ignoring country effects, a 
firm’s trading volume is important in its effect on the bid-ask spread, firm size and the 
variability of a firm’s earnings affects analysts’ forecast dispersion, and firm size impacts 
idiosyncratic risk levels.  These control variable results are not surprising.  When the 
trading volume of a firm’s stock is relatively large, dealers and traders are not as 
                                                 
52 A rank-order nonparametric test (Spearman R) is also applied to the observations of IAS compliance and 
each of the dependent variables.  The correlation between IAS compliance and the dependent 
variables is low even when based on ranks.  It should also be noted that several of the assumptions 
inherent in the proper application of Spearman’s coefficient are violated (e.g., more than 30 
observations and the data points within each dataset are not independent of one another. 
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concerned about illiquidity and the potential of finding themselves holding a stock with 
few potential buyers.  With respect to forecast dispersion, analysts should naturally have 
a more difficult time (as measured by both low forecast accuracy and high forecast 
dispersion) predicting earnings when the earnings stream is highly variable, but they 
should have an easier time predicting large firms’ earnings (for which there is generally 
more available information).  Finally, it is well established in the empirical literature that 










































     The objective of this study is to determine whether the extent of IAS compliance has 
an impact on information asymmetry.  Information asymmetry proxies for information 
risk, which in turn impacts a firm’s cost of capital.  This paper adds to the international 
accounting literature by addressing the extent to which the quality of a firm’s reporting 
impacts information asymmetry proxies in a non-U.S. environment.  It also provides 
insight into what variables may be associated with changes in the information asymmetry 
proxies.  A firm is motivated to reduce information asymmetry to reduce its cost of 
capital.  Overall, this study finds no evidence that the extent of IAS compliance has an 
effect on information asymmetry.  If the bid-ask spread, analyst forecast dispersion, and 
idiosyncratic risk are adequate proxies for information asymmetry, the results of this 
study imply that the extent of IAS compliance is unrelated to information asymmetry and, 
consequently, also unrelated to the information risk component of a firm’s cost of capital.  
One possible reason for the lack of association between IAS compliance and the three 
proxies for information asymmetry is that the information available in the annual report is 
usurped by other means of communication between the firm and capital market 
participants.  Though IAS compliance does not appear to be an important explanatory 
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variable for the three proxies, there is mild evidence that the auditor’s confirmation of 
IAS use and the interaction between the auditor’s confirmation and IAS compliance do 
impact two of the three proxies for information asymmetry, bid-ask spreads and 
idiosyncratic risk. 
     While it was not the primary objective of this study, the statistical models also show 
that variables unrelated to compliance with IAS or the auditor’s assessment are associated 
with firms’ information asymmetry proxies.  Trading volume appears to best explain the 
variation in firms’ bid-ask spreads, whereas firm size, trading volume, and the variability 
in firms’ earnings all serve to explain variation in forecast dispersion.  Alternative 
specifications of the measure of forecast dispersion do not materially change the overall 
results.  However, the conclusions stemming from the models involving idiosyncratic risk 
as the dependent variable are greatly dependent upon which model is used to generate the 
idiosyncratic risk.  Firm size (as measured by market capitalization), the auditor’s 
confirmation of IAS use, and the interaction between IAS compliance and the auditor’s 
confirmation of IAS each have a significant impact on idiosyncratic risk when it is 
measured using daily returns.  Conversely, when idiosyncratic risk is estimated using 
monthly returns, only firm size (and to a lesser extent, trading volume) impacts the 
variation in idiosyncratic risk.  These differing results show that the choice of a pricing 
model to derive firm-specific idiosyncratic risk can cause changes to the inferences 
though the same statistical model is applied in both cases.   
     An investigation of the factors associated with IAS compliance suggests that 
compliance seems to be related to a number of firm characteristics.  For this sample of 
firms, the country of domicile is a good indicator of the extent of compliance.  Firms 
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from Switzerland comply with IAS to a greater degree than firms from France and 
Sweden.  When an auditor confirms the use of IAS, it is also a strong indicator of 
relatively higher levels of IAS compliance for this sample of firms.  Relatively greater 
firm size, as measured by both market capitalization and number of employees, is mildly 
associated with greater levels of IAS compliance.  Analyst following, possibly because it 
is closely related to firm size, is also positively correlated with IAS compliance. 
     The conclusions in this study are only as reliable as the tests used to derive the results.  
The methods applied in this study are common in the literature and attempts have been 
made to control for all variables known to impact the variables of interest.  Because data 
availability does not allow for all potentially important variables to be included in this 
study, the results should be interpreted with caution.  However, the conclusion that the 
primary variable of interest, IAS compliance, does not appear to be associated with any 
of the three proxies for information asymmetry is unlikely to change with differing 




     It is difficult to believe that the quality of a firm’s financial reporting does not impact 
information asymmetry.  If the proxies used in this study are in fact adequate indicators 
of firm-level information asymmetry, it does not bode well for anyone wishing to justify 
compliance with rigorous financial accounting standards based on a firm reducing these 
proxies and, theoretically, its cost of capital.  However, two caveats should be noted.  
First, this study uses firms from a limited geographic region and fairly similar capital 
market environments, thus limiting generalizability of the results.  Second, there is 
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always the possibility that, in addition to several of the control variables, an omitted 
variable would assist in explaining the variation in bid-ask spreads, forecast dispersion, 
and idiosyncratic risk. 
     For instance, Tinic and West (1972), Benston and Hagerman (1974), Stoll (1978), 
Copeland and Galai (1983), and McInish and Wood (1992) all find that price volatility 
affects the bid-ask spread in U.S. markets.  Bhushan (1989a, b) and Moyer et al. (1989) 
also show that price volatility impacts the number of analysts following a firm.  Though 
one could presume that price volatility and earnings volatility measure a similar 
construct, the introduction of price volatility into at least the bid-ask model may have 
enhanced the ability of the model to explain the variation in bid-ask spreads.  Likewise, 
examining characteristics of the analyst providing the earnings forecasts may have 
provided a better explanation for variation in forecast dispersion.  The relative experience 
of an individual forecaster or his/her affiliations (i.e., buy-side versus investment banking 
firm) are just two characteristics that could plausibly cause consensus forecasts to have 
differing properties.  Finally, the relatively low R2 numbers in the idiosyncratic risk 
models also provide some indication that other omitted variables are possibly the cause of 
changes in idiosyncratic risk.  For example, industry or book-to-market factors (i.e., 
Fama and French, 1993) could enhance the ability of a pricing model to get at the “true” 




     Alternative modeling or testing techniques may provide additional insight into the 
relationships examined in this study.  Though IAS compliance and the auditor’s 
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confirmation of accounting standards use do not appear to greatly influence the 
information asymmetry proxies, more precise ways of measuring compliance and the 
auditor’s confirmation could serve to create more variability in these particular 
independent variables.  This would enhance the possibility that a relationship between 
these independent variables and the information asymmetry proxies is detected.  Non-
parametric tests, which do not assume the independent variables have a particular 
distribution, could also be applied to ranks of the data or on data that are transformed in 
some other manner.   
     Due to data availability, the entire bid-ask spread is used in this study (eventually 
resulting in the percentage spread metric).  The decomposition of the bid-ask spread and 
possibly an analysis of the size of individual trades (Easley et al., 1997) would enable a 
researcher to extract the theorized adverse selection component of the spread, thus 
providing a more precise proxy for information asymmetry.  Whether this will change 
conclusions about the impact of compliance with IAS (or even the auditor’s confirmation 
of IAS use) on information asymmetry is unclear and deserving of further study.  Finally, 
the low correlation between the analysts’ forecasts of differing time horizons in this 
study’s sample also indicates that the relationship between analysts’ accuracy and/or 
dispersion and the proximity to earnings announcement may require further investigation 
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     Pagano (1998) reports that the Paris Bourse is an electronic limit-order book exchange 
that anonymously and automatically matches buy and sell orders.53  Orders are prioritized 
for execution within the limit order book by price and time.  Since an electronic market 
of this nature has no market maker, the limit order traders provide liquidity to the market, 
and market order traders essentially use the market liquidity supplied by the limit order 
traders.54  The older system of dealers using open outcry in call auctions was replaced 
with an electronic order-driven CAC (Cotation Assistée en Continu) system in July 1986 
(Pagano, 1998)55.  Since 1986, the trading in nearly all securities has moved from the 
floor of the Paris Bourse onto the CAC system.  The CAC functions without either 
market-makers or specialists, although small- to medium-capitalized companies may 
contract with French brokerage houses so that the brokerage houses carry out certain 
market-making functions, such as posting bid-ask spreads.  Ranaldo (2002) states that 
                                                 
53 The FIBV reports that there are 1,097 firms listed in Paris, 425 on the Swiss Exchange, and 276 on the 
Stockholm Exchange.  Of these numbers, domestic firms represented 83.3%, 54.6%, and 93.3% of the 
total for each of the respective exchanges.  
54 A market order is a request to either buy or sell at the best price (highest price for a sell and lowest price 
for a buy) available in the market. Again, a limit order is a request to either buy or sell with the 
condition that a price ceiling (for a bid to buy) or a price floor (for an ask to sell) is specified. 
55 In addition to Pagano (1998), also see Jacquillat and Gresse (1998), Biais et al. (1995), and de Jong et al. 
(1995) for in-depth summaries of the operations of the Paris Bourse.  De Jong et al. probably provide 
the greatest detail regarding trading, while others provide more general observations on the Paris 
microstructure.  For instance, Jacquillat and Gresse note that it is difficult to compare volume of trade 
between Paris and either Stockholm or Zurich because the latter exchanges count trades made by their 
members on other markets, whereas Paris does not. 
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when the intermediaries (brokerage houses) are performing this role, they are referred to 
as “animateurs”.  Ranaldo reports that the Paris Bourse exchange facilitates orderly 
trading by engaging these intermediaries to maintain a maximum size for the bid-ask 
spread and a minimum depth in the limit order book.   
     Since orders are prioritized in the limit order book by price and time, the trading 
members submit orders indicating the order quantity, the price bid or asked, and the 
length of time the order is active (Aktas et al., 2002).  The most actively traded French 
stocks are traded on a monthly settlement basis in round lots (from 5 to 100 shares) as set 
by the Société des Bourses Françaises (SBF), which also acts as both a clearinghouse and 
a guarantor against default for traders.  De Jong et al. (1995) report that the Paris Bourse 
imposes a minimum tick size of 0.1 French francs for stock prices below 500 French 
francs and a tick size of 1 French franc for higher prices.  If multiple limit orders are 
issued at the same price, the CAC executes the trades based on strict time priority.56 
     The Paris Stock Exchange is also a market segmented on size and/or volume of trade.  
For instance, the “Nouveau Marche”, launched in 1996 by the Paris Stock Exchange, is 
designed for smaller firms in their attempts to acquire capital.  The requirements for 
listing on this segment of the Paris Bourse (a.k.a. Euronext Paris as of September 22, 
2000)57 are less rigorous than those of the other areas.   Euronext Paris is now divided 
into three markets (the Premier Marche, the Second Marche, and the Nouveau Marche), 
again, based on firm size and/or volume of trade. 
                                                 
56 Gajewski and Gresse (2003) offer a more recent description of the Paris Bourse microstructure. They 
report that in 1999, the CAC system was technologically improved and renamed as the NSC 
(Nouveau Système de Cotation). Gajewski and Gresse also review the literature exploring how 
trading costs differ between quote- and order-driven markets in various locations, including the U.S. 
57 Euronext is the consolidation of the Paris Bourse, the Amsterdam Exchange, and the Brussels Exchange. 
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     While claiming that the CAC system is extremely transparent, Pagano (1998) does 
note the existence of “hidden orders” on the Paris Bourse’s CAC system.  These are 
special limit orders which have both a disclosed and an undisclosed component.  The 
disclosed portion is observable as part of the limit order book, while the undisclosed 
portion is used to fill incoming orders after the disclosed portion is exhausted.  De Jong et 
al. (1996) find that although bid-ask spreads were similar for the CAC transactions and 
“cross” transactions (trades outside the CAC system), the subsequent price impacts of the 
two types of trades differ, with the CAC trades having a greater impact on future prices.  
Thus, the authors posit that the off-exchange trading is not anonymous and asymmetric 
information (adverse selection) is likely more of a concern for the CAC system.  De Jong 
et al. surmise that the lack of anonymity might explain why the CAC system seems to see 
a greater number of small transactions, with large trades occurring on either the London 
SEAQ International system or off-exchange in Paris. 
     De Jong et al. (1995) also compare the cost of trading French shares on two 
exchanges, the Paris Bourse and London’s SEAQ International.  Using effective and 
quoted bid-ask spreads to measure transaction costs, they find that for small transactions 
the Paris Bourse has lower costs.  The authors also note that in both markets the cost of 
trading decreases as the trade size gets larger, thus differing with each of two otherwise 
competing market microstructure theories (adverse selection and inventory control), 
which predict that as trade sizes increase, bid-ask spreads should also grow larger.  In a 
follow-up study, De Jong et al. (1996) point out that although French firms are often 
cross-listed on other exchanges (particularly the London SEAQ International), analyzing 
London transactions to ascertain bid-ask spreads is unreasonable.  According to De Jong 
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et al., transactions in London are often negotiated by telephone and are not made public.  
They report that only the market makers’ quotes are publicly observable, but that these 
quotes are not indicative of the actual transaction prices. 
     In what is apparently the only study of bid-ask components using Paris data, Declerck 
(2000) uses the Huang and Stoll (1997) decomposition model and trades in the CAC 40 
shares58 during the first six months of 1998 to assess the relative size of the spread 
components.  Declerck finds that the actual traded spread is only 85% of the posted 
spread, and that the order processing component makes up a comparatively large portion 
(82%) of the traded spread relative to the adverse selection component (10.12%) and the 
inventory component (8.34%).  The author also notes that the traded spread contains a 
relatively larger adverse selection component at both the beginning and the end of the 
trading day. 
     Finally, market depth appears to be a factor in the makeup of the limit order book.  For 
instance, Biais et al. (1995) also use Paris Bourse data to show that traders submit a 
greater number of market orders when the limit order book is relatively full, and a greater 
number of limit orders when the order book is relatively empty.  However, Biais et al. did 
not explore how these behavioral characteristics of traders on the Paris Bourse might be 




     Hollifield et al. (2001) and Sandås (2001), among others, detail the structure of the 
Stockholm Stock Exchange (SSE).  Hollifield et al. report that Stockholm completed the 
                                                 
58 The CAC 40 is an index that is essentially equivalent to the DOW 30 in the U.S.  Declerck (2000) lists 
the 40 firms that make up the index in Table 1. 
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introduction of a computerized limit order book in June 1990.  Continuous trading runs 
from 10 A.M. until 2:30 P.M. on the SSE, with the opening price determined by a call 
auction.  There are no floor traders, market makers, or specialists with trading privileges.  
All listed SSE stocks trade through a computer-based system called the Stockholm 
Automated Exchange (SAX hereafter).  Hollifield et al. claim that the SAX is very 
similar to other electronic limit order markets, including the Paris Bourse.  The SAX limit 
order book (LOB) provides traders fully automated execution of orders.  Incoming 
market orders (which would normally be executed immediately) are matched with 
existing limit orders (execution is condition on price) that are categorized first by price 
and then by time of submission.  If an incoming limit order cannot be matched to form an 
immediate trade, it is added to the existing order book.  The authors posit that when the 
market orders are matched with a previously submitted limit order, the market order is 
typically submitted by a trader who has better information than the limit order trader.  
Thus, Hollifield et al. theorize that traders submitting limit orders may be exposed to 
adverse selection (which these authors refer to as the “winner’s curse”).  Sandås (2001) 
adds to the Hollifield et al. description of the Stockholm Exchange by claiming that the 
SAX, like the Paris Bourse, is indeed a pure limit order book, with the member firms 
acting as “broker-dealers”.  He also claims that the Swedish market is quite transparent, 
with the limit order book information (i.e., five best bid and ask quotes with the 
corresponding quantities and the identities of the broker-dealers submitting the orders) 
being continuously transmitted to the offices of exchange members. 
    Niemeyer and Sandås (1993) provide further details on the characteristics of the 
Stockholm Exchange.  The authors contrast the Swedish exchange with the NYSE, where 
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a specialist handles a non-public limit order book that takes care of only a portion of the 
total trades.  To further distinguish between the two limit order books, the authors refer to 
the SAX version (taking care of most if not all trading and publicly viewable) as a 
“consolidated” open limit order book (COLOB).  Niemeyer and Sandås state that all 
Stockholm Exchange members (including some that also function as brokerage houses) 
may enter orders directly into the SAX system.  Though the brokerage firms can act as 
both dealers and brokers in the market, there are, again, no designated market makers as 
there are on SEAQ-I or the NYSE.  Niemeyer and Sandås claim that this “dual-capacity 
trading” may result in the problem of “front-running,” in which broker/dealers trade on 
their own account before executing a customer order.  However, as Niemeyer and Sandås 
point out, this danger is present in all markets in which the dealer and broker functions 
are integrated.  
     Niemeyer and Sandås (1993) also report that during 1992, trading on the SSE was 
highly concentrated in relatively few companies.  They find that 82 percent of the market 
value and 84 percent of the volume to be with the 20 most actively traded companies.  
Ownership is also concentrated, with the 10 largest shareholders holding 32 percent of 
market capitalization and the 50 largest shareholders accounting for 57 percent.59  While 
studying some of these most actively traded Swedish stocks, Niemeyer and Sandås 
(1993) found that only about half of the total trading volume in their sample firms was 
executed within the electronic SAX system.  The remainder of the volume was 
accomplished through either off-the-exchange trading (during both normal trading hours 
and after) and foreign markets (primarily SEAQ-International).   
                                                 
59 Graflund (2002) does, however, point out that nearly eight of ten Swedes have invested in the Swedish 
stock market. 
 134
     Unlike the results of many studies of other markets, Niemeyer and Sandås (1993) find 
no evidence of a U-shaped price volatility measure within the Swedish trading day.  The 
authors indicate volatility is higher is the first 15 minutes of the trading day, but quickly 
settles to a fairly constant level throughout the rest of the day.  The authors also find a 
similar L-shaped pattern when studying the behavior of the bid-ask spread.  After an 
early day spike in the magnitude and the volatility of the spread, it tends to level out by 
mid-day and does not spike near the close (again, differing from the U-shaped results for 
the bid-ask spread from other markets (e.g., Abhyankar et al.., 1997 [London], McInish 
and Wood, 1990 [Toronto], 1992 [New York], Chung et al., 1999 [New York], and 
Hamao and Hasbrouck, 1995 [Tokyo]).  Niemeyer and Sandås (1993) also advise that the 
bid-ask spread found in the Swedish market appears to be larger than other markets (e.g., 
London, Paris, NYSE, AMEX).  The authors discover that the average intraday spread 
for OMX stocks60 ranges from 0.78 percent of the bid-ask quote midpoint to 1.6 percent 
of the midpoint.  Comparatively, Pagano and Röell (1990) find that the spread in Paris 
ranges from 0.52 percent to 0.67 percent for sixteen French firms that are also listed on 
the SEAQ-I. 
     Angel (1997) determines, in contrast to Niemeyer and Sandås (1993), that the Swedish 
Exchange (per January, 1994) has one of the lowest transaction costs as measured by the 
relationship between each firm’s median bid-ask spread and the median tick size (with 
Swiss and French numbers being only marginally higher).  Angel also points out that the 
                                                 
60 The OMX index from the Swedish market is a value weighted index based on the 30 most active stocks 
at the SSE. Niemeyer and Sandås (1993) warn that the OMX occasionally includes more than one 
class of stock from the same company. The authors also report that it is common for Swedish 
companies to have multiple classes of stocks (“dual-class” stocks) based on whether or not the stock 
contained restrictions on foreign ownership (a rule that was revised Jan. 1993 to allow foreign 
ownership of all stocks) and whether the share of stock has full voting power. 
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tick size, as part of the design of a market, can have a big impact on what values the bid-
ask spread takes. 61  For instance, if a tick size on a particular market is in eights, it is 
unclear how the bid-ask spread may differ if it were allowed to take on finer values (as it 
would in a “decimalized” market).  Niemeyer and Sandås (1993) report that relatively 
large tick sizes in Sweden imply that the bid-ask spread is comparatively large, creating a 
negative effect on liquidity.  Niemeyer and Sandås also point out that, like the Paris 
Bourse, the Swedish market has different tick sizes based on the price of a stock.62  
During the Hollifield et al. (2001) sample period (December 1991 to March 1992), the 
tick size on the SAX was ½ SKr (kronor) when prices were below 100 kronor and 1 SKr 
when prices were above 100 SKr.63  Order sizes were also required to be an integer 
multiple of a round lot, typically 100 shares.   
     Finally, Niemeyer and Sandås (1993) note that trades greater than 500 trading units 
(which can be from 25,000 to 500,000 shares depending on the price of the share) often 
occur outside the bid-ask spread.  Niemeyer and Sandås claim that the Paris Bourse, 
conversely, requires a large block trade to be included in the CAC electronic system and 
that all limit orders with better prices are executed prior to the block trade.  In Stockholm, 
the trading parties are also under no obligation to clear the limit orders with better prices 
before executing large block trades. 
 
                                                 
61 Angel (1997) analyzes 22 of the world’s largest equity markets, including the U.S. and all three countries 
in this study’s sample.  Angel also discusses, as do Niemeyer and Sandås (1993), the impact of tick 
size on the bid-ask spread in various markets. 
62 Niemeyer and Sandås (1993) present the tick sizes for the SSE, the NYSE, and the Paris Bourse in Table 
4 (p. 10).  Their numbers concur with the Hollifield et al. (2001) numbers, but also include further 
details regarding the tick prices of shares traded at prices below 10 SKr., which become progressively 
smaller as the share prices get smaller. 
63 Hollifield et al. (2001) report that during their sample period, $1 was worth approximately 6.25 SKr. 
 136
SWITZERLAND 
    
     Demarchi and Foucault (1998) state that in 1995, three exchanges (Basel, Geneva, and 
Zurich) merged to form the Swiss Stock Exchange (SWX, hereafter).64  Like the two 
markets previously discussed, the SWX is an electronic limit order market which matches 
all orders in one computerized “book” (aside from a special procedure on the SWX that 
takes cares of odd lots).  Demarchi and Foucault mention that—as is the case with the 
NSC (the technologically revised CAC system) at the Paris Bourse—a very large 
percentage of all trades take place within the SWX trading system.  Ranaldo (2002) 
affirms that the SWX is a pure order-driven market, noting that the SWX also does not 
use market makers to provide supporting liquidity.  The traders on the SWX provide 
liquidity in the same manner they do on the NSC and the SSE—by supplying the order 
book with limit orders.  Ranaldo reports that the SWX and the Paris Bourse function in a 
very similar manner.  Though, as discussed earlier, Ranaldo also explains that the 
brokerage houses on the Paris Bourse help supply liquidity to some small- and medium-
sized firms by posting spreads and providing depth, a situation not found on the SWX.   
     Using intraday trading data, Ranaldo (2002) finds that the order processing cost 
component of the bid-ask spread is the largest of the three spread components on the 
SWX.  However, Ranaldo points out that the adverse selection and order persistence 
components are statistically significant as well.  He additionally finds that adverse 
selection and order processing costs both increase for less liquid stocks (those stocks with 
relatively less trading volume in terms of Swiss Francs and number of shares).  Finally, 
                                                 
64 For more information, Ranaldo (2004) provides an historical perspective of the development of the 
SWX.  
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Ranaldo discovers that trading costs for on the SWX are very comparable to those of the 
NYSE and the Paris Bourse. 
     The levels of bid and ask prices on a market can impact the measure of any variable in 
which these prices are used as “deflated” metrics (e.g., effective spread, relative spread).  
The stock prices on the SWX are of particular interest in this regard because, as Angel 
(1997) reports, the median price of a stock on the Swiss exchange per January 1994 is a 
lofty 888 Swiss francs ($605), as compared to France at 609 French francs ($103), and 
Sweden at 161 kronor ($20).  Thus, the same raw quoted spread, when deflated by price, 
would appear much smaller in the Swedish context than it would in Sweden.  The large 
stock price in Switzerland is due to restrictive par value rules, but Angel surmises that the 
relaxation of the rules in the mid-1990s will cause a great number of stock splits, thus 
decreasing Swiss prices.  In fact, Kunz and Majhensek (2002) claim that high Swiss 
prices and a 2001 law change that reduced the minimum par value of shares (from 10 to 
.01 Swiss francs) may have both served to motivate many firms to split their stock.  The 
authors report that the volume of stock splits have helped to bring down Swiss prices to 
the point that the January 2002 median price stood at 153 SWF.65 
     Given the prevalence of stock splits in at least the SWX, it may serve to discuss any 
research dealing with stock splits and the proxies for information asymmetry.  Desai et al. 
(1998) study the impact of stock splits on price volatility and the bid-ask spread for 
NASDAQ firms.  They find that volatility, the total bid-ask spread, and the adverse 
selection component of the spread all increase after stock splits.  However, those firms 
                                                 
65 Kunz and Majhensek (2002) report that the lowering of the par value requirement assisted in 64 Swiss 
companies carrying out 80 stock splits from January 1992 to December 2001.  Some of these firms 
(e.g., Phonak, Richemont, and Roche) each split their stocks by a ratio of up to 1:100.  Also, 40 of 
these stock splits were carried out in 2001 alone (as many as those in the nine previous years 
combined). 
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which experience a relatively larger increase in trading activity after splits also have a 
relatively smaller increase in the two spread measures.  The extent to which the Desai et 
al. findings can be generalized to France, Sweden, and Switzerland is unknown at 
present, but the prevalence of stock splits in, particularly, Switzerland, may help explain 
any increases in spread metrics for those firms splitting their stock during (or 

















APPENDIX 2 – IAS COMPLIANCE INSTRUMENT 
 
 
The firms’ financial statements were evaluated for IAS compliance based on the 
following Questions and this scoring method: 
 
Obviously compliant   3 
Unclear as to compliance  2 
Obviously not compliant  1 
 
The questions are in bold below, and are each preceded by the rationale for that particular 
question or set of questions being included in the IAS compliance instrument: 
 
IAS #2 requires disclosure of either 1) the cost of inventories recognized as expense 
during the period, or 2) the operating costs, classified by nature.  You would usually see 
the following under each of the two approaches: 
 
Function & COGS    Operating Costs by Nature 
 COGS      Raw Materials 
 Distribution expenses    Staff Costs 
 Selling expenses    Depreciation & Amortization exp. 
 Gen. and Adm. Expenses   other operating expenses 
 
1-B) Q:  Does the entity presents either COGS as a separate expense or it presents 
operating expenses classified by their nature? 
 
IAS #5 requires the disclosure of each component of stockholder’s equity (i.e., share 
capital, capital paid in excess of par value, revaluation surplus, reserves, and retained 
earnings) and the changes in these components during the year. 
 
2-B) Q:  Does the entity split up the components of stockholder’s equity? 
 
3-B) Q:  Does the entity provide the changes in the components of stockholder’s 
equity from beginning to end of the year? 
 
IAS #7 requires the presentation of a cash flow statement. 
 
4-A) Q:  Does the entity provide a statement summarizing the difference between 
cash inflows and cash outflows as part of the main financial statements? 
 
IAS #7 also requires that the cash flow statement be split into operating, investing, and 
financing sections.  Note that the cash flows can only be reported on a net basis in one or 
more of these sections if: 1) the cash flows reflect activities of an individual customer 
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rather the enterprise as a whole, or 2) these are cash receipts and payments for which 
there is quick turnover, amounts are large, and maturities are short. 
 
5-A) Q:  Does the Statement of Cash Flows provide a breakdown of the operating, 
investing, and financing activities? 
 
IAS #7 also requires that cash flows from the payment/receipt of interest, the 
payment/receipt of dividends, and the payment of taxes be reported. 
 
6-B) Q:  Does the Statement of Cash Flows disclose the payments and receipts for 
interest, the payments and receipts for dividends, and the payments for 
taxes? 
 
IAS #7 requires the cash and cash equivalents to be reported as reconciling amounts with 
the cash reported in the balance sheet. 
 
7-B) Q: Are Cash and Cash equivalents reported on the Statement of Cash Flows as 
a reconciliation to the cash reported in the Balance Sheet? 
 
IAS #6 and #7 specify that Cash equivalents are short-term, highly liquid interests which 
can be converted to known amounts of cash and which are exposed to only a small risk of 
changes in value.  The assets included in this section are held for the purpose of meeting 
short-term cash needs rather than for investment or other purposes.  Cairns (1999a) lists 
the type of assets that one would expect to see classified as Cash equivalents: short-term 
bank deposits (other than those demand deposits which are instead included in Cash), 
debt securities with a maturity of three months or less from the date of acquisition, and 
the few equity securities which are subject to insignificant risks of price changes. 
 
8-C) Q:  Does the entity properly include purchases and sales of equity investments 
in the Investing activities section of the Statement of Cash Flows, rather than 
erroneously classifying these instruments as Cash equivalents? 
 
IAS #7 also precludes a firm from deducting bank loans (which should be financing 
activity) and advances to/from parties in the cash and cash equivalents section of the 
Statement of Cash Flows. 
 
9-C) Q:  Are there no bank loans or advances deducted from cash or cash 
equivalents on the Statement of Cash Flows? 
 
IAS #8 (revised 1995) provides that only rarely would items be placed in the 
extraordinary items section of the income statement.  This requirement would preclude 
things that are under management’s control from being placed in the extraordinary item 
section (Cairns, 1999a).  For instance, these items do not belong in the extraordinary 
items section: effects of discontinued operations, write-downs of fixed assets, change in 
accounting principles, utilization of reserves, reorganization costs, foreign currency gains 
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and losses, etc.  IAS #8 also requires the disclosure of the nature and amount of each of 
these extraordinary items.   
 
10-B) Q: Does the entity presents only those items meeting the definition of an 
extraordinary item in the extraordinary items section of the income 
statement and is proper justification for their inclusion provided? 
 
IAS # 8 also provides that items such as goodwill amortization and profit sharing charges 
should be expenses that are deducted in determining profit from ordinary activities (not 
deducted after profit has been determined).   
 
11-A) Q: Does the entity amortize goodwill and other intangible assets in deriving 
profit from ordinary activities? 
 
IAS #9 requires that research costs be expensed in the period incurred. 
 
12-A) Q:  Are research costs expensed rather than capitalized? 
 
IAS #9 also requires that development costs are expensed unless: 1) product or process is 
clearly defined and costs attributable to the product or process can be separately 
identified and measured reliably, 2) the technical feasibility of the product or process can 
be demonstrated, 3) the entity intends to produce and market or use the product or 
process, 4) the usefulness of the product or process can be demonstrated, and 5) adequate 
resources exist to complete the project and market or use the product or process. 
 
13-B) Q:  Are the development costs that meet the necessary criteria then 
capitalized?   
 
IAS #10 requires that no contingent gains are reported unless realization of these gains is 
a near certainty. 
 
14-B) Q:  Are there no contingent gains on the balance sheet? 
 
IAS #14 requires the measurement of segment sales (distinguishable as external or 
between segment sales), segment profit, segment assets (either in monetary amounts or as 
a percentage of consolidated totals), and the basis of inter-segment pricing.   
 
15-A) Q:  Does the entity provide segment sales, distinguishing external customers 
from other segments (internal customers)? 
 
16-A) Q:  Does the entity provide segment profits? 
 
17-A) Q:  Does the entity provide segment assets? 
 
18-B) Q:  Does the entity disclose the basis for inter-segment pricing? 
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IAS #14 requires that the entity choose segments so that an adequate disaggregation of 
results is achieved.   
 
19-A) Q:  Does the entity adequately break down its operations into segments 
necessary to evaluate do product line and geographic analysis? 
 
IAS #14 also requires a description of both industry segments and geographic segments. 
 
20-A) Q:  Does the entity provide a description of its industry segments? 
 
21-A) Q:  Does the entity provide a description of its geographic segments? 
 
IAS #16 allows for fixed asset revaluations, but requires increases be taken to reserves 
and decreases be taken to the income statement (reversals of past increases are taken to 
the income statement and reversals of past decreases are taken to reserves). 
 
22-B) Q:  Does the entity take revaluation increases and reversals of past decreases 
to reserves, while taking revaluation decreases and reversals of past increases 
to the income statement? 
 
IAS #17 requires operating leases for a lessor to be classified as property, plant, and 
equipment, while financing leases should be classified as a receivable (and not as 
property, plant, and equipment). 
 
23-C) Q:  Does the entity as lessor properly classify its operating and financing 
leases? 
 
IAS #17 requires that leased assets and related liabilities for a lessee be separately 
disclosed on the Balance Sheet. 
 
24-B) Q:  Does the entity as lessee segregate leased assets and liabilities for leases 
from other assets and liabilities on the balance sheet? 
 
IAS #18 requires firms to disclosure the accounting policy for the recognition of revenue. 
 
25-A) Q:  Does the entity provide the basis for revenue recognition within the notes? 
 
IAS #18 also requires that each significant category of revenue be disclosed, including 
revenue from: 1) sale of goods, 2) providing services, and 3) interest, royalties, and 
dividends. 
 
26-A) Q:  Does the entity provide revenues segregated by source? 
 
IAS #19 requires firms to expense the current service cost (defined benefit) or current 
contributions (defined contribution) related to its pension plans. 
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27-A) Q: Does the entity report pension service cost as an expense in the income 
statement? 
 
IAS #19 also requires the firm disclose a description of the pension plan and provide a 
statement as to whether or not the plan is funded. 
 
28-A) Q:  Does the entity provide a description of its pension plan and state whether 
or not it is funded? 
 
IAS #21 and SIC (Standing Interpretations Committee) #19 require that exchange rate 
differences for foreign operations integral to the reporting entity be recognized through 
the income statement.  At the date of the transaction, initial recognition should use the 
transaction-date exchange rate.  At subsequent balance sheet dates: 1) monetary items 
should be reported using the closing rate, 2) nonmonetary items carried at historical cost 
should be reported using the exchange rate at the date of the transaction, and 3) 
nonmonetary items carried at fair value should use the exchanges rates in existence when 
the values were determined.   
 
29-A) Q:  Does the entity run gains and losses due to exchange rate differences 
through the income statement when the foreign operations are deemed to be 
integral to the reporting entity?   
 
IAS #21 requires that exchange rate differences for foreign operations of self-sustaining 
foreign entities be classified as a separate component of stockholder’s equity.  Assets and 
liabilities (both monetary and nonmonetary) are translated using closing rates.  Income 
statement items are translated at the rate in effect when the transaction occurred.  
 
30-A) Q:  Does the entity report gains and losses due to exchange rate differences as 
a separate component of equity (as a reconciliation of exchange differences) 
when the foreign operation is deemed to be a self-sustaining entity? 
 
IAS #22 requires the Pooling of Interests method be used when there is a uniting of 
interests and it requires the Purchase method be used for acquisitions. 
 
31-A) Q:  Does the entity use the Pooling of Interests method for any uniting of 
interests and use the Purchase method for acquisitions. 
 
IAS #22 (per 1993 version) requires that goodwill is capitalized and amortized over a 
period not to exceed five years using the straight-line method, unless a longer period (up 
to 20 years maximum) can be justified.  Any pre-1994 goodwill may have been written 
off directly to equity (under IAS #22-1983 version).   
 
32-A) Q:  Does the entity amortize positive (or negative) goodwill over a period not 
to exceed 20 years? 
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IAS #24 requires that related party relationships in which control exists should be 
disclosed whether or not there have been transactions between the related parties.  If there 
have been transactions between these related parties, the reporting entity should disclose 
1) the nature of the relationships, and 2) the types of transactions. 
 
33-C) Q:  Does the entity disclose relationships in which they have control, 
regardless of whether there are transactions or not? 
 
34-B) Q:  If there are transactions between related parties, has the reporting 
enterprise disclosed 1) the nature of the relationship, and 2) the types of 
transactions? 
 
IAS #25, which was eventually superseded by IAS #39 on financial instruments, required 
disclosures for the accounting policy for determination of the carrying amounts of 
investments. 
 
35-B) Q:  Doe the entity report its policy for determining the carrying amounts of 
investments? 
 
IAS #25 also required a disclosure for the accounting policy on the treatment of changes 
in market value of current investments carried at market value. 
 
36-B) Q:  Does the entity report its policy for treating changes in the market value 
for those current investments carried at market value? 
 
IAS #27 requires that a parent company should present consolidated financial statements.   
 
37-A) Q:  Does the entity present consolidated financial statements? 
 
IAS #27 requires minority interest to be shown separately from liabilities and the parent 
shareholder’s equity in the consolidated balance sheet. 
 
38-B) Q:  Does the entity present minority interest as a separate component from 
liabilities and the parent shareholder’s equity? 
 
IAS #27 requires that minority interest be shown separately in the consolidated income 
statement. 
 
39-B) Q:  Does the entity report minority interest as a separate component in the 
consolidated income statement? 
 
IAS #31 requires a number of disclosures when a firm has a joint venture in operations, 
assets, or entities.  However, these rules are specific to each of the three areas, and it is 
unlikely that a large number of the sample firms will have each of the three arrangements.  
Consequently, the general question becomes: 
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40-B) Q:  Does the entity provide information about joint operations, joint assets, or 
joint entities? 
 
IAS #32 (for periods beginning on or after January 1, 1996) requires a firm to, for each 
class of financial asset or liability, disclose information about the extent and nature of the 
instruments, including significant terms and conditions that may affect the amount, 
timing, and certainty of future cash flows. 
 
41-A) Q:  Does the entity present information about its financial assets and liabilities 
so that the amount, timing, and likelihood of future cash flows can be 
assessed? 
 
IAS #33, effective for fiscal periods beginning on or after January 1, 1998, requires a 
firm to provide a Basic earnings per share number (net income after extraordinary items – 
preference dividends) and Diluted earnings per share (Basis E.P.S. after adjusting for 
dividends deducted in arriving at gross profit, interest, and changes in income or expense 
from the conversion of potentially dilutive ordinary shares).   
 
42-A) Q:  Does the entity report both Basic and Diluted earnings per share figures? 
 
IAS #33 also requires the firm to provide the weighted average number of ordinary shares 
outstanding for both Basic and Diluted earnings per share. 
 
43-B) Q:  Does the entity disclose the weighted average number of ordinary shares 
used to calculate both Basic and Diluted earnings per share? 
 
The final three questions were added because they dealt with issues specifically noted in 
Cairns (1999a).  These questions were added after consulting the academics and 
practitioner regarding a proper weighting scheme.  Because these questions either 
do not apply to a large number of firms (#44) or noncompliance was uncommon 
(#45, 46), all three were assigned the moderate weighting factor (1.5). 
 




45-B)  Has the company postponed or insufficiently recognized certain standards 




46-B) Does the company avoided using LIFO to value inventories in one location, 














LEGEND FOR AUDIT REPORT/ACCOUNTING POLICY CLAIMS 
 
 
      A.      STANDARDS CLAIMED – ACCOUNTING POLICY STATEMENT 
       
IAS       1 
Domestic (or just says “GAAP”)   2 
Combination IAS and Domestic   3 
Other (e.g., US GAAP, EU Directives)  4 
Silent      5 
 
 
B.       STANDARDS CLAIMED – AUDIT REPORT 
 
IAS       1 
Domestic (or just says “GAAP”)   2 
Combination IAS and Domestic   3 
Other (e.g., US GAAP, EU Directives)  4 
Silent      5 
 
 
 B1.   EXTENT OF COMPLIANCE?  
  Full compliance   A 
     Exceptions summarized  B  














APPENDIX 4 – SAMPLE FIRMS
 
ABB AG  
AGA Group AB 
Agie Charmilles Holding  
Alusuisse-Lonza Holding Ltd. 
Ares-Serono SA 
Ascom Holding Ltd. 
Avesta  
BB Biotech AG 
BB MedTech 
BK Vision Ag 
Bossard Holding AG 
Calida Holding AG 
Canal+  
CAP Gemini S.A. 
Cementia Holding AG 
Christian Dalloz Group 
Clariant International, Ltd. 
Däetwyler Holding Inc. 
Danzas Holding 
DMC  
Eichhof Holding  
Ems-Chemie Holding AG 
Esec Holding AG 
Esselte AB 
Essilor International Compagnie 
Forbo Holding SA 
Fotolabo SA 
Gas Vision AG 
Georg Fischer AG 
Gurit-Heberlein AG 
Hermes International  
Holderbank Financiére Glarus LTD. 
Interroll Holding AG  
Intershop Holding Ltd. 
Jelmoli Holding Ltd. 
Julius Baer Holding Ltd. 
Keramik Holding AG  
Kuehne & Nagel International 
Kuoni Reisen Holding 
Lafarge S.A. 
Lagardere  
Lectra Systemes   
LVMH  





Nextrom Holding SA 
Norbert Dentressangle  
Novartis AG  
Oerlikon Büehrle Holding Ltd. 
OM Gruppen  
OZ Holding 
Pargesa Holding SA 
Perstorp AB 
Pharma Vision 2000 AG 
Phoenix Mecano AG 
Phonak Holding Ltd. 
Remy Cointreau  
Renault  
Richemont  
Rieter Holding AG 







SEZ Holding  
SGS Société Générale de Surveillance  
Siegfried Ltd. 
Sihl Zuercher Paperfabrik an der Sihl 
Sika Finanz AG  
Stora Kopparbergs Bergslags AB 
STRATEC Holding AG 
Süedelecktra Holding AG 
Sulzer Ltd. 
Sunstar Holding AG 





Unigestion Holding  
Unilabs SA 
Union Bank of Switzerland  
Valeo SA 
Von Roll AG 
WMH Walter Meier Holding 
Zellweger Luwa AG 
VITA 
Michael (Mike) D. Chatham, CPA 
 
Work Address                                Home Address 
G.W. Daverio School of Accountancy   1368 Beechnut Drive 
College of Business Administration     Akron, OH 44312 
The University of Akron                  (330) 645-9495 
Akron, OH  44325-4802      Email: mikeostate@aol.com  
Email: chatham@uakron.edu  
 
EDUCATION 
Bachelors Degree: Emporia State University (KS): B.S.B. in Accounting (1986) 
Master’s Degree: Emporia State University (KS): M.B.A. (1988) 
Completed the Requirements for the Ph.D. in Business Administration at Oklahoma State 
University in July, 2004  
 
PRIMARY RESEARCH INTEREST: Empirical analyses of variables that have the potential 
to affect firm valuation including disclosure, earnings management, litigation exposure, 
etc., both from a domestic (U.S.) and an international perspective. 
  
PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES 
     Program Coordinator: 
International Regional Program Coordinator for the Ohio Region of the American 
Association (2002-2003, 2003-2004) 
     Moderator:  
Ohio Region American Accounting Association Meeting 2003 – International Section 
Ohio Region American Accounting Association Meeting 2000 – International Section 
     Organizations: 
 Ohio Region American Accounting Association (2000, 2002, 2003) 
International Association for Accounting Education and Research (IAAER)  
(1998-2002) 
European Accounting Association (1997-2002) 
American Accounting Association – International Section (1995-2004) 
American Accounting Association – Financial Accounting and Reporting Section (1995-
2003) 




 Vernon K. Zimmerman Outstanding Paper - IAAER/CIERA 1998 Conference - Chicago 
   Oklahoma State University Outstanding Graduate Teaching Assistant for the College of  
Business Administration 1997-1998 
American Accounting Association Doctoral Consortium Fellow - Lake Tahoe, NV. 
(1997) 
 Conoco Inc. Graduate Fellowship (1996) 
 Southwest Accounting Doctoral Consortium Fellow - San Antonio, TX (1995) 
    Wilton T. Anderson Distinguished Graduate Fellowship (1995) 
